公司自願性設置獨立董監事之因素暨獨立董事與公司績效之關聯性

Abstract

台灣證券交易所及櫃買中心要求從2002年2月22（25）日起新申請股票上市（櫃）之公司必需設置獨立董事及獨立監察人。本研究首先探討台灣上市（櫃）公司自願性（即在2002年2月22或25日前申請股票上市或上櫃之公司）設置獨立董監事之因素，並考量到不同產業之公司聘請獨立董監事的動機可能有差異，分別針對電子業與非電子業進行分析。其次，分析設置獨立董監事後，對公司後續績效是否有正面效益，並分別就公司在不同董監事持股比例下來探討設置獨立董監事對公司績效的影響。 實證結果發現，就全部產業而言，公司規模愈小、研究發展費用率愈高、經營績效愈佳、董監事持股比例愈低、外國法人持股比例愈高、上市櫃年數愈短，以及電子業之公司，愈傾向自願聘任獨立董監事。就電子產業而言，經營績效愈佳、董監事持股比例愈低、外國法人持股比例愈高及上市櫃年數愈短之公司，愈易自願聘任獨立董監事。就非電子產業而言，公司規模愈小之公司愈易自願聘任獨立董監事。此結果亦顯示，電子業與非電子業在設置獨立董監事之決策上，確實有不同的考量因素。 此外，實證結果發現獨立董監事之設置與否與公司績效間，不一定具有關聯性。在不同績效衡量指標下，設置獨立董監事對公司績效之提升效果，在董監事持股比例愈低下可能愈大、愈小或無效果。

The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (“TSEC”) and the Republic of China GreTai Securities Market (“GTSM”) requires that companies applying initially for listing of its stock before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC markets before February 25, 2002 shall elect independent directors/independent supervisors. First, this thesis tries to find incentives that make companies elect independent directors/independent supervisors voluntarily ( that is, companies applying for listing before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC market before February 25, 2002 ). Besides, considering the incentives might be different for different industry, this thesis analyzes electronic industry and non- electronic industry separately. Next, this thesis tries to discuss whether electing independent directors/independent supervisors has positive effect on firm performance and whether the effect would be different due to different holding ratio of directors. The results of this study show that for whole sample companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have smaller firm size, higher proportion of research and develop expense, better operating performance, lower holding ratio of directors, higher holding ratio of foreign institutions, and shorter period since listed. Companies that belong to electronic industry are more likely to elect independent directors/independent supervisors than others. For electronic industry, companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have better operating performance, lower holding ratio of directors, higher holding ratio of foreign institutions, and shorter period since listed. For non-electronic industry, companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have smaller firm size. These results also indicate that the incentives are different for electronic industry and non- electronic industry. Moreover, the results of this study show that there is no consistent relationship between independent directors/independent supervisors and firm performance. Due to different indicators of operating performance, for the companies which have lower holding ratio of directors, the positive effect of electing independent directors/independent supervisors on firm performance would be larger, smaller or no effect.