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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/29131完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 宋玉生 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Tse Wu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 吳政澤 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T00:41:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-07-25 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2007-07-25 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2007-07-25 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 何泰寬 (1992), 「犯罪的經濟學分析」, 臺灣大學經濟學研究所碩士論文
陳柏如 (1992), 「獎勵私人捐贈公共財-兩種政策的比較」, 臺灣大學經濟學研究所碩士論文 郭凌志 (2001), 「破案的嚇阻、監禁及區域效果-以汽車竊盜為例」, 東吳大學經濟學研究所碩士論文 許義忠 (1995), 「Stackelberg賽局與不完全訊息下之公共財捐獻均衡」, 輔仁大學經濟學研究所碩士論文 鄧曉鋼、周愫嫻 (1995), 「法律處罰的嚇阻作用：警察的逮捕行為可否減少竊盜犯的再犯率」, 犯罪學期刊, 第1期, 113-124 廖福村 (1995), 「處罰與嚇阻成效之探討」, 警專學報, 第1卷第8期, 269-278 Becker, G.S. (1968), 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,' Journal of Political Economy 78, 169-217. Bergstrom, T.C. and R.P. Goodman (1973), 'Private Demands for Public Goods,' American Economic Review, 63, 280-296. Blakely, E. J. and M.G. Snyder (1997), Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, Washington, D.C.: Brookings. Cameron, S. (1968), 'The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, ' Kyklos, 41, 343-363. Campbell, G. and B. Reingold (1994), 'Private security and public policing in Canada,' Juristat Service Bulletin , 14(10), Canadian Center for Justice Statistics. Clotfelter, C.T. (1977), 'Public Services, Private Substitutes and the Demand for Protection Against Crime,' American Economic Review, 67, 867-877 Clotfelter, C.T. (1994), 'Private Security and the Public Safety,' Journal of Urban Economics, 5(3), 388-402. Cook. P.J. (1986), 'The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities,' Crime and Justice, 7, 1-26. De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono (1990), 'Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly,' Journal of Economic Surveys, 4, 1-17. Deutch, J., S. Hakim and J. Weinblatt (1987), 'A Micro Model of the Criminal's Location Choice,' Journal of Urban Economics, 22(2), 198-208. Dickens, W. (1986), 'Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with A Psychological Twist,' Journal of Public Economics, 30, 97-107. DiIulio, J. (1996), 'Help Wanted: Economists, Crime, and Public Policy,' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 3-24. Foldvary, F. (1994), Public Goods and Private Communities. Brookfield: Edward Elgar. Helsley, R.W. and W.C. Strange (1998), 'Private Government,' Journal of Public Economics, 69, 281-304. Helsley, R.W. and W.C. Strange (2005), 'Mixed Market and Crime,' Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1251-1275. Hui-Wen, K. and I.P.L. Png (1994), 'Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion?' International Review of Law and Economics, 14, 87-101. Lacroix, G., and N. Marceau (1995), 'Private Protection Against Crime,' Journal of Urban Economics, 37, 72-87. Mookherjee, D. and I.P.L. Png (1994), 'Marginal deterrence in Enforcement of Law' Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1039-1066. Oates, W.E. (1988), 'On the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods,' Journal of Urban Economics, 24, 85-94. Pogue, T. F. (1975), 'Effect of Police Expenditures on Crime Rates: Some Evidence,' Public Finance Quarterly, 3, 14-44. Shearing, C.D. (1992), The relation between public and private policing, in M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.) Modern Policing. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Steven Shavell (1991), 'Individual precautions to prevent theft: Private versus socially optimal behavior,' International Review of Law and Economics, 11(2), 123-132 Tullock, G. (1974), 'Does Punishment Deter Crime?' The Public Interest, 14, 103-111. Wildasin, D.E. (1988), 'Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition' Journal of Public Economics, 35, 229-240. Williams, R.A. (1984), Interactions between government and private outlays: Education in Australia, 1949-50 to 1981-1982. The Economic Record, 317-325. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/29131 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文以Helsley and Strange(2005)的犯罪模型為基礎再加以修改，其內容是探討社會犯罪體系下資源配置衍生的問題、相互關係以及可能的解決方式。Helsley and Strange的模型之中僅利用兩期的賽局嘗試著來解釋現今社會對犯罪行為的資源分配並不具效率性，但卻未提及外部效益所帶來的影響，亦只說明了為何會產生此現象的原因。在資訊流通的前提下，本文的目的在於藉由政府誠實地宣示其決策與資源的外部性影響，試圖修正模型本身、求解過程及闡釋上文遺留下來的問題，探討有否達成資源配置效率性的可能。本文的模型結果顯示：政府事先宣示政策的設定之下對防制犯罪的資源配置有所改善，然而亦限定在具外部效益的公共財上才有效果，一旦市場上充斥著公共財與私有財兼具的防制犯罪資源，其效果仍然有限。因此，理論上關於犯罪的經濟模型仍有許多擴充與改善的空間，等著許多人去探討。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T00:41:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-96-R91323040-1.pdf: 371215 bytes, checksum: 1d4a076f9d0ea08db5cf789e5d9464ee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 ii
中文摘要 iii 文獻回顧 iv 第一章 研究動機與目的 1 第二章 犯罪模型與選擇 2 第一節 模型的架構 2 第二節 模型的設定 4 第三節 目標的選定 7 第四節 市場結清 10 第三章 個體目標與政府的決策 18 第一節 私人防範水準的決定 18 第二節 政府的決策 24 第四章 結論 26 參考文獻 27 附錄 30 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 市場機制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 私人防範水準 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 一般性效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 具體效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 犯罪嚴重性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 犯罪率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公共防範水準 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 社會福利 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 比較靜態分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | free rider | en |
| dc.title | 犯罪行為與防制犯罪之資源配置的經濟分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Economic Analysis of Crime and Resource Allocation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 95-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 古慧雯,林明仁 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 犯罪率,犯罪嚴重性,具體效果,一般性效果,公共防範水準,私人防範水準,市場機制,比較靜態分析,社會福利, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | free rider, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 37 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2007-07-25 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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