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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 蔣明晃 | |
dc.contributor.author | Bing-Jyun Hsieh | en |
dc.contributor.author | 謝秉均 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T05:55:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2006-07-14 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2006-07-14 | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2006-06-30 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
1.Atkingson, Scott E., Linda R. Stanley and Tschirhar, 1988.” Revenue sharing as an incentive in agency problem” , The RAND Journal of Economics. 2.Cachon, G. P. and Lariviere M., 2001. “Contracting to assure supply:How to share demand forecates in a supply chain”, Management science,Vol 47(5),629-646 3.Cachon, G. P.and Lariviere M., 2002. “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing: Strength and Limitations”, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 4.Cachon, G. P., Lariviere M., 2001. “Supply Chain Coordination with contracts”, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 5.Dana, Jr.J.D and Spier, K.E.,2001. “ Revenue sharing and Vertical control in the Video Rental Industry”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol.XLIX,223-45 6.David, E.M., and Dennis L. weisman Sappington(1996), “Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans”, Information Economics and policy 7.Dariene, C. Chisholm, 2005. “Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues”, The Journal of Law, Economics, Organization. 8.Eberhard Feess and Frank Stähler,2005,”Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues”, University of Otago Economics Discussion Papers 9.Gerchak, Y., Wang Y., 2003. Revenue Sharing vs wholesale-price contract in assembly system with random demand, Production operation Management 10.Ilaria, G. and Pierpaolo, P., 2004. “Supply Chain Coordination By Revenue sharing contracts”, Int. J. Production Economics, Vol.89,pp.131-139 11.Motimer, J.H., 2002. “The Effect of Rvenue sharing Contracts on Welfare in Vertically-Separated Markets: Evidence from the Video Rental Industry”, Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 12.Pasternack,B.A.,2001.”The Capacitated Newsboy Problem with Revenue Sharing”, Journal of Applied Mathematics and decision Science, Vol.5(1), 21-33 13.Shah, N., Gjerdrum J., and Papageorgiou L.G., 2001.”Transfer Prices For Mutienterprise Supply Chaun Optimization”,Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., Vol.40,pp.1650-1660. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34120 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 論文摘要
隨著資訊科技的進步及數位化的潮流,市場上出現大量的數位內容產品以及各式各樣播放數位內容的器材,而數位內容產品與其專屬的播放器材必須要共同在品質、創新與服務上都能夠滿足消費者的需求才能締造銷售的佳績。而在實務上契約(例如蘋果電腦公司和音樂商之間的契約)的訂定,是由硬體提供商針對每單位數位內容支付內容供應商一筆固定的費用,以取得提供其硬體購買者下載或購買的權利。但是,這樣的契約模式所給的報酬無法完全反應內容本身所提供的價值,因此內容供應商在追求其本身利益極大的考量下,做出的決策對於硬體銷售自然貢獻度較小,而造成全體的利益無法達到最大。因此本研究以蘋果電腦公司的iPod做為情境,針對一家硬體提供商及一家內容供應商之間,提出利潤分享契約及費用補貼契約與實務上的固定支付契約做比較,使雙方的目標一致而極大化整體的利潤。 首先,在給定的契約參數下,本研究建立不同契約中內容供應商與硬體提供商的期望利潤模型。這些契約包括固定支付契約、費用補貼契約及營收分享契約。希望找出在給定參數下能有效整合內容供應商及硬體提供商的契約;然後本研究進一步對契約中的重要參數進行調整以瞭解在各參數的變動下對於內容、硬體廠商利益及契約效果的影響,找出各契約所適用的情境及管理上的意涵。經由分析和比較的結果本研究可獲得以下結論: 1. 在其他條件不變下,利潤分享契約到達某個比例下可以使內容供應商做出使全體利益極大的決策,而不管利潤分享的比例為何,硬體供應商仍然能夠保有一定的獲利而不至於虧損。 2. 當增加數位內容種類的成本較高時,利潤分享契約較佳而當增加數位內容種類的成本較低時固定支付契約較佳。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Abstract
With the progress of information technology and the trend of digitalization, various digital contents and compatible players are emerging. Excellent sales for both digital content provider and player manufacturer are dependent on superior quality, service and innovation of products provided by both content providers and hardware suppliers. However, in practice under the current contracts, hardware suppliers always pay a fixed fee for digital contents such that the hardware buyers have a right to download or buy them. This mechanism can not give a reasonable reward for the value created by content providers. Thus, the content providers simply make their decision based on profit maximization of themselves and don’t take manufacturers’ profit into account, which will lower the total profit of whole supply chain. In this thesis, we compare the revenue sharing contract and expense subsidy contract compared with current contract and hope to find a effective tool for the better coordination and higher profit of whole supply chain, content provider and hardware supplier. Firstly, three contract model under a set of given parameters are developed and solved by a non-linear programming to obtain the profit of whole supply chain. Next, the sensitive analysis of important parameters is performed to explore the impact of parameters’ change on the profits of content provider and hardware manufacturer. Also, the applicable scenario for each contract is identified. Finally, the results show that: 1. If profits sharing contract which is adopted by content providers will maximize the total profit of whole supply chain and keep both content provider and hardware supplier profitable. 2. When the cost of developing different type of content is high, revenue sharing contract is better; on the other hand, when the cost of developing different type of content is low, fixed fee contract is better. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T05:55:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-R93741068-1.pdf: 887143 bytes, checksum: 9e4dc062abc2c6268afaf4282dd73349 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
目錄.....................................................Ⅰ 圖次.....................................................Ⅲ 表次.....................................................Ⅳ 第一章 緒論............................................1 1.1研究動機........................................1 1.2研究目的........................................2 1.3研究方法........................................3 1.4論文架構........................................5 第二章 文獻探討...........................................6 2.1 營收分享契約於存貨上的應用.....................6 2.2 營收分享契約在一致化誘因上的應用...............8 2.3 營收分享契約的限制.............................9 2.4 結論..........................................10 第三章 模型建立與求解....................................11 3.1 問題敘述......................................11 3.2 基本假設、符號說明及模型設定..................12 3.2.1 基本假設................................12 3.2.2 符號說明................................13 3.2.3 模型設定................................13 3.3 模型建立......................................15 3.3.1 全體利益極大化之模型....................15 3.3.2 收取固定費用之契約模型..................16 3.3.3 補貼下載費用之契約模型..................18 3.3.4 營收分享之契約模型......................19 3.4 模型求解範例..................................20 3.4.1 全體利益極大化模型......................21 3.4.2 收取固定費用契約模型....................21 3.4.3 補貼下載費用之契約模型..................21 3.4.4 營收分享之契約模型......................22 3.5 結論..........................................22 第四章 參數分析..........................................23 4.1 參數分析......................................23 4.1.1固定費用變化的影響.......................23 4.1.2補貼費率變動變化的影響...................26 4.1.3營收分享比率變動變化的影響...............28 4.1.4內容樣式的成本變動的影響.................29 4.1.5每單位內容的製作成本C2變動的影響.........30 第五章 結論與建議........................................32 5.1 研究結論......................................32 5.2 研究貢獻......................................33 5.3 研究限制......................................34 5.4 未來研究方向........................................35 參考文獻................................................36 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 協同數位內容供應商與硬體提供商之契約設計 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A contract design to coordinate didital content provider and hardware supplier | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 郭瑞祥 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳靜枝,周雍強 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 營收分享,數位內容,誘因,外部效果, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | revenue sharing,digital content,externality, | en |
dc.relation.page | 37 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2006-06-30 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 |
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