企業執行長來源對策略延續性影響之研究

Abstract

此論文研究主要是基於廠商行為、進化、代理及慣性理論為出發點，探討廠商行為、規模、年齡及執行長領導力之關係與影響。此研究以122家美國高科技公司為主要研究對象，研究期間橫跨六年。此研究發現組織並不一定完全遵循過去的行為發展模式或歷史軌跡（例如在母群體研究中，在存貨及研究發展之單項策略層面上以及在綜合策略層面上，組織並不循著歷史軌跡發展。而在次群體研究中，大公司在存貨及研究發展之單項策略層面上，亦不循著歷史軌跡發展，但在其他單項及綜合策略層面上，組織則仍受到歷史軌跡發展模式的影響；而小公司僅在財務槓桿之單項策略層面上，會循著歷史軌跡的發展模式。就歷史較悠久的公司而言，在廣告之單項策略層面上，不會循著歷史軌跡來發展，但在其他策略層面上，無論是單項或綜合層面，則仍受到歷史軌跡發展模式的影響；而相對成立較短的公司而言，則在財務槓桿之單項策略層面及綜合層面上，會循著歷史軌跡的發展模式）。綜言之，歷史有其重要性，但組織發展並不一定完全遵循著過去歷史的發展模式；此外，組織行為慣性在大部份的單項策略層面上，會被組織規模所干擾，但相對地，組織行為慣性僅在小部份的單項策略層面上，會被組織年齡所干擾。不同於ㄧ般常識與認知，企業執行長因不同繼任來源（內部拔擢或外部空降）所產生不同的領導力，在對策略延續上之影響，無論組織規模或年齡，其干擾程度非常有限（例如企業執行長因繼任來源不同，僅在財務槓桿之單項策略層面上有顯著干擾影響；而對大公司而言，企業執行長因繼任來源不同，還會在非生產費用之單項策略層面上及綜合層面上產生顯著干擾影響）。綜言之，執行長因不同繼任來源所產生在領導力上的差異性，對策略延續上之影響，其干擾程度非常有限，然而在其有限之顯著影響層面上，內部拔擢之執行長，相較於外部空降之執行長，會更強化其組織慣性及策略延續性之程度。 此研究結果在研究意含上可從以下三個層面來探討：第ㄧ，組織並不一定完全遵循過去的歷史軌跡及行為發展模式，此結果對常規或路徑依賴的相關理論討論上，可帶來不同角度的思考與論證；第二，雖然企業在少數策略層面上顯示內部拔擢之執行長，相較於外部空降之執行長，會更強化其組織慣性，但在絶大部份之策略層面上，執行長因不同繼任來源所產生在領導力上的差異性，對策略延續慣性上，其干擾程度非常有限；此外，更換執行長對策略延續上的影響，其程度亦非常有限，此結果將有助於董事會從不同角度對執行長繼任議題之探討與瞭解；第三，組織慣性確實會依組織規模與年齡而有所不同，但組織規模對組織慣性之影響，並不等同於組織年齡對組織慣性之影響。因此，此研究希望在以下二方面能有所貢獻：第ㄧ、此論文在組織慣性上的研究，融入不同層面之策略延續性活動，藉以從不同角度及結構，能更廣泛性地探討策略延續與慣性；第二、此論文從不同層次及研究對象上，進ㄧ步探討企業執行長繼任來源對策略延續與慣性之影響，以更廣泛性地探討企業執行長繼任等相關議題。

This study seeks to extend research on issues relating to firm behaviors, the influences of firm size and age, and executive leadership to clarify the relationship between the momentum effect and the leadership effect of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) origin. This study offers models predominantly based on behavioral, evolutionary, agency, and inertia theories, and tests hypotheses using panel data from 122 companies over six years in the high-technology sectors in the U.S. Results indicate that organizations do not always follow their routines, as organizational momentum fails to persist in some strategic indicators (e.g., in the overall analysis, organizations follow momentum on non-production overhead, financial leverage, and advertising intensity regardless of a CEO change, but fail to follow momentum on inventory, research and development (R&D) intensity and the composite strategic indicator; in the sub-group analysis, large firms follow momentum on plant and equipment (PE) newness, non-production overhead, financial leverage, advertising intensity, and the composite strategic indicator regardless of a CEO change, but fail to follow momentum on inventory, and R&D intensity; small to medium enterprises (SMEs) follow momentum only on financial leverage, but fail in all other strategic indicators; while old firms tend to follow momentum on PE newness, inventory, non-production overhead, financial leverage, R&D intensity, and the composite strategic indicator regardless of a CEO change, but fail to follow momentum on advertising intensity; young firms follow momentum only on financial leverage and the composite strategic indicator, but fail in all other strategic indicators). To sum up, firms do not always follow their momentum, and strategic persistence is not always prominent. Further interaction analysis finds that the momentum effect can be moderated by firm size in most single strategic indicators (e.g., PE newness, inventory, non-production overhead, advertising intensity, and R&D intensity), and by firm age in fewer single strategic indicators (e.g., PE newness, and non-production overhead). Contrary to conventional wisdom, executive origin only significantly moderates momentum on strategic persistence in financial leverage in most organizational structures (except for SMEs: executive leadership origin does not significantly matter in all strategic indicators of persistence in SMEs); while in larger firms, executive origin can also significantly moderate momentum on non-production overhead and the composite strategic indicator, and in older firms, executive origin can also significantly moderate momentum on the composite strategic indicator. To sum up, the impact of CEO succession origin is limited in moderating the momentous forces in a firm, but from these limited but significant findings, insider CEOs tend to strengthen the maintenance of past practices, while outsider CEOs tend to weaken such maintenance. The implications can be at least three-fold: first, organizations do not always follow routines that may encourage further discussion over routine-based arguments in analyzing firm behaviors. Second, although this study finds that insider CEOs tend to maintain the past practices more than outsider CEOs in some strategic indicators, CEO succession origin does not seem to matter in most of the strategic indicators. Furthermore, a change of CEO in a firm may disrupt the momentous forces only in the dimension of PE newness. These findings may provide boards of directors with evidence as to if a change of CEO matters, and how much and when successors’ origin matters from a multi-dimensional perspective when strategizing a succession event. Third, the findings reveal that organizational inertia varies with firm size and firm age in most dimensions that support the inertia perspective. However, firm age is not largely captured by firm size, and that larger firms are not generally older firms. The findings imply that firm size and firm age both can impact organizational inertia, but differently. Hence, this study makes two fundamental contributions to the literature as well as to business practitioners. First, this study focuses on strategic persistence and includes structural inertia in the study of organizational momentum and the leadership effect of CEO origin, so that related issues can be studied from multiple dimensions instead of just the single dimension of business activities. Second, this study elaborates arguments to further the debate on the relationship between the momentum effect and the leadership effect from both the overall level and sub-group level, in order to generate results convincing enough to deal with the succession issues and the impact of CEO origin. This study provides evidence-based findings to further understand how and when organizational momentum prevails and interacts with the leadership effect. The findings should enrich the literature in firm behaviors, structural inertia, and CEO successions, and provide boards of directors with advanced implications as to the knowledge of CEO succession events and the influence of CEO origin on firms from a multi-dimensional perspective.