請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37695完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 莊正民 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Shan-Ju Chiang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 江珊如 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T15:39:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2011-08-16 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-08-16 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-08-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37695 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 中文摘要
由於服務業對國人的生活愈來愈重要，各種型態的服務也紛紛推陳出新，從服務業工作者的角度，惟有將服務需求與服務供給透過〝有效的銷售〞予以連結，服務業才能真正展現能力而達成營利目標。鑒於台灣社會快速邁向少子化、高齡化的人口結構，傳統上由親族鄰里協助處理的身後事宜，已漸漸須由專業的外人來提供往生服務。殯葬業者於民國83年將流行於美國、日本的生前契約引進國內，開始推動「往生服務交易預先規劃」的觀念，但直到殯葬管理條例於91年制定通過，生前契約相關法令自92年7月起陸續實施，政府為推動殯葬改革及促進社會、財政等問題的解決而在生前契約產業引發的政策性商機，終於成形。生前契約作為身後事提早安排的媒介，自有其價值，但國人普遍忌諱往生事宜也欠缺身後事處理的相關資訊，合法業者為了推展生前契約業務，預占未來的往生服務需求，勢必要與銷售團隊建立有效的合作關係才能竟其功。生前契約作為性質獨特的新興服務，合法業者是以何種治理結構與控制機制從事銷售團隊的建構交易，其原因與結果分別如何，對政府、民眾、業界以及其他新興服務業代表何等意義，為本研究希望探討的課題。 研究重心放在「階層治理」或「混合治理」，並探討「市場治理」及「關係治理」的應用可能性。控制機制依序從法、理、情三個面向討論，法的部分－契約�法律控制，理的部分－正式控制機制，情的部分－非正式控制機制，其中情的部分以信任為核心，分為對人的信任－與關係、合作經驗有關，以及對能力的信任－與夥伴選擇、聲譽有關。研究對象有四家合法業者，各自在殯葬產業發展的不同年代設立、投入生前契約業務的時間點不同。四家業者在重點銷售團隊的交易關係與治理結構各有特色，A公司是混合治理，B公司是市場治理加關係治理，C公司是階層治理，D公司則是混合治理加關係治理，各家業者的作法都隱隱透露著對於生前契約市場、甚至殯葬產業的經營理念與發展期待，然各家業者在其他銷售團隊的建構管理則較為相似，大多在市場治理的基礎上融合某種程度的關係治理。 從生前契約業者的實務經驗來看，新興服務業的銷售團隊建構，因為業者在發展初期多半沒有成功典範可供學習仿效，在治理結構的選擇與運用上，往往呈現嘗試－錯誤－修正的狀況而有〝各顯神通〞的多元景象，不過對於控制機制的選擇與運用，業者都同時融合法、理、情三個層面的手法，交錯採取正式機制及非正式機制來管理銷售團隊的建構交易。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | ABSTRACT
It is always essential for capable service providers to obtain and secure the opportunity for providing services. As predicted, the aging population in Taiwan is getting more and fewer children are being born in modern families. Following these trends, the consumption styles and the service needs are changing gradually. It is reasonably expected more and more emerging services will be introduced to the market. Although the funeral industry has long history and tradition in Taiwan, the handling methods are highly dependent on the connections and experiences among families and friends. Due to the moderination and aging population in Taiwan, the above connections and experiences are lost day by day. People who have the knowledge and experience to handle funeral matters are reduced and the market need for funeral service is emerged. To accomodate this, the pre-need arrangements were introduced to Taiwan funeral industry. In 2002, the Funeral Management Statute was announced and imposed certain requirements on the pre-need service providers. This research intends to explore the transaction characteristics, governance structure, and control mechanisms in the pre-need service industry. To understand the rationale and implementation of different businesses, four service providers are interviewed and the results are analyzed and compared. Based on this research, currently there is no unified governance structure in the pre-need service industry. The governance structure adopted by each pre-need service provider is highly impacted by the thoughts of its founders. It is the combination of governance structure and control mechanisms to significantly influence the performance of the transaction, not purely the governance structure. Further, most pre-need service providers emphasize more on the formal controls at current stage. More efforts from the government and the service providers are to be made to improve the acceptance and popularity of pre-need arrangements. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T15:39:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R93724028-1.pdf: 5105821 bytes, checksum: 471ccc82d5ef37f174713a1d6258a0f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
中文摘要 i ABSTRACT iii 第一章、緒論 1 第一節、研究動機 1 第二節、研究背景 1 第三節、研究目的 7 第二章、文獻回顧 9 第一節、交易成本理論與治理結構之關係 9 第二節、關係治理 17 第三節、交易過程所使用的控制機制 19 第四節、契約 27 第五節、台灣生前殯葬服務契約產業之研究 35 第三章、研究架構與研究方法 40 第一節、研究架構 40 第二節、變數說明 41 第三節、研究方法設計 45 第四節、研究限制 50 第四章、產業背景及可能遭遇的交易問題 52 第一節、產業背景 53 第二節、產業特性 57 第三節、可能遇到的交易問題 62 第五章、個案公司訪談與分析 65 第一節、個案A公司 65 第二節、個案B公司 76 第三節、個案C公司 86 第四節、個案D公司 97 第五節、綜合比較 109 第六章、研究發現與結論建議 127 第一節、研究發現 127 第二節、研究結論 135 第三節、後續研究建議 141 參考文獻 143 一、中文部分 143 二、英文部分 147 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 殯葬產業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 服務提供者 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 生前契約 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 治理結構 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 控制機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | control mechanisms | en |
| dc.subject | governance structure | en |
| dc.subject | pre-need arrangements | en |
| dc.subject | funeral industry | en |
| dc.subject | service providers | en |
| dc.title | 交易特質、治理結構、與控制機制關係之研究－以新興服務業交易為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Transaction Characteristics, Governance Structure, and Control Mechanisms in an Emerging Service Industry | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 朱文儀,黃國? | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 服務提供者,殯葬產業,生前契約,治理結構,控制機制, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | service providers,funeral industry,pre-need arrangements,governance structure,control mechanisms, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 161 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-08-10 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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