美國創投契約對投資人權益之影響 -- 以清算分配優先權, 反稀釋條款, 與購買參與權為例

Abstract

投資人都會依照時勢, 調整作法. 過去數年, 全球科技股泡沫崩盤引發劇烈的市場震盪, 為求因應, 投資人在投資的作法與架構已作出相當的改變. 由於投資損失的可能性大增, 北美地區的創投業者近年投下大量心力, 更新設計投資架構,以降低潛在投資虧損的幅度. 為能清楚呈現新投資架構對投資人權益的潛在影響, 本篇論文選取一家設於美國加州矽谷的網路儲存系統公司為分析標的, 探討三項投資契約條款的演變與後果. 此三項條款攸關投資人或被投資公司的權益保障, 包括在絕大多數投資契約中必然會出現的清算分配優先權 (liquidation preference) 與反稀釋條款 (anti-dilution) 兩項, 以及近來在北美日益普遍採納的購買參與權 (pay-to-play) 條款. 由於此家五年前創立的企業已經歷過多回合特別股募資, 因此我們可以藉由量化與質化的分析演算,對比了解不同的投資架構設計對投資人權益的衝擊. 為能更明確掌握台灣的創業投資業者在此投資架構下的處境, 我們以台灣投資人的觀點出發, 對投資權益進行模擬計算. 實際演算的結果明確呈現: 不同的合約設計導致不同的投資權益數字. 相較之下, 敢於明確主張並爭取較佳合約條款設計的投資人, 即便在公司面臨清算時, 都可以是贏家. 但我們必須了解: 任何主導談判新一回合投資架構的領銜投資人 (lead investor), 都是在創業與經營團隊, 既有投資人, 與其自己三者不同利益之間求取微妙的平衡. 唯有在三方利益都被充分顧及與平衡的情況下, 新的投資架構才能協助被投資企業長久的成功. 也唯有如此, 創投業者所作的投資才算真正成功. 由於對北美投資手法與規則並不熟悉, 台灣的創投業者極少能成為北美投資案的領銜投資人. 但台灣的業者必需建立此種能力與知識, 才可能適應新的北美投資遊戲規則, 進而在未來的國際創投市場開拓更大的揮灑空間. 要作精明的投資人, 先要能徹底掌握並防護可能的風險, 才可能進而攫取正向的投資回收.

Investment professionals adjust their playbook to go with the times. As the collapse of the technology bubble in early 2000’s has instigated changing prospects for the venture capital industry, it has profoundly altered the way how investors structure their deals. Already North American VCs have spent an inordinate amount of efforts in stemming potential losses in all possible avenues of profit or loss. This thesis aims to illustrate the new pattern of deal structure with a real case, a Silicon Valley-based networked storage system company that underwent multiple rounds of private financing in the last four years. Under scrutiny are two clauses related to investor downside protection that always appear in investment term sheets: liquidation preference and anti-dilution, plus another one protecting the firm that gets increasingly popular amongst VC investors lately: pay-to-play. Through modeling the economic outcomes of one Taiwanese venture capitalist’s investments into the firm’s last two rounds, the thesis demonstrate how different deal terms lead to different financial consequences for the investor. The calculation and analysis demonstrates marked quantitative differences regarding investor well-being between varying contract designs. On paper, the ones who get assertive claiming a more favorable deal seemingly attain the upper hand. Yet the readers also have to be aware of the intricate situation that an early-stage lead investor faces when working with the entrepreneurs and the existing investors to strike a deal of new funding. Only when optimal balance is reached between the three interests can the financing truly help the long-success of the venture. Even though it is very unusual for Taiwan-based VCs to play as a lead investor in US VC financing, Taiwanese venture capitalists still need to build the skill set and knowledge base to cope with the new patterns of US VC investment terms and conditions. Only by having a deal’s potential risks well understood and covered can one smartly recoup the investment upsides.