家族企業與公司治理之個案研究—以新纖事件為例

Abstract

民國93年8月至12月，新光合成纖維股份有限公司內部爆發董座之爭，不僅使得家族企業的問題再次浮上檯面，其間牽涉的公司治理相關問題，更使得此一個案錯綜複雜而值得深入探析。針對此一個案，本研究擬針對公司治理與家族企業間的相關議題，分別從制度設計與管理層面，探討以下幾個重要的問題： (1)企業所有權與企業經營權分離原則，在家族企業間該如何落實？ (2)對於身為家族成員之大股東，該如何加以監控，使其能以公司利益為優先考量？ (3)管理制度之引進是否有助解決我國家族企業與公司治理間的衝突？ (4)如何讓家族成員為公司經營時，亦能考慮到應盡之社會責任？ 本研究結果發現，家族企業在公司治理的制度層面有以下三處缺失：1、企業所有與企業經營原則在理論與實務上存在矛盾之處；2、法人董監制度設計之不良，以致於法人股東得以輕易掌控公司董監人選，進一步達到控制公司經營的結果；3、股東參與監控機制仍須補強，讓小股東有機會參與公司決策，選出代表小股東利益的董監事；此外，管理層面則有：1、在沒有釐清我國監察人的定位為何前，倉促引進獨立董監制度對我國公司治理沒有太大實益；2、企業社會責任未能確切落實等疑慮。 針對上述制度與管理問題，本研究建議：在制度層面，企業所有與企業經營分離原則，在家族企業的體制下不一定要全然貫徹，重要的是監控制度的落實；因此，在監控同是公司大股東的家族成員方面，可透過選任監察人方法的改進、與少數股東權的權限擴大加以補充。目前我國公司法的修正方向，即針對少數股東權，增加股東提案制度與書面、電子通訊投票制度，增加少數股東權參與公司經營的機會。另外，若要在管理層面引進獨立董監制度，以我國目前的情況來說，應先貫徹我國監察人的監督功能，再去考量獨立董監引進的必要以及相關配套措施的設計，否則將使固有的監察人與獨立董監制度混雜使用，造成我國公司治理的亂象；最後，家族企業在為公司治理時，不僅應該思考公司內部該如何經營，亦應該思考公司與整個社會的互動，盡到應有的社會責任，注重公司利害關係人的權益保障，因為唯有懂得反餽社會的公司，才能基業長青。

The battle of corporate control of ShinKong Synthetic Fibers Corporation occurred in August 2004 induced a wide scope of public attention and conversation over the issues of family business and corporate governance. The complexity involving both family power structure and corporate control provides a fruitful ground for academic research from various perspectives. Based on a thorough review on all the events occurred during August and December of 2004, this research proposes several key questions to study; they are: (1) How is the applicability of the principle of the separations of corporate ownership and operational control within the context of family business, (2) How to audit the behavior of family-linked board members on behalf of the shareholder’s benefit? (3) How effective is the corporate governance system within the context of family business? (4) How to enforce the considerations of social responsibility within the framework of corporate governance, especially in a family business? This research finds that there are three shortcomings of the corporate governance system within the context of family business: 1). There are significant conflicts of applying the principle of the separations of corporate ownership and operation controls within the context of family business; 2) There is a flaw of designated board director system which provide opportunities for a conglomerate to achieve minority control? 3). The auditing mechanism of shareholders needs to be strengthened and the minority participation to the board decision making shall be further enforced. In addition, there are two issues to be discussed: 1) The usefulness of independent board director system will be discounted if we don’t have a clear definition on the auditing functions of the board; 2). Corporate social responsibility is hardly realized in the current system. To reply to these issues, we suggest that it seems not practical to fully apply the principle of the separations of corporate ownership and operational controls to the family business. Instead, building up effective auditing mechanisms may be even more important. In other words, for family businesses, we shall enforce the functions of elected director-auditors and adequately expand the rights for minority shareholders. More critically, we shall strengthen the auditing functions in the board structure before inducing the system of independent board directors. Finally, family businesses shall take social corporate responsibility into serious considerations in their decision making before these companies can become built-to-last ones.