清朝與明鄭和戰互動策略兼論其對兩岸關係的啟示

Abstract

由於不完全王朝交替的緣故，清朝入關之後，便與擁護前朝正朔的勢力展開正統地位的爭奪戰，其中，以鄭成功家族為核心的抗清勢力退居台灣後，仍隔海與清朝對峙長達數十年，雙方歷經激烈交戰、勢力板塊消長以及堪稱頻繁的遣使和談。在此期間，清朝作為一個實力較強大的一方，其政策隨著該政權穩定其天下的程度逐漸擴大而走緩，後期清朝甚至允諾由明鄭所提出的以朝鮮例作為雙方未來和平共處的模式。明鄭雖然是實力相對弱小的一方，卻沒有屈從於大國的支配，反而積極以武力試圖重建屬於明朝的天下。 清鄭雙方並未如西方現實主義預期般，依照自身政權的實力強弱來決定對外策略的強硬與否，這是因為對身處中國環境系絡中的決策者而言，若要使該政權成為中國正統王朝，除了必須以武力奪天下外，也必須以懷柔的方式來安天下。因此，逐漸邁向安天下階段的清朝，政策自然趨緩；仍必須以武力奪天下的明鄭，政策必然強硬。 隔著台灣海峽對峙的清朝與明鄭，像極了現在也隔著台灣海峽的大陸與台灣，就連兩個時代雙方所提出的策略也有雷同之處。我們根據同為中國歷史發展過程中的清鄭互動策略的分析可知，大的一方政策將逐步趨緩，且大的一方曾在表明理解並肯定雙方分裂事實的基礎上，允諾以朝鮮例來作為雙方未來和平共處的模式。在兩岸分隔半個多世紀以來，中國大陸的對台政策的確由激進的武力犯台往較為和平的一國兩制移動，但在認知上否認雙方分裂的事實，而台灣的大陸政策與學界見解則十分多元，至今兩岸並未達成任何具體共識。本文認為，作為以中國正統政權自許的對岸政府，其對台政策將會如同清朝一樣繼續走緩，並可能提出類似羈縻的懷柔政策，這將可望突破現今兩岸談判場上的「一國兩制僵局」，另覓一個較為符合雙方期望的均衡點。

Because of the partial state succession, the Manchu conquerors had launched into a rivalry with the political forces that supported the Ming Dynasty as the rightful legitimate regime. Among the opposition forces, Ming-Cheng, the anti-Ching power ruled by Zheng Cheng-Gong family, retreated to Taiwan and confronted with the Ching emperors for decades. Both sides fought fierce battles and entered into frequent negotiations. Being the relatively powerful party, the Ching Dynasty’s policy toward Ming-Cheng eased when the Manchus gradually gained effective control over the Chinese mainland. Although Ming-Cheng’s strength was relatively weak, it actually did not submit to the mainland’s domination. Instead, they doubled their military efforts, attempting to restore the Ming Dynasty. Contrary to what many western realists would have anticipated, the Ching and the Ming-Cheng by no means based their foreign strategies solely on their power. This is because in the Chinese context, in order to establish effective and legitimate dynastic control over China, the regime must not only gain territorial control with military power, but also exercise that power to create faith and win the minds and hearts of the populace. Therefore, the Ching Dynasty would gradually soften its policy, while the Ming-Cheng in its effort to restore the dislodged Han Chinese dynasty, would inevitably sustain its hard-line military stance. Separated by the Taiwan Strait, the duality of the Ching Dynasty and the Ming-Cheng bear a striking resemblance to the present cross-strait relationship between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan); even the proposed strategies in these two historical settings are identical. According to the interactive strategic analysis of China’s historical process, as with the Ching and the Ming-Cheng, the bigger, stronger party tends to become more conciliatory as time goes by, demonstrate an understanding of the reality, and promise a peaceful coexistence pattern. Having been separated for more than half a century, mainland China’s Taiwan policy has shifted from hard-line military option toward the “one country, two systems” formula, but still denies recognition of a “split or de facto division”. Yet, Taiwan's mainland policy and academic circles’ opinions are extremely diverse. As of this moment, both sides of the Taiwan straits have achieved no substantial political consensus. This thesis argues that the mainland China government, which considers itself to be the sole legitimate Chinese regime, may in time soften its Taiwan policy, and perhaps propose a similar conciliatory position such as that of the Ching Dynasty, with the hope to break through current deadlock in cross-strait relationship, and seek a balanced position for both sides.