請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34459完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 張佑宗 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Peng Shih-fen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 彭士芬 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T06:09:39Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2011-05-15 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2006-05-15 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-05-15 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中文部份
王維芳，2002。〈『半總統制』下的政治穩定：以中華民國為例》，《遠景基金會季刊》，3卷，3期，頁47-73。 吳玉山，2001a。〈合作還是對立？半總統制府會分立下的憲政運作〉，明居正、高朗主編，《憲政體制新走向》，北市，新台灣人基金會。 吳玉山，2001b。〈制度、結構與政治穩定〉，《政治學報》，32期，頁1-29。 李怡達，2004。〈議程拒絕與法案審議—以第四屆立法院運作為例〉，國立台灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。 沈有忠，2005。〈制度制約下的行政與立法關係：以我國九七憲改後的憲政運作為例〉，《政治科學論叢》，23期，頁27-60。 周永鴻，2000。〈民進黨與第四次修憲—制度設計談判中的偏好形成與策略選擇〉，國立台灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。 林佳龍，2001。〈台灣半總統制的缺失與改進：論總統、閣揆與國會的三角關係〉，明居正、高朗主編，《憲政體制新走向》，北市，新台灣人基金會。 林繼文，2001。〈創設、選擇與演化：制度形成的三個理論模式〉，《政治學報》，32期，頁61-94。 姜林青，2003。〈台灣選民的議題投票行為—空間理論的探析〉，國立中山大學政治學研究所碩士論文。 徐正戎、呂炳寬，2002。〈九七憲改後的憲政運作〉，《問題與研究》，41卷，1期，頁1-24。 徐正戎、張峻豪，2004。〈從新舊制度論看我國雙首長制〉，《政治科學論叢》，22期，頁139-180。 徐斯勤，2001。〈新制度主義與當代中國政治研究：理論與應用之間對話的初步觀察〉，《政治學報》，32期，頁95-170。 盛杏湲，2001。〈立法委員正式與非正式立法參與之研究：以第三屆立法院為例〉，《問題與研究》，40卷，5期，頁81-104。 莊文忠，2003。〈制度的研究：『新制度論』觀點的比較與『後現代制度論』的發展〉，《理論與政策》，16卷，4期，頁15-44。 陳敦源，2001。〈政策分析之政治可行性評估：一個從『空間理論』的初探〉，余致力、郭昱瑩、陳敦源合編，《公共政策分析的理論與實務》，台北，韋伯。 陳敦源，2003。〈政務領導、國會監督與官僚自主：台灣全民健保政策『否決者』之研究，1986-2003〉，國科會個別型研究計畫，編號NSC92-2414-H-004-071。 黃安元，2004。〈預算審議過程中行政與立法互動之研究—以空軍預算為例〉，國立東華大學公共行政研究所碩士論文。 黃昭元，1998。〈九七修憲後我國中央政府體制的評估〉，《台大法學論叢》，27卷，2期，頁1-34。 黃秀瑞，2003。〈第五屆第三會期通過的法案總體檢〉，2003澄社監督國會報告。 黃德福，2000。〈少數政府與責任政治：台灣「半總統制」之下的政黨競爭〉，《問題與研究》，39卷，12期，頁1-24。 楊婉瑩，2002。〈立法院委員會的決策角色：以第三屆立法院為例〉，《問題與研究》，41卷，4期，頁83-114。 楊婉瑩，2003。〈一致性到分立政府的政黨合作與衝突：以第四屆立法院為例〉，《東吳政治學報》，16期，頁49-95。 楊婉瑩、陳采葳，2004。〈國會改革風潮下黨團協商制度之轉變與評估〉，《東吳政治學報》，19期，頁111-150。 魏陌、陳敦源、郭昱瑩，2001。〈政策分析在民主政體當中的機會與挑戰〉，《中國行政評論》，11卷，1期，頁1-28。 貳、西文部份 Aldrich, John H., David W. 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Crepaz, Markus M. L. 2001. “Veto Players, Globalization and the Redistributive Capacity of the State: A Panel Study of 15 OECD Countries.” Journal of Public Politics. Vol. 21. No. 1. pp. 1-22. Croissant, Aurel. 2003. “Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of Delegative Democracy: A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea.” Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 68-98. Diermeier, Daniel & Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. “Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 611-621. Elgie, Robert. 2004. “Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations.” Political Studies Review, Vol. 2, pp. 314-330. Elgie, Robert. 2005. “From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?” Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 106-122. Enelow, James M. & Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. Farley, Rebecca. 2005. “Parties, Coalitions, and Peace: Applying the Veto Player Theory to the Arab-Israel-Palestinian Peace Process, 1992-2001.” Prepared for the Conference of American Graduated Students of Political Science. Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman & Nicholas R. Miller. 1981. “Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games.” Mathematical and Computer Modeling, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 405-416. Fell, Dafydd. 2004. “Measurement of Party Position and Competition in Taiwan.” Issue & Studies. Vol. 40. No. 3/4. pp. 101-136. Fernández-Albertos, José & Víctor Lapuente Giné. 2004. “When Veto Players Do Not Agree.” Presented at the 2004 ECPR sessions. Fuchs, Dieter. 2001. “Types and Indices of Democratic Regimes.” Discussion Paper FS Ⅲ 01-203. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung(WZB). Fukumoto, Kentaro & Satoshi Machiclori. 2004. “Is the Lower House Dominant over the Upper House? 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No. 4. pp. 73-79. Hug, Simon & George Tsebelis. 2002. “Veto Players and Referendums Around the World.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.14, No. 4, pp. 465-515. Jochem, Sven. 2003. “Veto Players or Veto Points? The Politics of Welfare State Reforms in Europe.” Presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association. Kastner, Scott L. & Chad Rector. 