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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 林正弘(Cheng-Hung Lin),楊金穆(Chin-Mu Yang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Hao-Cheng Fu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 傅皓政 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T00:36:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-07-31 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2007-07-31 | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2007-07-26 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Adams, E. (1975), The Logic of Conditionals, Dordrecht: Reidel.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/29035 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 這篇論文的主要目的在於提供一個新的進路,用以消解條件句理論中瑞姆濟試驗和保存判準的不相容性。自弗雷格(G. Frege)在十九世紀末創建現代符號邏輯(通稱為古典邏輯)以來,邏輯學家們注意到以古典邏輯中的「A | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The main purpose of this dissertation is to provide a new approach to resolve the incompatibility between the Ramsey test and the Preservation criterion. Since G. Frege established modern symbolic logic at the end of the 19th century (in general called classical logic), logicians noted that it was inappropriate to express the form of sentence ‘if A, then B’ in our ordinary language into the form of ‘A | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T00:36:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-96-D91124004-1.pdf: 1007386 bytes, checksum: f1e169ef94dc216dd41f908c6b2b49bb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
口試委員會審定書………………………………………….. i 致謝…………………………………………………………….. ii 中文摘要………………………………………………………. iii 英文摘要………………………………………………………. vi 導 論…………………………………………………………. 1 第一章 動態知識論的模型……………………………… 20 第一節 AGM理論的模型理論進路…………………… 21 第二節 AGM理論處理的對象─知識狀態…………… 28 第三節 信念變遷的函應…………………………… 35 第四節 知識上的牢固性……………………………. 49 第五節 最小變動原則與純粹縮減…………………. 56 第二章 瑞姆濟試驗與保存判準………………………... 65 第一節 條件句與實質蘊涵…………………………. 66 第二節 瑞姆濟試驗…………………………………. 72 第三節 保存判準與瑣碎性問題……………………. 84 第四節 瑞姆濟試驗與保存判準的不相容性………. 90 第三章 解決瑣碎性問題的策略………………………... 96 第一節 瑣碎性問題的預設及雷外的策略…………. 97 第二節 葛登福斯的策略……………………………. 108 第三節 洛特的策略…………………………………. 115 第四節 其他立場與評價……………………………. 120 第四章 威廉森的知識論進路…………………………… 130 第一節 模型的元素-知識狀態……………………. 131 第二節 回到知識本身………………………………. 134 第三節 知識的非清晰性與證據……………………. 142 第五章 威廉森與條件句…………………………………. 150 第一節 反事實條件句的知識…………………….. 151 第二節 形上學模態與反事實條件句………………. 160 第三節 條件句的知識………………………………. 168 第四節 描繪知識的模型……………………………. 174 第五節 條件句的斷言規則…………………………. 182 結 論………………………………………………………….. 188 參考文獻………………………………………………………. 196 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 信念變遷與條件句
──消解瑞姆濟試驗和保存判準不相容性的一個進路 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Belief Change and Conditionals:
An Approach to Resolve the Incompatibility of Ramsey Test and Preservation Criterion | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 95-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.advisor-orcid | ,楊金穆(cmyang@ntu.edu.tw) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 方萬全(Wan-Chuan Fang),彭孟堯,趙之振 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 條件句,信念變遷,瑞姆濟試驗,威廉森,知識, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Conditional,Belief change,Ramsey Test,Tim Williamson,Knowledge, | en |
dc.relation.page | 203 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2007-07-26 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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