地方財政與軟性預算限制：台灣地區之研究

Abstract

近十幾年來台灣地方財政狀況急遽惡化，許多地方政府必須仰賴中央政府的補助才能避免破產。地方財政困窘的成因大致上可歸納為兩個層次。在財政制度面上，稅收豐裕的稅目多劃歸中央，導致地方政府自有財源不足；另財政制度所引發的政府行為面上，地方政府長期養成依賴中央政府補助的心態，中央亦透過財政補助以控制地方政府行政，「控制-依賴」的關係給予地方政府擴大支出的誘因，使中央政府被迫予以援助，形成公共支出的無效率及財政失衡。 為分析地方政府是如何養成依賴心態，並如何迫使中央政府給予援助，而造成無效率的公共支出，本文應用「軟性預算限制」的概念分析地方財政問題。其次，本文修正Doi and Ihori（2006）的兩期三階段賽局模型，以探討中央與地方之間的財政互動關係。再利用1987年至2005年台灣地方財政資料進行實證分析，實證結果發現，地方政府會因為隔年度的補助收入預算、統籌分配稅款收入預算或是當年度的追加減預算增加，而提高當年度的支出，顯現台灣地方財政存在著「軟性預算限制」問題。此外，本文並發現1999年財政收支劃分法修訂，造成結構性的變革，影響了地方政府的預期心理及行為，使「軟性預算限制」問題有所改善。 欲健全台灣地方財政，徹底根除「控制-依賴」關係，中央政府必須調整「家長主義」心態，地方政府亦須有為自身財政負責的認知，不再依賴中央補助的觀念。未來財政收支劃分法的修訂必須納入「懲罰」機制，強迫地方政府遵守財政紀律，減少無效率的支出行為，至於保留統籌分配稅款則須儘量朝向公式化、效率化方式分配，降低人治色彩，將能有效改善地方財政困境。

The financial problems of local governments in Taiwan have aggravated greatly in the recent decades. Many local governments have to rely on grants from the central government in order to avoid bankruptcy. Local financial distress can be resulted from two main causes. First, the central government gathers most of the important tax revenues, which lead to local government suffering from fiscal shortage. Second, regarding the behavior of central and local governments, the local are accustomed to relying on the grants form the central. Through these grants, the central government gains control over the local government. The “control vs. reliant” relationship gives the local government inducement to expand public expenditure, for the central government is forced to bail-out. This would lead to a waste of public expenditures and cause an unbalance of local governmental finance. In order to analyze how the local government acquired a habit of relying on the central and how it forces the central government to grant, which causes a waste in public expenditure, we apply the concept of “soft budget constraint” for local governmental finance problems. Furthermore, we emend the model of two-period three-stage game of Doi and Ihori (2006). It discusses the interaction between the central and local governments. We then use the fiscal data in Taiwan from 1987 to 2005 for empirical analysis. The empirical result shows that local governments will increase the current year's budget expenditures according to the future increase on the grant revenues, the centrally-allotted tax revenues of the following year or the increase in the supplementary budget for the current year. This outcome reveals that the local governmental finance in Taiwan has a problem of “soft budget constraint.” We also find that the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures in 1999 resulted in a transform in financial structure, which has affected the behavior of local governments and allowed the problem of “soft budget constraint” to be improved. To study the local governmental finance in Taiwan and exterminate the “control vs. reliant” relationship, the central government should amend the “paternalism.” On the other hand, local governments have to take accountability for it's own finance and not wholly rely on central grants. In the future we suggest to setup a “punishment” system into the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures. This will force the local government to follow fiscal disciplines and decrease inefficient expenditures. The reserve of centrally-allotted tax should be allotted based on formula allocation to reduce artificial interference. This would improve the financial shortage of local governments.