2003. “Institutional Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability.” International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 47, pp. 1-22. Kitschelt, Herbert. 2002. “Can Veto Player Configurations Explain Pathways of Economic Reform after Communism?” Paper prepared for the presentation at the “Veto Players and Policy Change” workshop. Lin, Jih-Wen. 2002. “Democratic Stability Under Taiwan’s Semi-Presidentialist Consititution: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations.” Issue & Studies. Vol.38. No. 1. pp. 47-79. Lin, Jih-Wen. 2002. “Transition Through Transaction: Taiwan’s Constitutional Reforms in the Lee Teng-hui Era.” American Asian Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 123-155. Lin, Jih-Wen. 2004. “Taiwan‘s Referendum Act and the Stability of the Status Quo.” Issue & Studies. Vol. 40. No. 2. pp. 119-153. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 1. No. 1. pp. 51-69. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Virtues of Parliamentarianism.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 1. No. 4. pp. 84-91. Mainwaring, Scott & Matthew S. Shugart. 1997. “Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy. A Critical Appraisal.” Comparative Politics. Vol. 29. No. 4. pp. 449-471. Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. “Presidentialism in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review. Vol. 25. No. 1. pp. 157-179. Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy. The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 26. No. 2. pp. 198-228. Miller, Nicholas R., Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld. 1989. “The Geometry of Majority Rule.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 379-406. Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal & Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga. 2003. ”Veto Players in Presidential Regime: Institutional Variables and Policy Change.” The 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Power, Timothy J. & Mark J. Gasiorowski. 1997. “Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 30. No. 2. pp. 123-155. Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition. Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 527-540. Riggs, Fred W. 1994. 'Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field: Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective.' Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance. Mattei Dogan & Ali Kazancigil, eds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp.72-152. Roller, Edeltraud. 2003. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Institutions of Democratic Governance: A Critical Review and Empirical Validation of Veto-Player Indexes.” Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of workshop “Institutional Theory: Issues of Measurement and Change” UK. Rothstein, Bo. 1996. “Political Institutions: An Overview.” in Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemanne (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press. 133-166. Santoni, Michele & Francesco Zucchini. 2001. “Veto Players and the Constitutional Court: the Italian Case.”mimeo. Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. London: Macmillan Press. Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium In Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 27-59. Shugart, Matthew S. & John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. St. Marie, Joseph J., John P. Tuman, Kenneth N. Hansen & Erol Kaymak. 2002. “The Asian Economic Crisis and the Developmental State: A Veto Player Analysis.” Prepared for the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Stepan, Alfred & Cindy Skach. 1993. “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism.” World Politics. Vol. 46. No. 1. pp. 1-22. Stepan, Alfred. 2004. “Institutional and Partisan Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems.” in Edward Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Strøm, Kaare. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, pp. 261-289. Strom, S. Gerald. 1990. The Logic of Lawmaking: A Spatial Theory Approach. