寡占業者聯合行為之研究-以中油、台塑個案為例

Abstract

中文摘要 中油、台塑兩大供油商於油價調整上常同漲同跌。公平會乃主動介入調查，並得出了兩大供油商有聯合行為的結論。本文有鑑於此，乃欲以本案例出發，為聯合行為規範之研究。最後本文得出如下結論： 一、同質寡占市場的廠商中往往維持相同的定價，且其價格決定通常呈現同漲同跌、易漲難跌等價格僵固性之情形。廠商間並無勾結意圖，所為之價格跟隨行為，係屬合法之平行行為。倘廠商間彼此係共謀而為價格決定，其行為乃屬具可非難性「一致性行為」。判斷事業間是一致性行為或有意識的平行行為，最重要處即在於「合意」有無的證明。 二、「合意」與否之證明，得以間接證據來證明事業間「合意」的存在。然為免擴大解釋，間接證據需達於依經驗法則，事業間確有聯合行為之合意，為外部行為一致之「唯一合理」解釋，始足以論斷。 三、又聯合行為合意的產生，必然需事業間有某種程度上的默契，而這種默契的產生，以事業間有某種程度的「接觸」為前提。 四、價格資訊交換需考慮其動機，若是市場關於價格資訊本來就可以快速流通的情形下，則價格資訊交換應認為正常之經濟行為。 五、公平會對於兩大供油商之聯合調價行為，可以公平法第5條第2項及第10條第2款之規定，判斷兩大供油商之合理獲利空間，避免兩大供油商對價格有不當決定、維持或變更之行為。

Abstract This research is a case study of Fair Trade Commission (hereafter 'FTC') fining Chinese Petroleum Corp. (hereafter 'CPC') and Formosa Petrochemical Corp. (hereafter 'FPC') for violating the Fair Trade Law by constituting concerted action. In Taiwan, there are only two firms in gasoline production market. The market structure is considered as duopoly. In 2005, FTC considered that CPC and FPC had utilized media to trade pricing information to make their own pricing decision. Therefore, FTC decided that these two companies had constituted a concerted action that violated the Fair Trade Law of the R.O.C. However, there are controversial opinions on this issue. The most important is that based on economic theories it is common that price leader-follower model appears in oligopoly market, especially in duopoly. This thesis discusses the appropriateness of the rule on this issue and tries to offer opinion on some related issues of the concerted action. As for the structure of this thesis, first, Chapter 1 introduces this case and Chapter 2 reviews the related studies. In Chapter 3, some issues of ‘concerted action’ in practice are discussed. Then, Chapter 4 analyzes other related cases. In Chapter 5, regulations of some other countries are reviewed, so as to suggest amendments for the Fair Trade Law of the R.O.C. Chapter 6 concludes all the issues mentioned and offers some opinion of the author. Finally, Chapter 7 makes a brief conclusion of this thesis.