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標題: | 資產減損與盈餘管理之關聯性研究 A study of the relationship between asset impairment and earnings management. |
作者: | Ying-Mei Cheng 鄭英美 |
指導教授: | 蔡彥卿 |
關鍵字: | 資產減損,折現率,公司治理,盈餘管理, Asset Impairment,The Discount Rate,Earnings Management,Corporate Governance, |
出版年 : | 2006 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 我國財務會計準則委員會於民國93年發布財務會計準則35號公報「資產減損之會計處理準則」,由於資產減損會計處理涉及諸多假設和判斷,以致資產減損之金額、提列時點及減損後迴轉之時點等都易受到管理當局之操縱,因此資產減損之會計處理常淪為盈餘管理之工具;其中使用價值之折現率在現實環境中根本不可能找到真正理想的折現率,因此折現率之取決可能是35號公報在適用上最困難的議題且容易成為資產減損盈餘管理之工具。
綜上所述,本文針對我國93年年報或94年半年報已適用且提列資產減損之上市上櫃公司為樣本進行研究,試圖分析資產減損之認列與公司當期盈餘表現之關聯性,以探討我國資產減損之認列是否有盈餘操縱之疑慮;並且進一步針對財務報表上已揭露使用價值折現率之公司進行分析,探討公司是否有可能藉由折現率之操縱,以達到操縱盈餘之目的;實證結果顯示: 一、盈餘門檻與資產減損之金額存在顯著關聯性,顯示管理當局會因盈餘門檻而影響資產減損金額之提列,藉以達到洗大澡或盈餘平穩化之盈餘操縱。 二、折現率與盈餘門檻之間無顯著關聯性,顯示管理當局並不會因盈餘門檻,而高估折現率,藉以多認列資產減損而達到盈餘管理之目的。 三、使用價值之折現率與公司治理之間無顯著關聯性。 使用價值之折現率並未發現操縱之行為,本文認為可能原因為:(1)折現率之操縱並非其唯一工具,管理當局可能偏好其它操縱方式來影響資產減損,如現金流量之估計等。(2)可能已存在樣本偏差。(3)本研究以自行估計之加權平均資金成本(WACC)作為判斷標準,可能與企業所用以估計之折現率標準不一。 此外,本文發現有部分公司所採用之折現率明顯不合常理,如日馳(2.91%)、必翔(3.30%)、元隆(3.62%)、精碟(3.58%)及大展證券(1.78%)等公司,所採用之折現率低於中央銀行基本放款利率,而本文認為這些公司有可能係為了規避資產減損金額之認列,因而低估折現率。 Name :Ying-Mei Cheng Month / Year: June, 2006 Advisor :Yan-Ching Tsai Title :A study of the relationship between asset impairment and earnings management. Financial Accounting Standards Committee in Taiwan pronounced SFAS NO.35 “Accounting for Asset Impairment” in 2004. Since the implementation of SFAS NO.35 substantially involves accounting assumptions and estimates, firms maybe take advantage of SFAS NO.35 as an earnings management device. In addition, it is hard to obtain the ideal discount rate in the real world, so the determination of the discount rate may be another issue to be concerned and a source of earnings management after the adoption of SFAS NO.35. The paper tries to examine the association between the amount of asset impairment reported and firm’s current performance in exploration of the existence of earnings management. The sample consists of TSE & OTC listing firms, which have implemented SFAS NO.35 and recognized impairment in 2003 annual financial reports or 2004 semi-annual financial reports. The paper also examines whether firms intend to manage earnings through the manipulation of the discount rate. The empirical analysis reveals that: (1)The amount of asset impairment reported is significantly associated with the performance thresholds. The result indicates that managers may apply flexibility in the reporting decisions relating to asset impairment so as to smooth earnings or take big bath. (2)The discount rate is insignificantly associated with the performance thresholds. The result reveals that managers may not overestimate the discount rate so as to manage earnings. (3)The association between the discount rate and corporate governance is insignificant. There is no manipulation behavior for the discount rate of value in use, and the possible reasons are:(1) the discount rate is not the only device for the amount determination of the amount for asset impairment, and managers maybe prefer other ways- an estimate of cash flow, for example. (2) maybe there are sample biases. (3) WACC calculated in the paper may be not the standard which firms take for an estimate of the discount rate. In addition, I find that the discount rates taken by part of firms are unreasonable, SUNRACE (2.91%), PIHSIANG (3.30%), AMPI (3.62%), PRODISC (3.58%) and TACHAN(1.78%) et al., for example. The discount rates of these firms are below prime rate of Central Bank, and I think these firms may underestimate the discount rate to reduce the recognition of asset impairment. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34005 |
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