垂直產品差異化下廠商廣告媒體選擇與產品線策略之研究

Abstract

本研究旨在探討當廠商面對品質偏好強度不同的消費者，廠商產品品質的定位對其廣告媒體選擇的影響，以及在考慮後續廣告媒體選擇下，對廠商的最適產品線決策的影響。目標廣告由於可以只把廣告訊息傳達給特定區隔，除了可節省浪費的廣告數量外，文獻亦指出其可緩和水平差異化的競爭。本文試圖建立一賽局模型假設在垂直產品差異化市場下，獨占廠商先決定廣告媒體策略後，再決定產品價格。研究發現廠商的廣告媒體策略除了受到目標廣告接觸率影響外，尚決定於產品品質、市場區隔相對大小及不同媒體間接觸高低端目標市場的重疊程度。而競爭者的加入將會增加廠商使用目標廣告之可能。此外，當消費者須仰賴廠商的廣告方能獲得產品資訊時，此種資訊不完美可能會使廠商多開發低端市場、轉換目標市場、放棄高端市場、或放棄低端市場。

We analyze the optimal advertising media strategies and product line design for a monopoly in a vertically differentiated market. We build a game-theoretic model where a monopoly chooses advertising media before setting the price(s) for its product(s). Our results show that the optimal media strategy depends not only on the reach rates of different media and the extent of different media overlapping with each other in reaching each segment but also on the size of each segment. In particular, the following results are obtained. First, when the valuation of consumers in the low-end segment also increases with product quality, the monopoly with the product of higher quality will have higher incentives to serve more consumers and thus to adopt uniform advertising strategy. Second, the introduction of competition will increase the likelihood that the monopoly chooses targeted advertising. Finally, compared with the case under perfect information, the monopoly under imperfect information may expand into the low-end market, change its target market(s), or gives up either the high-end or the low-end market.