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DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 杜榮瑞 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chia-Jung Wu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 吳佳蓉 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T01:43:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-07-16 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2007-07-16 | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2007-07-10 | |
dc.identifier.citation | References
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/30200 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 近年來國內外知名企業發生一連串之財務舞弊,顯現企業內部控制未能發揮預期功效,促使業界與學界致力於加強內部控制有效性之議題。本研究之目的在探討獨立董事以及控制-家族持股對內部控制有效性之影響,希冀提供在制定政策時之參考。
本研究係按2002年二月至2006年十二月之間上市公司為樣本;內部控制有效性之衡量方式是根據公司初次申請上市公開說明書內,所含上市前三年內部控制缺失建議點數;獨立董事比例以及控制-家族持股比例之資料則取自各公司年報與台灣經濟新報資料庫。在刪除資料遺漏值與金融產業類股後,總共取得一百五十六筆有效樣本,採用迴歸分析對樣本資料予以分析。 實證結果如下: 一、 獨立董事比例與內部控制重大缺失數量無顯著關係 二、 控制-家族持股比例與內部控制重大缺失數量有顯著正向關係 是故,除了證交法第十四條之二針對獨立董事設置之規定外,主管機關亦應考量控制-家族持股,以提高內部控制有效性。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Recent years have seen many cases of fraudulent financial reporting occurred around the world. The importance of corporate governance has thus regained the attention from academics, practitioners and policy makers. Internal control is an essential and integral part of corporate governance and the implementation and effectiveness of internal control have become more important than before. The aim of this study attempts to explore how independent directors associate with the effectiveness of internal control and how managerial-family shareholding relates to the effectiveness of internal control.
This study uses the deficiencies in internal control quoted from the Prospectus for the Initial Public Offering of each sampled corporation as a measure of internal control effectiveness. The data for the factors associated with internal controls-percentage of independent directors, and managerial-family shareholding-are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal Database. The results based on 156 companies becoming listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange in the period from December 2002 to February 2006 are as follows: 1. There is no significant relationship between percentage of independent directors and the incidence of material deficiencies in internal control. 2. There is a positive and significant relationship between managerial-family shareholding and the incidence of material deficiencies in internal control. The results of this study suggest the policymakers that, while promoting internal control, managerial-family shareholding should be taken into account. Limitations and suggestions for future research are offered. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T01:43:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-96-R94722048-1.pdf: 2537621 bytes, checksum: 5733938d320bcf6053450e84f9dc054f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定文件…………………i
Acknowledgements…………………ii 中文摘要……………………………iv 英文摘要……………………………v Contents……………………………vii Tables………………………viii I. Introduction……………1 Motivation and Objectives…………………………1 Structure of the Thesis……………4 II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development…………5 Background……………………………………5 COSO Report………………………………5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404…………………6 Internal Control Standard of PCAOB……………7 Evaluation of Internal Control……………………10 Factors Associated with Corporate Governance Effectiveness…12 Board Structure……………………………… 13 Managerial-Family Shareholding………… 15 Other Factors…………………………………18 III. Research Design …………………………………21 Sample Selection and Data Sources…………21 Measurement of Internal Controls Effectiveness…23 Corporate Governance Variables………………26 Board Structure………………………………26 Managerial Family-shareholding…………26 Control Variables………………………………28 Empirical Model…………………………………30 IV. Empirical Results…………………………………31 Descriptive Statistics………………………31 Analysis of Multi-Collinearity……………37 Multiple Regression Analysis………………39 Testing for Hypothesis 1…………………42 Testing for Hypothesis 2…………………44 Effects of Control Variables…………46 V. Conclusion and Suggestions………………………48 Conclusion……………………………………48 Limitations………………………………………50 Suggestions………………………………………51 Suggestions for Future Research…………51 Suggestions for Policy-makers……………52 References………………………………………………54 Appendix I -Questionnaire……………………………58 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 獨立董事、家族持股與內部控制有效性之關聯性探討 | zh_TW |
dc.title | An Empirical Examination of the Relationships among Independent Directors, Family Ownership and
Effectiveness of Internal Control | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 95-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王全三,黃德芬 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 內部控制,公司治理,獨立董事,控制-家族持股, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | internal control,corporate governance,independent directors,managerial-family shareholding, | en |
dc.relation.page | 65 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2007-07-11 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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