宏觀調控對大陸台資企業之銀行融資行為與策略的影響

Abstract

2004年4月29日，中共總理溫家寶在訪歐前夕接受路透社訪問時宣稱中國正式實施宏觀調控政策，震驚全球，全世界稱之為「溫氏效應」。為解決固定投資增長過快，部份行業(含鋼鐵、水泥、電解鋁)有過熱之虞的問題，中共採行政手段、市場手段雙管齊下之策略，透過金融信貸調控、土地管制措施、產業政策措施，希能達成平穩較快發展之戰略目標。 台商在中國較大規模之投資始於1987年我政府開放探親之後，1993年達到最高峰，依中共之統計，該年投資協議金額幾達百億美元，項目也創記錄達到10,948項。以我國上櫃市公司來說，依證交所及櫃買中心統計迄2004年第三季截止，上市公司有468家，上櫃公司有274家，合計742家，共匯出台幣3,992億元至大陸投資。隨著投入金額之增大，及因應全球供應鏈布局之擴充需求，向銀行融通資金之需求量愈來愈大。然碰到金融調控政策所導致的信貸緊縮，台商企業，無論是傳統產業或是高科技產業；也不管是中大型企業、或是中小型企業，或多或少皆受到一些波及。因此現階段台商的融資議題恐非僅是昔時資金調度的問題，而是未來生存與發展的嚴肅課題。 本研究藉由相關文獻之探討，加上對代表性台商及中外資銀行進行一系列的深度訪問，推導出在宏觀調控政策下，台商企業遭受影響及調整因應之五個假說。為了進一步驗證上述假說，本論文特進行一項較大規模的問卷調查，針對台商密集地的廣東、福建、浙江、上海、江蘇五地之台商進行隨機抽樣，共抽取2,000個樣本，經由各種管道之寄送，收回311份問卷，平均回收率為15.55%，其中有效問卷為302份，作為本研究分析之用。 經由相關之分析，本研究發現，台商之資金來源有61.8%來自台資銀行之DBU、OBU或香港分行，來自陸資銀行佔27.4%，而來自外資銀行者佔8.5%。五項假說也經由本次問卷調查，獲得適當地驗證。透過問卷分析資訊，也得知在宏觀調控之後，台商改變往來銀行之對象，第一優先為台資銀行OBU或香港分行(佔58.1%)、第二優先為外資銀行(佔19.4%)、第三優先才是四大國有銀行(也佔19.4%)。 最後本研究參酌台商銀行融資實務，參考文獻探訪及深度訪談所得，以及問卷調查之驗證結論，歸納出在宏觀調控之後，台商企業五項融資新策略，分別是： 一、 強化策略 二、 分散策略 三、 深化策略 四、 避險策略 五、 反融資策略 並根據上述研究所得，分別向中國金融當局及銀行界、台灣金融當局及台商企業本身提出相關的建議，作為其施政或營運之參考，以完成本研就之初衷。 關鍵詞：融資策略(Financial Strategy) 宏觀調控(Macro Adjustment)

To slow down the too hot investments of some industries, such as steel, cement, and electrolytic aluminum industries, the Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao announced the astonished “Macro Adjustment” in April 29 2004, when he was visited by Reuters’ reporter. By means of administrative control, market discipline, finance tightening, land control and industry policy, the government wanted to keep the economic growth at a moderate way. According to statistic data of Taiwan Stock Exchange & OTC Market, 742 listed companies have investments in China. The total amount is more than TWD 399.2 billion. The more money they put in China, the more finance they need. However, the finance tightening policy of China made the Taiwanese companies in China hard to meet their requirement. The finance problems prevailed in all kinds of company, no matter traditional company or high tech company. Sometimes, even the famous Taiwanese conglomerates were not satisfied with the finance service. Hence, the finance problems of Taiwanese companies in China are not only the old problem of fund transfer, but also the critical issue of future development. By means of reviewing the related literature, in-depth interviews with representative Taiwanese companies as well as local commercial banks and foreign banks in China, this study concludes five hypotheses that Taiwanese companies in China may face the finance problems and should adjust their strategy to overcome the “Macro Adjustment” effects. To testify the hypotheses, a large scale of questionnaire was applied to the Taiwanese companies gathered in major cities in China, including Kwandong, Fu-Jian, Zhe-Jiang, Shanghai and Jiang-Su. 2,000 samples, taken by random way, were sent by all kinds of channel, and 311 returned. The return ratio is 15.55%, and the effective samples are 302. This study reveals that 61.8% of finance resources for Taiwanese companies comes from DBU (domestic banking branch), OBU (offshore banking branch) or Hong Kong branch of Taiwanese banks, 27.4% from Chinese banks, and only 8.5% from foreign banks. The five hypotheses are well testified by the questionnaire. According to the questionnaire, Taiwanese companies changed their correspondent banks after the “Macro Adjustment”. The new first priority that they want to deal with the banks is the OBU or Hong Kong branch of Taiwanese banks. The second choice is foreign banks and the third is Chinese banks. Here concludes five strategies that Taiwanese companies can avoid the negative effect of “Macro Adjustment”. The strategies are, (a) Intensify Strategy, (b) Diversify Strategy, (c) Deepen Strategy, (d) Hedge Strategy and (e) IPO Strategy. Based on this study, here proposes several comments to Taiwanese companies, and the finance regulators of China and Taiwan for their reference.

Key Word: (a)Financial Strategy (b)Macro Adjustment