冷戰後臺日中三邊關係下的日本兩岸政策發展

Abstract

所謂「日本兩岸政策」，是指二戰之後日本對中國政策以及對臺灣政策的集合。換言之，只有其決策之對象是臺灣與中國，且決策之意義可突顯出日本因應或改變臺日中三邊關係的變化以維持自身國家利益者，才是本文所要探討、解釋的部份。而冷戰後臺日中互動頻繁，三邊關係的變遷與日本兩岸政策互為影響，因此本文將研究時點置於冷戰後至今十餘年。本文所採用之理論工具，為1970年代為解釋美中蘇三國既合作又競爭此一現象所構思出來的戰略三角理論。 按照戰略三角理論，到2006年為止，本文將日本兩岸政策分成六個階段。 1990年到1994年間，日本一方面摸索新型態的中日關係，一方面也因為兩岸關係的和緩而認識到必須拉近臺日關係以維護自身利益。到了1995年，由於實現國家戰略的手段產生變化，再加上臺海危機已威脅日本生存利益，在兩岸關係惡化的前提下，只要維持住臺日關係友好，日本對中政策是可以暫時強硬，中日關係亦可以容忍倒退以避免自身戰略利益受損。此後只要日本向中國尋求關係改善，日本即可以佔據最有利之樞紐角色，中國也因可以擺脫孤雛提升至側翼而欣然與日本和解，因此我們可以看見1997年到1999年日本在經貿上從兩岸方面各獲得不少利益。2000年到2006年，臺日中三邊關係在結構變遷上重新循環，再度從三邊家族型戰略三角過渡到婚姻型B，再從婚姻型B擺盪至羅曼蒂克型A戰略三角。而本文也認為，日本屢屢不能從朋友直接攀升至樞紐，而是必須先平行過渡到與朋友效益相同之夥伴，才能上升到樞紐的原因，在於中日兩國面對雙邊利益矛盾時陷入囚徒困境，必須等到中國態度轉趨靈活務實之後，日本才有辦法與中國修好。而日本的兩岸政策，筆者認為具有五大特徵，其政策重心就是維持日本在臺日關係與中日關係間的平衡，從重中輕臺改變成「重中親台」。 檢視日本十餘年來的兩岸政策發展，筆者認為確實符合現實主義之理性。而從研究看來，1990年到1994年以及2000年到2002年的三角結構顯示了臺灣其實在臺日中三角關係是具有能動性以及自主性的，不單只是中日兩國間的一個議題。因此臺灣可以主動制訂策略改變三角結構，提升自我效益。就結構的演變規律來看，目前已走到羅曼蒂克型A，對臺灣較可行的策略便是同中國一起改善兩岸關係，至少改善成不好不壞的關係，將日本從樞紐的地位拉下來。

The so-called “Japan’s cross-strait policy” refers to the collection of policies toward China and Taiwan after World War II. In other words, this thesis only investigates and explains policies concerning Taiwan and China, and those with significance that accentuates Japan’s attempts to keep its national interests while dealing with the changing trilateral relations with Taiwan, Japan, and China. There were frequent interactions among Taiwan, Japan and China after the Cold War. The changing trilateral relations and Japan’s cross-strait policy had had impact on each other. This thesis focuses on the period lasting for more than ten years, namely, from the end of the Cold War to the present. This thesis has adopted the theoretical tool called strategic triangle theory, which was developed in 1970s to explain the cooperative yet competitive relations among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Using the strategic triangle theory, up until 2006, this thesis divides Japan’s cross-strait policy into six stages. From 1990 to 1994, Japan was, on the one hand, exploring the possibility of a new type of China-Japan relation. On the other hand, Japan had recognized the need to develop a closer tie with Taiwan to protect its self-interests given that cross-strait tension had been eased. In 1995, the national strategic methods had changed, plus the cross-strait crisis became a threat to Japan’s survival. Under such worsened cross-strait circumstances, Japan had to be temporarily tough on China to keep its friendship with Taiwan. To protect its strategic interests, Japan could even tolerate a deteriorating China-Japan relation. Under such conditions, Japan could take the pivot by improving relations with China. And China would be happy to do so because it could then lift itself up from an outcast to become a wing. As a result, from 1997 to 1999, we observe that Japan had garnered much economic and trade interests from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. From 2000 to 2006, the trilateral relations of Taiwan, Japan, and China repeated the circle of structural changes, again shifting from Menage a trois strategic triangle to marriage B strategic triangle, and then swinging from marriage B strategic triangle to romantic A strategic triangle. Japan could only transit itself to partner, which is of the same effect of friend, and then elevate to pivot. Japan has repeatedly failed to climb directly from friend to pivot. This thesis makes the point that such failures result from the prisoner’s dilemma facing China and Japan while they are both trapped in bilateral interest confrontations. Japan can only make up with China if China adopts flexibility and pragmatism. And I think there are five significant traits to Japan’s cross-strait policy. The objective of the policy is to keep the balance between Taiwan-Japan relation and China-Japan relation, and changing the stance from China-leaning and neglecting Taiwan to valuing China and hobnobbing with Taiwan. After examining Japan’s cross-strait policy development for over the past ten years, I think it fits the ration of realism. Research shows that the triangle structure in the 1990-1994 period and 2000-2002 periods has demonstrated that Taiwan enjoys motility and independence in the trilateral relations of Taiwan, Japan, and China. Taiwan is not just an “issue” being discussed by China and Japan. Therefore, Taiwan can actively change the triangle structure by working out self-interested strategies. As far as the structural pattern is concerned, Taiwan has reached the stage of romantic A. A plausible strategy for Taiwan is to work hand in hand with China to improve bilateral relation to at least the extent of mediocre level, toppling Japan from the pivot status.