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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林嬋娟 | |
dc.contributor.author | Fu-Ciang Syu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 許富強 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T16:32:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2005-07-21 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2005-07-21 | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2005-07-11 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/38391 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 論文摘要
配合公司法於民國90年的增訂,上市、上櫃公司得以發行員工認股權證。由於員工認股權證本身所具備的誘因機制及激勵效果,對於投資人而言,員工認股權證應為一項獎勵人才的良好工具。且我國公司過去使用大量員工分紅入股政策獎勵未來績效,若公司能以員工認股權證取代員工分紅入股,以激勵員工未來表現,則對於投資人而言,應屬於正面的訊息。因此,本研究目的之一,為檢視當公司宣告發放員工認股權證時,投資人所抱持的看法。而員工認股權證剛引進我國,員工認股權證與公司特質關係,對於投資人而言,可提供決策參考之資訊。因此,本研究另一目的,即透過實證性研究,歸納發放員工認股權證公司所具備之特質。 本研究之假說1,即預期公司宣告發放員工認股權證資訊,對於投資人而言,具有資訊內涵。而假說2則預期公司發放員工認股權證比例,與公司成長機會、人力資源重要性、公司面臨現金壓迫、員工過去取得股票紅利比率以及股票股利支付率有顯著正相關。 檢視民國90年至93年之資料,結果顯示,就整體樣本而言,公司宣告發放員工認股權證,對於投資人而言,具有資訊內涵,符合假說1預期。若進一步區分上市及上櫃公司樣本,則:(1)高權益市值類上市及上櫃公司之員工認股權證訊息宣告,對於投資人有正面資訊內涵。(2)低權益市值類上市公司之員工認股權證訊息宣告,則具負面資訊內涵。 特質分析方面,就全部樣本而言,公司面臨的現金壓迫及員工過去取得股票紅利比例,對於公司發放員工認股權證比例,具有顯著解釋能力。而公司成長機會、人力資源重要性以及股票股利支付率則未達顯著水準。上市公司對於員工認股權證的發放,主要考量著重於公司未來的成長機會,而上櫃公司則較偏重於財務面的考量。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Abstract
With the amendments of Company Law in 2001, companies can grant employee stock options. In the past, Taiwanese companies were used to adopting employee stock bonus plans to motivate future performance. It is therefore conjectured that it could be good news if companies grant employee stock options instead of employee stock bonuses because less dilution effect may occur. The main purpose of this study is to examine how investors react to the announcement of employee stock option plans. Secondly, this paper attempts to understand the determinants of adoption of employee stock option plans. The hypothesis 1 of this study is to test if investors respond positively to announcement of employee stock options. The hypothesis 2 of this paper is to predict whether the magnitude of employee stock options is positively related to the opportunity of firms’ future growth, the importance of human capital, the extent of cash deficits faced by companies, the level of stock bonuses distributed, and payout ratio of stock dividends. Using the data from 2001 to 2003, the empirical results show that the announcement of companies granting employee stock options has information content, which supports the hypothesis 1. If we divide samples into TSE stocks and OTC stocks further, the results show that: (1)investors react positively to TSE stocks with higher market value and OTC stocks. (2)investors react negatively to TSE stocks with lower market value. With respect to the determinants of adoption of employee stock option plans, the empirical results reveal that the magnitude of employee stock options is significantly positively related to companies facing cash deficits, distributing employee stock bonuses in the past. But there is little evidence that the opportunity of firms’ future growth, the importance of human capital, and payout ratio of stock dividends can explain the magnitude of employee stock options. We also find that the main determinant of TSE companies granting employee stock options is the opportunity of firms’ future growth. Nevertheless, OTC companies are more concerned about financial conditions while making employee stock options decision. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T16:32:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-93-R92722025-1.pdf: 534362 bytes, checksum: 684d473ee56ee4b64c91df57e6590bae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 章節目錄
論文摘要 I 章節目錄 V 表目錄 VI 圖目錄 VIII 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 1 第二節 研究動機與目的 3 第三節 研究架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 8 第一節 員工認股權制度介紹及與員工分紅入股之比較 8 第二節 員工認股權制度宣告效果之文獻回顧 18 第三節 員工認股權制度與公司特質之文獻探討 25 第三章 研究假說與研究方法 32 第一節 研究假說 32 第二節 實證設計與模型建立 47 第三節 研究期間、資料來源與樣本選取 48 第四章 實證結果分析 53 第一節 平均異常報酬率及平均累積異常報酬率之分析 53 第二節 員工認股權證與公司特質之迴歸分析 72 第五章 研究結論與建議 83 第一節 研究結論 83 第二節 研究限制 85 第三節 研究建議 86 參考文獻 88 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 員工認股權證宣告效果及公司特質分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Information Content of Employee Stock Options and Determinants Analysis | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 93-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉啟群,薛敏正 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 員工認股權證,資訊內涵,現金壓迫, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | employee stock options,information content,cash deficits, | en |
dc.relation.page | 93 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2005-07-11 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
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