管理階層具會計師事務所經歷、門檻心理與盈餘管理之研究

Abstract

安隆(Enron)案的爆發，美國一連串的會計弊案，震驚全球資本市場。國內也接連爆發出博達、訊碟、皇統等企業舞弊案，會計師首當其衝。投資人對會計師事務所的審計品質與審計人員的獨立性產生質疑。安隆案不僅僅是突顯非審計公費對獨立性損害的疑慮，也點出另一個可能危害獨立性的情況，那就是安隆公司的高階管理人員部分來自其查核事務所(安達信會計師事務所)，投資人不免懷疑旋轉門關係是否會傷害審計人員的獨立性。 本研究的目的在於探討公司之董事、主要經理人或財會主管具會計師事務所經驗(來自查核事務所)是否易於進行盈餘管理，並探討其盈餘管理的目的為何，是否從事盈餘管理以達到特定盈餘門檻。 實證結果顯示，若公司之董事、主要經理人或財會主管具會計師事務所經驗，則公司較易操縱增加盈餘；而來自查核事務所之管理階層部分則未發現有顯著盈餘管理之情形。接著探討管理階層盈餘管理的目的為何，發現公司的管理階層確有為了達到分析師之預期而向上操縱盈餘。而在避免損失與盈餘減少方面，本研究並未發現管理階層為了避免損失與盈餘減少而有顯著盈餘管理的行為。進一步分析管理階層具會計師事務所經驗是否較易達到特定盈餘門檻，則無論在操縱增加或減少盈餘的公司中，本研究均未發現若公司之管理階層具會計師事務所經驗較易進行盈餘管理以達到「報導盈餘為正」、「維持去年盈餘水準」，以及「分析師之預期」這三個門檻。

The unprecedented media and regulatory attention on auditor independence issues following the collapse of Enron Corporation has brought the “revolving door” into sharp focus. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000), and the Independence Standards Board (ISB, 1999) suggest that audit quality can be impaired when executives previously worked for their companies’ audit firms. This study investigates whether the management of companies with working experience of CPA firms engages in earnings management more easily. In addition, this study also examines whether the management has incentives to manipulate earnings to exceed the following three earnings thresholds: report positive profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts’ expectations. Using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, 1995) to calculate discretionary accruals from 2003 to 2005, this study finds that companies employing management with working experience of CPA firms reported larger positive discretionary accruals than other companies, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect discretionary accruals. In addition, this study also observes that companies just meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts report larger positive discretionary accruals.