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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 電機資訊學院
  3. 電信工程學研究所
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34351
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dc.contributor.advisor張進福(Jin-Fu Chang)
dc.contributor.authorYi-Kuei Changen
dc.contributor.author張逸逵zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-13T06:04:22Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-01
dc.date.copyright2011-08-01
dc.date.issued2011
dc.date.submitted2011-07-25
dc.identifier.citation[1] K. C. Chen and R. Prasad, “Cognitive Radio Networks,” John Wiley & Sons, 2009
[2] NTIA, “U. S. Frequency Allocation,” [online] http://www.nita.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf
[3] K.-C. Chen, Y.-J. Peng, N. R. Prasad, Y.-C. Liang, and S. Sun, “Cognitive radio network architecture: Part I—General structure,” in Proc. ACM ICUIMC, Seoul, Korea, 2008, pp. 114–119.
[4] G. Owen ,Game Theory, Academic Press, 1995.
[5] K.-C. Chen, H-B Chang, “Auction-Based Spectrum Management of Cognitive Radio Networks,” IEEE transactions on vehicular technology, VOL.59, NO.4 MAY 2010
[6] T. S. Rapaport, Wireless communication: Principles and Practice. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996
[7] R.A. Horn and C.R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1985
[8] C. Peng, H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao, “Utilization and fairness in spectrum assignment for opportunistic spectrum access,” Mobile Netw. Appl. Vol. 11, no.4, pp.555-576, Aug. 2006
[9] M. Halldorsson, J. Halpern, L.Li, and V.Mirrokni, “On spectrum sharing games, “in Proc. 23rd Annu. ACM Symp. Principle Distrib. Comput., St. John’s, NF Canada, 2004, pp. 107-114
[10] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “A game-theoretic approach to competitive spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks,” in Proc. IEEE WCNC, Hong Kong, Mar. 2007, pp. 16–20.
[11] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Competitive pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: Dynamic game, inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, and collusion,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. , vol.26, no. 1, pp.192-202, Jan.2008
[12] V.Krishna, Auction Theory. London, U.K.: Academic, 2002
[13] M. Dramitinos, G. Stamoulis, and C. Courcoubetis, “Auction-based resource
reservation in 2.5/3G networks,” Mobile Netw. Appl., vol. 9, no. 6,pp. 557–566, Dec. 2004.
[14] J. Sun, E. Modiano, and L. Zheng, “Wireless channel allocation using an auction algorithm,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1085–1096, May 2006.
[15] J. Huang, Z. Han, M. Chiang, and H. V. Poor, “Auction-based Resource All- ocation for Cooperative Communications,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.,vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1226–1237, Sep. 2008.
[16] J. Huang, R. Berry, and M. L. Honig, “Auction-based spectrum sharing,”ACM Mobile Netw. Appl. J., vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 405–418, Jun. 2006.
[17] Al Daoud, T. Alpcan, S. Agarwal, and M. Alanyali, “A Stackelberg game for pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks,” in Proc. 47th IEEE Conf. Decision Control, Cancun, Mexico, Dec. 2008,pp. 1422–1427.
[18] O. Ercan, J. Lee, S. Pollin, and J. Rabaey, “A revenue enhancing Stackelberg game for owners in opportunistic spectrum access,” in Proc. IEEE DySPAN, Oct. 2008, pp. 1–8.
[19] Al-Daoud, M. Alanyali, and D. Starobinski, “Secondary pricing of spectrum in cellular CDMA networks,” in Proc. IEEE DySPAN, Nov. 2007, pp. 535–542.
[20] Y. Xing, R. Chandramouli, and C. M. Cordeiro, “Price dynamics in a compet-
itive agile secondary spectrum access market,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun ,
vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 613–621, Apr. 2007.
[21] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Integration of WiMAX and WiFi: Optimal pricing for bandwidth sharing,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 45, no. 5,pp.140–146,May 2007.
