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標題: | An Essay on Game Theory: Rationalizable
Behavior under Coalitional Interactions |
作者: | Chih-Chun Yang 楊智鈞 |
指導教授: | 羅曉(Xiao Luo) |
關鍵字: | Rationalizability,Coalition,Bayes Updating, |
出版年 : | 2006 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | We extend Ambrus’s [QJE, 2006] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutual beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations –i.e.
the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, not only against restricted subsets of strategies. In this paper we offer an alternative notion of c-rationalizability suitable for such complicated interactions. More specifically, following Bernheim’s [Econometrica 52(1984), 1007-1028] and Pearce’s[Econometrica 52(1984), 1029-1051] approach, we define c-rationalizability by the terminology “coalitional rationalizable set (CRS)”. Roughly speaking, a CRS is a product set of pure strategies from which no group of player(s) would like to deviate. We show that this notion of c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability. We also provide its epistemic foundation. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D81 |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/32144 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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