日本、韓國、台灣金融體制改革的比較政治經濟分析

Abstract

新古典經濟學者認為日本、韓國和台灣過去經濟成就係因遵循他們主張的外貿、金融自由化等「順應市場」政策建議，但在三者發生金融危機後卻指責是過去國家的干預市場、政商勾結之親信資本主義是禍首。而和新古典經濟學針鋒相對的發展型國家論者則主張，國家適度干預市場是經濟奇蹟的主因，但對金融危機發生的原因卻說是國家無法再適度干預市場，亦即發展型國家之發生金融危機是因為不再是發展型國家！ 本文認為這兩個理論對日、韓、台過去的經濟成就和近來發生經濟危機的解釋邏輯並不一貫，所以由比較三國發生危機的金融部門著手，藉新制度經濟學中的交易成本理論和代理人理論發展一個分析架構，比較東北亞三國金融體制的戰後原型的形成、金融自由化時期及危機之後的轉變，認為東北亞三國在戰後國際政經環境因素下，形成特殊的金融體制，其特徵在於重視政府、企業與金融機構間的協調，而非監控。不過，由於三者的政府-企業-金融機構間互動的差異，而使各自的金融體制在協調和監控特徵上的程度略有不同，其中韓國程度最高，日本居中，台灣則較低協調，這樣的差異導致三者爾後走向不同金融自由化的路徑。雖然金融體制內容有所差異，但同樣重視協調的特徵使日韓台得能迅速解決戰後復興導致的資金稀缺問題，進而將資金作為產業發展的工具而促成經濟奇蹟。 然而1970年代國際政經環境因素的變化和1980年代民主化要求的壓力，使東北亞三國的金融自由化過度著重在打破原有金融體制的協調機制，而朝向監控的強化。但三者的國家、企業和金融機構仍然依循原有的金融體制特徵行動，而產生行為和體制上的不搭；加上監控尚未完全常規化，終而導致金融體制協調和監控的不均衡，進而埋下金融危機的導火線。東北亞三國對前述內外壓力的自我調整並不相同，使金融體制協調和監控不均衡的程度也有所差異，金融危機程度因此也不相同。不過，金融危機的發生和處理，都促使東北亞三國進行政經改革，但三者改革的程度也有所差異：危機前金融體制不均衡程度最嚴重的韓國危機也最深，故造成的反彈改革力量最大，改革程度也最高；日本則居中，台灣的危機最輕，反彈的改革力量也最小，改革程度也最低。 對危機後的改革是否使東北亞三國朝向英美式的「管制型國家」，新古典主義者認為是，而發展型國家論則承認發展型國家正在適應新的全球化政經環境，但不見得只有「管制型國家」一途。本文贊同發展型國家的觀點，並結合交易成本理論和代理人理論指出，東北亞三國的改革雖然採用了許多美英國家(尤其是美國)的政策措施，但改革方向皆是希望找到協調和監控的均衡。雖然理論並無法明確說明協調和監控的均衡，但本文的比較個案研究則說明日本、韓國的國家在退出干預市場、由市場協調時，除了國家的監控之外，也制度化鼓勵小股東集體行動的社會力量，主動對企業和金融機構監控的誘因機制，因而脫出新古典經濟學和發展型國家論在國家與市場間的爭論。「將社會與集體行動帶回來」可成為進一步理論性思索協調與監控如何均衡的出發點。

Why were Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (hereafter JKT) which had great economic performance hammered by financial crisis? The two mainstream schools, neoclassic economists (NE) and capitalist developmental statists (CDS) can not give a consistent explanation. What’s matter with the JKT’s financial regime in the past fifty years? The author argues that the two schools are according to the method of case study in particular time to evolve their arguments with the result of theoretical inconsistency. Comparing the building, evolving of JKT’s financial regimes which induce the 1990s’ crisis can give us a whole map to review and rethink the political economy behind the scenes. Beside the financial institution, e.g. banks, NBFIs, the financial regime also includes the state, the industries and the relationships each other. Based on the transaction cost theory and principle-agency theory of the new institution economy (NIE), the financial regime is characterized by coordination mode or control/monitor mode. In order to make the two modes opearationalized, the financial regime is subdivided into five political economic aspects: the character of political regime, the relationship between the politician and bureaucracy, and the state-finance, the state-industry, the industry-finance. Each aspect is provided with proxy indexes to indicate either the coordination mode or control/monitor mode. According to the new institution economy theory, the author argues that the JKT’s wonderful economic performance is due to the coordination mode of financial regime. But the degree of coordination of each state’s post WWII prototype is different: the higher is South Korea, the lower is Taiwan, and Japan’s is between them. Under the pressures of international political economic changes and democratization in the 1970-1980s, these differences indicate JKT’s hereafter different financial liberalization paths with result that the financial regimes’ degree of coordination is lower, and the degree of control/monitor is not increased in the meantime. The disequilibrium of financial regime, and mismatch between changing regime and actors’ inertias lead to the 1990s’ financial crisis. The Author argues that, the seriousness of financial crisis is depended on the degree of disequilibrium and mismatch. The comparative cases studies support this argument: South Korea’s most disequilibrium leads to the most serious financial crisis; Taiwan’s lighter disequilibrium causes the slighter crisis; Japan’s is between them. JFK take a lot of policy reforms to reshape their financial regime to seek the equilibrium after crisis. The NE argues JFT will converge to the “regulatory state”, the CDS against this argument and argues JFT is only adaptation, not transformation, but they can not tell contents of adaptation exactly. The NIE can not indicate the equilibrium precisely either. Finally, this comparative studies point out the Japan and South Korea institutionalize the incentive system of small shareholder’s collective action to control/monitor the enterprises in order to balance the latter’s higher coordination. The author suggests this “bringing the society and collective action back in” may provide some clues to think further, theoretically how to get the equilibrium between coordination and control/monitor.