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Tsebelis, George & Amie Kreppel. 1995. “The History of Conditional Agenda-Setting in European Institutions.” Working Paper, Center for the Study of German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley. Tsebelis, George & Jeannette Money. 1995. “Bicameral Navette System in France.” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 101-129. Tsebelis, George. 1994. “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 128-142. Tsebelis, George. 1995a. “Decision Making in Political System: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 289-325. Tsebelis, George. 1995b. “Veto Payers and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies.” in Herbert Dӧring (ed.). Parliamentary and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, pp. 83-113.. Tsebelis, George. 1996. “More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 839-844. Tsebelis, George. 1999a. “Institutional Analysis of European Union.” European Community Studies Association Newsletter. Tsebelis, George. 1999b. “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 591-608. Tsebelis, George. 2000. “Veto Players and Institutional Analysis.” Governance: An Institutional Journal of Policy and Administration. Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 441-474. Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. Tsebelis, George. 2004. “The European Convention and the Failure of the Rome IGC: A Veto Players Analysis.” Unpublished working paper. Wiberg, Matti. 2002. “Veto Players in Legislative Games: Fake and Real.” Prepared for the workshop “A Renewal of Parliaments in Europe? MP’s Behaviours and Action Constraints.” Wu, Yu-Shan. 2000. “The ROC’s Semi-Presidentialism at Work: Unstable Compromise, Not Cohabitation.” Issue & Studies. Vol. 36. No. 5. pp. 1-40. 參、網路資源 www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis Tsebelis的個人網頁，跨國量化的否決者資料。 http://udndata.com/ 聯合新聞資料庫 http://www.tol.com.tw/CT_NS/ctsearch.aspx 中時新聞資料庫 http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/ TVBS民調中心資料庫 http://www.advocates.org.tw/ 群策會民調資料庫 http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage 立法院議事決議資料影像檔案庫 http://nplnews.ly.gov.tw/index.jsp 立法院圖書館新聞知識管理系統 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34459 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 以Tsebelis的否決者理論建立台灣之否決者模型。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T06:09:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-R91322008-1.pdf: 751548 bytes, checksum: 6819d7f58338ed6feb21568be8ccb98e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
第一章 緒論/1 第一節 研究動機與目的/1 第二節 文獻探討/6 壹、 憲政制度研究的演進/6 貳、 否決者理論的應用與檢討/9 參、 國內的制度研究/14 第三節 研究架構/15 壹、 假設與架構/15 貳、 中華民國第七次修憲案/17 參、 軍購特別預算條例與特別預算案/18 第四節 章節安排/19 第二章 研究方法/21 第一節 否決者理論(Veto Players Theory)/21 壹、 單一否決者/20 貳、 集體否決者/28 第二節 理論的修改與適應/29 第三節 個案研究法/31 壹、 研究方法/31 貳、 資料蒐集方法/31 第四節 研究限制/34 第三章 修憲案的否決者/35 第一節 背景：中華民國第七次修憲案始末/35 第二節 制度層次的否決者/38 壹、 兩個否決者？/39 貳、 集體性與議程控制/41 參、 條件多數決(Qualified Majority)/42 第三節 政黨層次的否決者/42 壹、 否決者數目與政策位置(Policy Position)/45 貳、 議程控制權/47 參、 真正的競爭結盟關鍵/48 第四節 民意與國際層次的否決者/49 壹、「國會改革」的民意壓力/49 貳、國際層次/52 第五節 修憲案中的否決者模型與政策產出/52 壹、 制度層面/52 貳、 政黨層面/53 參、 國際與民意層面/54 第四章 軍購案的否決者/55 第一節 背景：軍購案(特別預算與特別條例)之發展背景/55 第二節 制度層次的否決者/57 壹、 總統/58 貳、 行政院/60 參、 立法院/61 第三節 政黨層次的否決者/62 第四節 民意與國際層次的否決者/63 壹、 公投/63 貳、 民意/65 參、 國際層次的否決者/66 第五節 軍購案中的否決者模型與政策產出/69 壹、 雙首長制下分立政府造成制度層面的政策產出困難/69 貳、 立法院中的黨團立場/69 參、 國際壓力與民意/70 肆、 民主的深化是決策權的分享？/70 第五章 結論/72 第一節 否決者理論的不足/72 第二節 台灣的否決者模型與特性/74 第三節 政制空轉/75 第四節 研究結果的檢討/76 參考書目 壹、 中文部分/77 貳、 西文部份/79 參、 網路資源/85 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 否決者理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | veto players theory | en |
| dc.title | 台灣政策產出的否決者模型--以修憲案與軍購案為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Veto Players Model of the Policy Output in Taiwan | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃德福,楊婉瑩 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 否決者理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | veto players theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 131 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2006-05-15 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 政治學系 | |
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