創業投資事業對於新上市公司盈餘管理行為 是否扮演監督的角色

Abstract

過去的文獻指出公司在新上市年度會有調高盈餘的動機；創業投資事業對於被其投資的公司扮演著監督的角色。結合這兩個觀點，本研究預期創投業者在公司新上市年度能扮演監督盈餘管理行為的角色。本研究選取2003-2006年間330家新上市公司進行實證研究，結果發現有創投事業支持的新上市公司確實有較低程度的盈餘管理行為。 本研究接著測試哪些因素會影響創投業者願意擔任監督者的誘因與能力；實證結果發現當創投業者對於一家公司的投資期間越久，則反倒有可能利用其影響力促使公司進行調高盈餘的盈餘管理行為。

Prior studies indicate many firms have incentives to increase earnings in IPO year. Studies also demonstrate that VCs play a general monitoring role in their portfolio companies. Combined these two concepts, I expect that IPO-year abnormal accruals are lower in the presence of VCs for a sample of 330 IPO firms during 2003-2006. According to my empirical result, VC-backed IPOs present lower degree of earnings management. My study then expects to observe the proxies for VC’s incentives and ability to monitor. I find out the longer VCs invest in their portfolio companies, the more abnormal accruals firms will have in IPO year.