慈惠可以是道德上被要求的嗎？

Abstract

在我們日常生活的道德實踐中，作為一個道德行為者，在很大的程度上，與如何回應他人的需要有關。在不涉及任何可執行的制度性規範的情況下，如何回應需要乃是關於慈惠的議題。在這樣的情境中，作為一個盡責的道德行為者，我們必須了解：在道德的觀點下，他人的需要一般而言意謂著什麼。是否任何真切的需要，無關乎所涉及的人際關係，都會衍生出幫助他人的道德理由？如果確實如此，這是否隱含著一項慈惠的義務有可能存在？ 本文第一章所進行的工作，正是去指認並證成幫助他人的道德理由。在尋找此一理由的過程中，藉由一個假設情境，我們同時發現此一理由具有自身便足以奠定道德要求的份量。因此，如果它確實存在，也就存在著一項一般而言幫助他人的義務。本章第二部份的工作乃是要展示此一理由的規範效力，或者一項一般而言的慈惠的義務，如何能以康德提出的方式獲得證成。 為了完成對一項一般而言的慈惠的義務的論證，在第二章中我們必須處理有關慈惠的行為之道德品類的論爭。更確切地說，我們必須透過理論與實踐的觀點來檢驗，是否「對他人慈惠」，作為一項普遍的規定行為的義務，勢必構成不合理的要求，因此慈惠的行為一般而言，更恰當地被視為超出義務的要求。然而經由本章的討論，我們將會指出，以上兩種詮釋方式都無法完全捕捉「對他人慈惠」必須具備的所有特徵。 在最後一章裡，藉由康德對義務的區分，我們將採取第二章的討論所遺留的另一個選項，將「對他人慈惠」視為一項不完全義務，亦即一項本身具有寬容度的、有關設定目的的義務。並且將會展示出，一種對此一義務以行為能力為基礎的解釋，如何使得它的要求不但是可行的，甚至是對於擁有一個有意義的生活必不可少的。至此，對一項慈惠的義務的證成，便得以完成。

In our ordinary moral practice, being a moral agent to a large extent lies in how we respond to needs of others. In absence of enforceable institutional norms, a matter of responding needs is an issue of beneficence. In such cases, as a conscientious moral agent, we have to know from the moral point view what needs of others in general mean. Does any genuine need, regardless of the relationship involved, give rise to a moral reason to aid? If so, does this imply that there is a duty of beneficence? The first chapter of this essay is to identify and justify a moral reason to aid. In seeking out such a reason, through a speculative case, we also find that this reason has a sufficient weight to ground a moral requirement by itself. So if it actually exists, a duty to aid in general may arise. The rest of the chapter is to show how the normative force of this reason or a duty of beneficence in general can be justified in the way that Kant had proposed. In order to complete our argument for a duty of beneficence in general, in the second chapter we have to engage in the debate about the moral status of beneficiary acts. We have to examine, from theoretical and practical perspectives, whether beneficence, as a general duty of action, necessarily constitutes an unreasonable requirement, so beneficiary acts in general are more properly viewed as beyond the call of duty. However, to the end of this chapter, we will point out that both ways of interpreting failed to capture all the features beneficence must have. In the final chapter, through Kant’s divisions of duties, we will take the third option to treat beneficence as an imperfect duty, i.e. a duty of end-setting which has latitude as its inherent feature. It will be showed that how an agency-based account of this duty makes its demand not only feasible, but also essential for having a meaningful life. Accordingly, our justification of a duty of beneficence is completed.