勞退新制實務運作及未來發展方向之建議

Abstract

退休計劃之基本目的為勞工有足夠的退休所得以支應其退休後生活，而退休計劃之成功與否的關鍵，則在於退休基金之經營及風險控管是否得宜，基金資產是否能同時兼具長期穩定成長與短期的流動性，使勞工所得替代率達到一般水準，對於台灣未來將大量採用確定提撥制之退休計劃而言，此課題尤為重要。 雖然相較於傳統依勞動基準法成立、採確定給付制之職工退休辦法，勞工退休金條例較能切合目前台灣勞動市場流動率高、企業平均壽命短的經濟環境，但由於勞工退休金條例僅針對勞工退休基金提撥方式作修改，退休基金經營方式仍就維持以往政府集中管理，潛在政府經營無效率以及嚴重的政府代理問題。 就制度設計的合理性分析方面，本文指出：1) 勞工退休金條例「以個人退休金帳戶為主、年金保險為輔」的措施除使勞工投資風險過度集中，亦扭曲採確定提撥制之退休計劃的基本精神，且可能使勞工退休年金保險商品因背負政府當初立法時的政治承諾，而發展有限；2) 理論上，參加採確定提撥制之退休計劃的勞工應自行投資、自行承擔退休基金之投資風險，但在勞工退休金條例的設計下，僅規定勞工應自行承擔政府所有的投資損失與融通政治目的的成本，但勞工並無『理財權利』，而對勞工的『理財教育』及『資訊公開』的機制亦嚴重不足；3) 勞工退休金條例僅解決未來退休準備金未足額提撥的問題，但對於勞工參加傳統退休計劃所累積的年資及高達二兆六千億元未提撥金額仍未有具體的解決方案，使中、高年齡層的勞工之退休生活堪虞。 本文除針對上述問題提出建議外，於各章節中明確指出未來政府與民間資產管理機構於台灣退休金產業所應辦演的角色。本文指出，政府在職業退休計劃中的主要責任應在於，建全勞工退休基金儲存的管道、確保勞工具備足夠的投資理財能力與權力，而非積極介入退休基金的經營，與民間資產管理機構形成競爭對手；民間資產管理機構的主要責任應為努力為勞工設計出多種穩健、具長期成長之退休投資商品，或建立資產管理服務機制，為未具理財能力或時間的勞工投資。具體的施實方式為：1) 保留、但逐漸縮小政府勞工退休基金的規模；2) 開放民間退休投資商品上架；3) 由金管會負責民間退休投資商品的管理；4) 將勞工個人退休金帳戶管理作業信託予銀行信託部，鼓勵銀行信託部、證券投資信託業者、壽險業者，以及其他投資機構相互結盟，於勞工提撥退休金時，銀行信託部將提供一份『勞工自選投資清單』，由勞工自行選擇投資上述機構所募集的退休投資商品或政府勞工退休基金。

The purpose of this submission is to point out the potential flaws of previous pension system and to propose some practical solutions that may undo the problems: A) According to newly proposed labor pension regulations, individual retirement account and pension insurance contracts constitute the two, but competing, panels for the labor pension system. The former is, by design, the principal element of retirement resources and is solely control by the government. The structure of the new system may suffer serious government agency problem and can be overly conservative, and cause lower earnings replacement ratio, compared to other developed countries’; B) By definition, as pension system transform toward defined contribution, employees are the risk taker of the pension investment. According to previous plan design, except for insurance contracts, employees are not allowed to participate fund investment, nor do they have sufficient information of how the fund are invested or how to invest the fund; C) The renovation of regulations, still, hasn’t fully resolve the ‘black hole’ of the pension funds. The estimated insufficient contribution of pension is more than two million million. The changes of regulation or the promise of government doesn’t tell the whole story of how the end the pension crisis. We suggest that the government should relinquish its role of pension investment and control to private assets investment entities. The relevant supervision and moderate penalty enforcements will be the key elements of the success of this transformation of privatization of pension funds. We propose three transit phases. First, a gradual decrease of government involvement on the pension funds, and establish of supervision system. Second, treat the insurance contracts as one of the ‘pension investment’, instead of a ‘pension panel’. Besides insurance contracts, government should encourage developments of moderate and privately operated investment objects, so that employees may have more portfolio choices based on their preference, occupation, and financial status. Third, return to the basic spirit of defined contribution plans: employees are the decision makers and risk takers. To avoid non-sophistication and over-optimistic investment of pension fund by individual investors, we propose that individual retirement account could be established in the various certified bank trusts. The bank trust should take the responsibility of education of the public at large, provide appropriate monthly investment checklists, and submit mandatory investment reports or other relevant disclosure to government agency.