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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 劉啟群 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Fang-Chi Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張芳綺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T06:09:58Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2006-06-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2006-06-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-05-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bagwell, L. S., 1991. Share repurchase and takeover deterrence. Rand Journal of Economics 22, No. 1, 72-88.
Bagwell, L.S., 1992. Dutch auction repurchases: An analysis of shareholder heterogeneity. Journal of Finance 47, 71-105. Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., Wong, M. H. F., 2002. Real investment implications of employee stock option exercises. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 359-393. Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483-527. Brewer, E., Hunter, W. C., Jackson, W. E., 2004. Investment opportunity set, product mix, and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2004-36. Brown, David, T., Ryngaert, M., 1990. Heterogeneous shareholders: Evidence from buybacks and control contests. Working Papers. Dann, L., 1981. Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D. J., 2000. Special dividends and the evolution of dividend signaling. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 309-354. Dittmar, A. K, 2000. Why do firms repurchase stock?. Journal of Business 73, 331-355. Easterbrook, F. H., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American Economic Review 74, 650-659. Fenn, G. W., Liang, N. , 2001. Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72. Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2002. Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution hypothesis. The Journal of Finance 57, No. 4, 387-424. Grullon, G., Michaely, R., Swaminathan, B., 2002. Are dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?. Journal of Business 75, 387-424. Hirtle, B., 1998. Bank holding company capital ratios and shareholder payouts. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance 4, No. 9. Howe, J. S., Jain, R., 2005. Share repurchase programs by banks. Paper presented to the FMA annual meeting, Chicago, 2005. Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C. P., Weisbach, M. S., 2000. Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384. Jensen, M. C., 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, No. 2, 323-329. Jolls, C., 1998. Stock repurchases and incentive compensation. NBER Working Paper, No. 6467. Laderman, E. S., 1995, Bank stock repurchase. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco FRBSF Weekly Letter, No. 95-43. Dec 29, 1995. Lintner, J., 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review 46, 97 -113. Liu, Z., 2003. The role of firm size in executive compensation. State University of New York Working Paper. Scholes, M., Williams, J., 1977. Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 309-327 Smith Jr., C.W., Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263-292. Stever, R., 2005. Bank size, credit and the sources of bank market risk. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley Working Paper. Vermaelen, T., 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signaling－An empirical study. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 139-182. Vermaelen, T., 1984. Repurchase tender offers, signaling, and managerial incentives. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19, 163-181. Weisbenner, S. J., 2000. Corporate share repurchase in the mid-1990s: What role do stock options play?. MIT Working Paper. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34465 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究針對美國380家金融控股公司於1994至2004年是否宣告庫藏股加以探究其動機。茲以二項Logit模型同時檢驗下列假說與公司特性：股利替代假說、股價低估假說、最適資本適足率假說、經理人動機假說、併購防禦假說、自由現金流量假說、證券化、風險、投資機會等。
實證結果顯示金融控股公司因複雜動機而宣告庫藏股，蓋與高額股息、低估報酬、可觀規模、過剩資本、少額高階主管認股權、併購威脅、自由現金流量、低度系統風險、有限成長機會等因素相關。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study examines the decision of stock repurchase announcements specifically for U.S. bank holding companies. A sample of 380 U.S. bank holding companies over the period from 1994 to 2004 is investigated. All of the motives for share repurchase announcement are simultaneously captured and analyzed by binary Logit regression. The following hypotheses are tested: substitution hypothesis, undervaluation hypothesis, takeover deterrence hypothesis, optimal capital ratio hypothesis, management incentive hypothesis, and free cash flow hypothesis. In addition, bank characteristics as securitization, risk, and investment opportunity are also thoroughly researched factors.
The results reveal diverse motivations behind share repurchase announcements by bank holding companies. Whether bank holding companies announce to repurchase is related with generous dividend payout policy, undervalued return, large size, takeover threat, excessive capitalization, lower level of management incentives, free cash flow, low systematic risk, and limited growth opportunity. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T06:09:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-R93722027-1.pdf: 434147 bytes, checksum: 808c84d51743297ccce6396065dbc57e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | I INTRODUCTION 1
II LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 2 III RESEARCH DESIGN 10 IV DATA SOURCE 12 V EMPIRICAL RESULTS 14 I. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 14 II. CORRELATION MATRIX 15 III. REGRESSION RESULTS 16 IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 21 VI CONCLUSIONS 22 VII REFERENCE 24 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 併購防禦假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投資機會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 經理人動機假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 最適資本適足率假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 自由現金流量假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股價低估假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股利替代假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 金融控股公司 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 庫藏股宣告 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 證券化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Investment Opportunity | en |
| dc.subject | Share Repurchase Announcement | en |
| dc.subject | Bank Holding Company | en |
| dc.subject | Substitution Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Undervaluation Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Optimal Capital Ratio Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Management Incentive Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Free Cash Flow Hypothesis | en |
| dc.subject | Securitization | en |
| dc.subject | Risk | en |
| dc.title | 美國金融控股公司是否宣告庫藏股：規範與動機 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A Study on Whether U.S. Bank Holding Companies Announce to Repurchase: Impact of Motives and Regulation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星揚,吳清在 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 庫藏股宣告,金融控股公司,股利替代假說,股價低估假說,最適資本適足率假說,經理人動機假說,併購防禦假說,自由現金流量假說,證券化,風險,投資機會, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Share Repurchase Announcement,Bank Holding Company,Substitution Hypothesis,Undervaluation Hypothesis,Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis,Optimal Capital Ratio Hypothesis,Management Incentive Hypothesis,Free Cash Flow Hypothesis,Securitization,Risk,Investment Opportunity, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 40 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2006-05-12 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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