[22] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34351-
dc.description.abstract感知無線電科技被視為可以有效解決頻帶主要無線電網路對頻譜使用率普遍偏低的問題。然而為了實現感知無線電的精神,感知無線電用戶在使用頻帶主要網路所擁有之頻譜帶時,勢必提供服務提供者及頻帶主要無線電網路額外的獎勵或利益,這相對提升了頻譜管理的難度。在本論文,我們考慮感知無線電基地台、服務提供者以及感知無線電用戶所組成的架構。我們提出一個基於拍賣模型來特徵化以及分析一些感知無線電使用者在感知無線電網路下之動態頻譜管理既有的問題特色(例如:感知無線電使用者之間的競爭關係以及對於無線通訊環境的不確定性)。基於這個模型,我們分析服務提供者如何經由感知無線電基地台利用”預先拍賣“來避免本身效能之下降。假設感知無線電使用者是自私的,我們表現這場拍賣是一個非合作式賽局,每一個感知無線電使用者理性的做出行為來最大化本身的利益,而整個系統的網路容量也達到最大化,同時服務提供者更可以動態調整得自感知無線電網路之額外利益收入。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe cognitive radio(CR) is proposed to utilize the unused bandwidth of primary radio network(PRN) where the authorized users(called primary users, PU) have the priority to transmit. Once when the cognitive users are allowed to transmit their traffic, it is inevitable to interfere the PU due to the collision. Though many channel detection algorithms have been proposed, however, the phenomena can not be eliminated. The incentive policies are usually to deploy so as to compensate the PU but to increase the difficulty of resource management. In order to realize the CR concept, the Cognitive Radio Base Stations(CR-BS), classified as the PU, have usually been assigned to manage the channels which allow CR users access the network. In this thesis we study the access control policy with variety performance indicators such as capacity and revenue under the QoS constraint. The auction algorithms are adopted to analyze the performance. In our study, the system is composed by regular PU, CR-BS, and CRs. The once when CR-BS detect that there are free channels, it inform the CR about the opportunity of access into the free channel. This auction-based control policy can be used to determine the permission of rejection of access requests from CR by control policy, capacity or revenue. The channel characteristics such as noise, interference, and threshold of receiving power intensity are also taken into consideration. Since the auction mechanism follows the concepts described in non-cooperative game theory, the primary assumptions for user behaviors such as the selfish and seeking the minimum cost and maximum profit or capacity are derived in the analysis. Variety performance indicators are used to evaluate those control algorithms under these assumptions. The main contributions for our study are to study those performance indicators including channel capacity and revenue with different access control algorithms by the using of auction theory. The optimization between the system capacity and revenue is also addressed in this paper.en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T06:04:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-100-R98942106-1.pdf: 1338586 bytes, checksum: d1cc631b97bb35a28d0525b617f2376b (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2011
en
dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
ABSTRACT iv
CONTENTS vi
LIST OF FIGURES x
LIST OF TABLES xii
Chapter 1 緒論(Introduction) 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 感知無線電網路 (Cognitive Radio Networks) 2
1.2.1 感知無線電系統由來 2
1.2.2 感知無線電網路終端之能力 3
1.2.3 感知無線電網路架構 7
1.3 賽局理論 (Game Theory) 10
1.3.1 賽局的定義 11
1.3.2 納許均衡(Nash Equilibrium) 15
1.4 研究動機 16
1.5 論文架構 18
Chapter 2 在感知無線電網路下基於拍賣方式之頻譜管理(Auction-based Spectrum Management in Cognitive Radio Network) 21
2.1 文獻探討(Related Work) 21
2.2 系統模型(System Model) 24
2.2.1 網路拓樸(Network Topology) 24
2.2.2 動態頻譜管理下之階層模型( Hierarchical Model for Dynamic Spectrum Management ) 24
2.3 拍賣機制(Auction Mechanisms) 26
2.3.1 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves拍賣 26
2.3.2 多重維度拍賣與出價之結合(Multi-Dimensional Auction with Pricing) 27
2.4 系統分析(System Analysis) 33
2.5 效能探討(Performance Evaluation) 35
2.5.1 系統環境參數 35
2.5.2 效能分析 36
2.6 本章回顧與結論(Conclusion) 39
Chapter 3 在感知無線電網路下基於拍賣方式之頻譜管理之價格分析(Price Analysis of Auction-based Spectrum Management in Cognitive Radio Network) 42
3.1 文獻探討(Related Work) 42
3.2 基於拍賣方式之頻譜管理價格分析(Price Analysis of Auction-based Spectrum Management) 43
3.2.1 頻譜價格搜尋演算法(Price Seeking Algorithm) 44
3.2.2 在感知無線電網路下頻譜管理之價格分析 45
3.2.3 在收益最大化下之價格分析 (Price Analysis of Revenue Maximization Problem) 47
3.3 效能探討(Performance Evaluation) 49
3.3.1 價格對系統效能影響之分析 49
3.3.2 拍賣參與人數目對收益影響之分析 51
3.3.3 可競標頻帶數目對收益影響之分析 53
3.4 本章回顧與結論(Conclusion) 55
Chapter 4 在感知無線電網路下基於拍賣方式及結合功率控制之頻譜管理(Auction-based Spectrum Management with Power Control in Cognitive Radio Network) 58
4.1 網路拓樸(Network Topology) 58
4.2 基於拍賣方式及結合功率控制之頻譜管理(Auction-based Spectrum Management with Power Control) 60
4.2.1 上行鍊路最佳化功率控制問題(Uplink Power Control Optimal Problem) 60
4.2.2 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Optimality Conditions[22] 61
4.2.3 最佳化功率控制演算法(Optimal Power Control Algorithm) 61
4.3 效能分析(Performance Evaluation) 65
4.4 本章回顧與結論(Conclusion) 68
Chapter 5 結 論( Conclusion) 71
5.1 研究總結 71
5.2 未來展望 72
REFERENCES 75
APPENDIX 79
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.title在感知無線電網路下基於拍賣架構之頻譜管理zh_TW
dc.titleAn Auction Framework for Spectrum Management in Cognitive Radio Networksen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear99-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee魏學文,金力鵬
dc.subject.keyword感知無線電網路,賽局理論,頻譜管理,拍賣理論,收益最佳化,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordGame theory,spectrum management,cognitive radio network,auction theory,revenue optimization,en
dc.relation.page82
dc.rights.note有償授權
dc.date.accepted2011-07-26
dc.contributor.author-college電機資訊學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept電信工程學研究所zh_TW
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