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標題: | 系統風險:從眾行為、銀行紓困政策與利率政策 Systemic Risk: Herd Behavior, Bailout Policy, and Interest Rate Policy |
作者: | Ping-Heng Lee 李秉恆 |
指導教授: | 陳業寧(Yehning Chen) |
關鍵字: | 系統風險,從眾行為,利率政策,紓困政策, Systemic Risk,Herd Behavior,Bailout Policy,Interest Rate Policy,Too-many-to-fail,financial crisis, |
出版年 : | 2011 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文分析不當的紓困政策加上利率政策如何導致自我實現的系統經濟危機,不當的紓困政策會誘使投資人從眾投資相似的衍生性金融商品並且提高系統風險,如果接受到足夠的紓困資金的話,銀行投資時就不會考慮系統風險所帶來的影響,除此之外,因為降息會使得市場流動性降低,所以會進而促使主管機關對更多的銀行進行紓困,這接著會助長高風險的投資行為。 I analyze how the improper bailout policy, together with the low-interest rates, can lead to a self-fulfilling systemic banking crisis. An improper bailout policy induces banks to herd by investing in similar financial derivatives and increases exposure to systemic risks in the banking industry. Banks will never take systemic risks into account if they do not suffer much due to the bailout. Moreover, a decrease in interest rates causes the regulator to bail out more banks by decreasing liquidity of the entire market. In turn, this encourages excessive risk-taking by increasing the probability of being bailed out. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/35962 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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