WTO禁止性補貼制度之檢討：兼論現行規定在特定產業之適用

Abstract

從GATT成立以來，補貼一直是會員最關切的議題之一，尤其是在SCM協定下兩種被完全禁止的補貼—出口補貼及進口替代補貼—經常成為爭端的焦點。有鑑於此，本文旨在釐清兩種禁止性補貼定義之疑義、檢討在救濟過程曾引發的問題以及現行規定在特定產業適用（漁業、航空器製造業等）之適當性。 與出口或者使用國內產品有法律上或事實上條件關係的補貼都會構成禁止性補貼。因為認定事實上條件關係的標準並未明文化，需由爭端解決機構根據全部事實綜合判斷，造成認定上的不確定性，因此澳洲等會員曾多次提案修正現行條文，本文認為，為保持事實上條件關係在認定上的彈性，不宜以列舉方式將其要件明文化，但可嘗試以例示的方式列出一定會被小組或上訴機構納入考慮的事實，除此之外，將系爭補貼的貿易效果，也就是所造成的出口競爭力的提升作為認定事實上出口補貼的一個要件是值得考慮的，這對於倚賴出口貿易的會員將是比較公平的作法。 禁止性補貼的救濟引發了許多相當有趣的問題，包括WTO爭端解決機構是否可以要求會員採行回溯性的救濟、是否可以採取懲罰性損害賠償等等，本文認為，若欲容許禁止性補貼有不同於一般違反WTO協定之措施的救濟方法，必須先說明禁止性補貼何以嚴重於其他違法措施，否則，貿然容許在SCM協定第4條之下採取回溯性救濟與懲罰性損害賠償，將破壞WTO爭端救濟體系的一致性，並且可能會牴觸DSU的立法精神。 除非農業協定有特別規定，否則SCM協定應該一體適用於所有產業，本文認為應例外容許漁業與航空器製造業不適用SCM協定，並針對這兩個產業制訂特殊的補貼規範。就漁業而言，現有的兩種禁止性補貼並非漁業補貼常見的措施，因此與漁業資源枯竭無直接關聯，而就航空器製造業而言，適用SCM協定將扼殺此產業的發展與進步。

Prohibited subsidies, namely export subsidies and import substitution subsidies, have long been the focus of WTO dispute settlement mechanism since WTO’s inception. In view of this, this thesis aims to clarify the interpretation of the definition of prohibited subsidies, to examine the remedies under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, and further, to call for specific subsidies rules for fisheries and aircraft manufacturing. One of the elements of prohibited subsidies is de jure or de facto contingency on importation or using domestic products over imported goods. However, de facto contingency is sometimes a vague idea and can only be established based on all the facts surrounding the provision of the disputed subsidy. It has been proposed by members that elements of de facto contingency should be enumerated in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement so that the rule can be more predictable. It is the view of the author that enumerating elements of de facto contingency could limit the flexibility on establishing this point. But it would be helpful if certain important elements are listed in the SCM Agreement so that DSB’s decision can be more predictable and consistent. And the author also argues that it would be fairer for members who rely heavily on export if the level of export competitiveness can be one of the elements of de facto export subsidies. Article 4 of the SCM Agreement is a special and additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement under the meaning of Article 1.2 of the DSU. As decided by the Panel in Australia-Leather, Article 4 allows retrospective remedies. And as interpreted by the author, the Arbitrators in Canada-Aircraft 22.6 authorized Brazil to impose punitive measure. The author believes that without further elaboration on the severity of prohibited subsidies - how is it more trade-damaging than other WTO-inconsistent measures - such interpretation can not be justified. Under WTO Agreements, all subsidies are governed by the SCM Agreement, unless AOA contains “specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.” However, like agriculture, there are some industries where the SCM Agreement, especially the rules on prohibited subsidies, does not really “fit.” For example, fisheries subsidies have led to overcapacity and overfishing, but they do not usually come in the form of export subsidy or import substitution subsidy. Thus, current rules on prohibited subsidies do not effectively solve problems caused in this field, whereas in aircraft manufacturing, applying the SCM Agreement would kill the industry, because it is an industry that all producers need financial aid from their governments. Therefore, the author believes that there should be specific subsidies rules for certain industries.