當前國際金融議題二論： 1.人民幣升值之議 2.論新布列敦森林體制

Abstract

本論文旨在對近日來關於國際金融的兩項時事議題進行介紹，並就此兩項議題的時尚觀點加以評析。 第一篇為「人民幣升值之議」。近來人民幣匯價問題成為國內外政經注目的議題，雖然學者專家常於媒體對此提出眾多意見，但卻鮮少有人以系統性的方式針對這些意見加以解讀並提出評論。本文以市場上關於人民幣是否升值的討論為出發點，探討所謂的人民幣問題到底為何？其次分別探討：中國貿易帳順差、中國的低價出口策略對美國失業的影響、中國與歐洲的相對競爭力、以及中國因外匯存底急速增加而產生貨幣供給大幅增加，及沖銷的利息負擔日益加重等支持人民幣升值的理由，並據以提出相應的評論。本文研究指出，這些理由除採行固定匯率，將使中國喪失其貨幣政策的自主性外，其他的觀點尚不足以全然合理化升值的要求。本文也研析人民幣傾向不升值的意見，包括:失業、人民銀行國外資產匯兌損失、民間金融體系，以及中國可能步日本後塵，於廣場協議後，日圓大幅快速升值造成1990年代經濟嚴重衰退等問題。對此，本文發現，東南沿海低技術勞工的失業問題並不嚴重，人民幣不升值的最大考量在其可能引起廣大的農民轉移問題。至於人行國外資產匯損以及日本經驗等都尚不足以堅實地構成人民幣不升值的理由。最後，本研究認為，除採行固定匯率，將使中國喪失其貨幣政策的自主性外，我們都可對人民幣應否升值的每一種時尚觀點，提出不同的意見。由於人民幣升值的主要壓力來自美、歐，因此，與其將人民幣是否升值的議題，視為一個純經濟問題，不如將其看成是一個國際社會政治、外交、經濟等三大層面必須相互綜合妥協的議題。 第二篇為「論新布列敦森林體制」，主要探討當前全球經常帳失衡的情形、新布列敦森林體制的概念及其可維持性。我們的研究發現：一，新布列敦森林體制主要由以中國為首的東亞國家，在金融風暴後挾著低估匯率伴隨而生的經常帳順差，以及高估的美元及其鉅額經常帳赤字，此兩項事實所構成。二，東亞各國以累積的外匯準備大量購買美元資產，提供美國低成本的外部融通，此反應在美國公債長期利率的走低以及美國資產價格的上揚方面。三，由於美國的長期利率維持在低檔，殖利率曲線日漸平滑化，並引導資源由貿易部門流向利率敏感部門，造成美國國內資源配置的扭曲。四，東亞各國面臨沈重的融通負擔，尤以中國為甚，而此將可能進一步造成通貨膨脹以及資產泡沫化、國外資產匯損。五，由於缺乏具實質強制力的協商機構，體制中各國不但難以平衡彼此責任分攤而良好合作，更存在「搭便車」的誘因來脫離這個融通美國的卡特爾（cartel），而此將更不利於新布列敦森林體制的維持。綜上，由於國際分工合作機制的闕如，我們認為此制度在長期必然走向瓦解的命運，而各國若未能及時調整此一不均衡狀態，未來將面臨美元劇貶、美國長期利率飆升的局面，並進一步演變為全球的不景氣。

The main purpose of this paper is to introduce two contemporary issues with regard to international finance as well as comment on the fashionable perspectives on these two issues. The first part of this paper discusses about “the Debate on the Appreciation of Renminbi .” The Renminbi exchange rate problem has become a highlighted issue on the world’s political and economic stage. From the media outlets, many experts have offered various comments and insights regarding this topic. However, up until now, very few systematic studies or reviews have been performed on these reports. This paper begins by analyzing the market’s view of whether or not the Renminbi will appreciate, and the underlying problems surrounding the currency. The second topic addresses the various assessments of why the Renminbi should appreciate. These include---China’s trade surplus, impact of China’s low-priced export strategy on the United State’s unemployment problem, the changing competitive status between China and Europe, the large influx in China’s money supply caused by drastic increases of its foreign exchange reserves, and the increasing burden of interest rate payments due to sterilization. This paper states that except for the analysis that a fixed exchange rate regime may cause China to lose its independent monetary policy stance, the other viewpoints are not strong or persuasive enough in explaining why the currency should appreciate. In addition, this study also analyzes the reasons from the other side of the argument in advocating why the Renminbi should be kept from appreciating. This encompasses China’s unemployment problems, capital loss of the People’s Bank of China’s (PBOC) foreign assets denominated in Renminbi, the private financial structure, and the possibility of experiencing the same serious recession and other ramifications caused by the rapid appreciation of the Japanese Yen after the Plaza Accord. This paper has discovered that with the unemployment problems associated with low-skilled labor along China’s southeast coastal areas being not too serious, the biggest challenge for the Renminbi in not appreciating, lies in the possible massive transfer of China’s rural residents to urban areas. As for capital loss of the PBOC’s foreign assets denominated in Renminbi, and the Japanese experience, they are not convincing enough to serve as concrete reasons for China’s currency to not appreciate. Finally, except for the fact that the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime will cause China to lose its control over its domestic monetary policy, this research is capable of counter arguing the fashionable perspectives on whether or not the Renminbi should appreciate. Because the main pressure on the Renminbi to appreciate comes from the United States and major European countries, this issue shouldn’t be regarded as a pure economic problem, but a complicated entanglement of political, diplomatic, and economic associations, where a delicate balance should be struck. The second part of this paper is “ Issue of New Bretton Woods Regime.”, mainly discusses of the scenario of global current account imbalances, the concepts of New Bretton Woods regime as well as its sustainability. We draw the conclusions as follow. First, New Bretton Woods system (BW2) is composed of two facts: one is the undervalued currencies and the sequential current account surpluses run by East Asia (led by China) after Asian Financial Crisis; the other is the overvalued US dollar in company with the tremendous current account deficit of the US. Second, by purchasing vast dollar-denominated assets bolstered by the accumulation of foreign reserves, the East Asian countries provide low-cost external financing for the US, which reflects the descending long-term rate of US T-bonds, contributing to the soaring dollar asset prices. Third, with the low long-term rate and the flattened yield curve, resources flow out of tradable sectors into interest-sensitive sectors, which in turn lead to the internal distortion in US. Fourth, East Asian countries (especially China) have encountered with significant financing burden, and that may further bring about the problem of higher inflation, bubbles of asset prices and the capital loss of foreign assets in financial system. Finally, with the deficiency of a substantial and powerful institute, it is difficult for members among BW2 to share responsibility for financing for US and collaborate in an appropriate way. In addition, these countries also have incentives to free ride and opt out of the cheap dollar financing cartel. In summary, for the lack of an international coordinating mechanism, we conclude that BW2 is destined to unravel in the long run. In case that all members among BW2 (including the US and East Asian countries) fail to adjust these circumstances of imbalance, they will confront with the situation of severe depression of US dollar and hovering US long-term rate, which may go a step further to evolve a worldwide recession.