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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 財務金融學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26848
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dc.contributor.advisor曾郁仁(Yu-Ren Tzeng)
dc.contributor.authorYi-Chieh Huangen
dc.contributor.author黃依潔zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-08T07:28:42Z-
dc.date.copyright2008-07-16
dc.date.issued2008
dc.date.submitted2008-07-04
dc.identifier.citationChiappori, P. A., and B. Salanie', 2000,“Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 108(1):56-78.
Chiappori, P. A., 2000,“Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information”, Handbook of Insurance, G. Dionne, ed., p.365-394.
Chiappori, P. A., and B. Salanie', 1997,“Empirical Contract Theory: The Case of Insurance Data”, European Economic Review, 41:943-950.
Cohen, A., 2002,“Asymmetric Information and Learning in the Automobile Insurance Market”, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Papers Series, No.371.
Cole, C. R., and K. A. McCullough, 2006,“A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance”, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73:169-192.
Cutler, D. R., and P. M. Ellis, 2005,“A Simple Model to Predict Loss Ratios in the Domestic Stock Property-Liability Insurance Industry”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 44:129-139.
De Meza, D., and D. C. Webb, 2001,“Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets”, The Rand Journal of Economics, 32(2):249-262.
Dionne, G., C. Gourie'roux, and C. Vanasse, 2001,“Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment”, Journal of Political Economy, 109(2):444-453.
Doherty, N., and K. Smetters, 2005,“Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets”, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72(3):375-391.
Fang, H., M. P. Keane, and D. Silverman, 2008,“Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market”, Journal of Political Economy, 116(2):303-350.
Finkelstein, A., and K. McGarry, 2006,“Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market”, The American Economic Review, 96(4):938-958.
Garven, J. R., and M. F. Grace,“Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets”, The Seminar of Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, Baylor University (September 2007).
Garven, J. R., and J. Lamm-Tennant, 2003,“The Demand for Reinsurance: Theory and Empirical Tests”, Assurances, 71:217-238.
Garven, J. R., and J. Lamm-Tennant, 2002,“Economic and Financial Perspectives on the Demand for Reinsurance”, Rational Reinsurance Buying(London: Risk publications), 10:163-186.
Huang, R. J., L. Y. Tzeng, and K. C. Wang,“Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Insurance Market”, The 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists, Barcelona, Spain(September 2006).
Jean-Baptise, E. L., and A. M. Santomero, 2000,“The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9:274-297.
Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith, 1990,“On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market”, Journal of Business, 63:19-40.
Puelz, R., and A. Snow, 1994,“Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market”, Journal of Political Economy, 102(2):236-257.
Rothschild, M., and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976,“Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4):629-649.
Wang, J. L., V. Y. Chang, G. C. Lai, and L. Y. Tzeng, “Demutualization and demand for reinsurance”, The First Seminar of Taiwan Risk and Insurance Association, Taichung, Taiwan(December 16, 2007).
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26848-
dc.description.abstract過去的文獻中,鮮少探討再保險市場資訊不對稱的議題。再者,資訊不對稱之理論在實證研究上,最主要被探討的議題-保額與損失機率間是否有顯著關係以及其關係之方向,文獻仍未有一致的發現與結論。本論文之目的,即為藉由探討再保險市場保額與損失機率之關係,檢視再保險市場是否存在資訊不對稱之情形;若兩者間存在顯著之關係,意即存在資訊不對稱之情形,則進一步探討其方向,藉此判定此種資訊不對稱之可能類型。
本論文使用2004年NAIC產險資料庫的資料。於整理及刪除不符邏輯之數值後,樣本中共有1,192個觀測值。為檢視再保險保額與損失機率間是否有顯著關係,先控制再保險人已知之資訊,再對殘餘之再保險比率與損失比率之條件相關性進行檢定。檢定結果未能拒絕兩者無顯著相關之假設;換言之,本論文並未發現足夠之證據,支持再保險市場之保額與損失機率有顯著關係之論點。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether asymmetric information exists in reinsurance markets by testing the correlation between the reinsurance coverage and the loss probability of an insurer. For one thing, few papers do empirical research about asymmetric information in reinsurance markets. For another, whether insurance coverage is significantly related to loss probabilities and what the direction is if the correlation exists still don’t reach to a consistent conclusion from empirical literature. If the correlation exists; that is, asymmetric information exists, I further see the direction and try to identify possible types of this asymmetric information.
The data used in this paper is from 2004 NAIC property-casualty database and there are 1,192 property and casualty insurers in the sample. After controlling reinsures’ known information, I examine the correlation by performing the conditional dependency test on the residual reinsurance ratio and the residual loss probability. However, I find no evidence for it.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:28:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-97-R95723031-1.pdf: 235048 bytes, checksum: aaf19e71c4512f9cc90d19cec49351b6 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2008
en
dc.description.tableofcontentsTable of Contents
ABSTRACT(IN CHINESE)....................................VI
ABSTRACT................................................VII
1.INTRODUCTION........................................ - 1 -
2.DATA AND VARIABLES...................................- 4 -
3.METHODOLOGY..........................................- 9 -
STEP 1. CONTROL REINSURERS’ KNOWN INFORMATION.........- 9 -
STEP 2. PERFORM A CONDITIONAL DEPENDENCY TEST.........- 10 -
STEP 3. COMPUTE A CONDITIONAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT.- 11 -
4.EMPIRICAL RESULTS...................................- 13 -
5.CONCLUSIONS.........................................- 16 -
REFERENCES............................................- 17 -
APPENDIXES............................................- 20 -
Tables
TABLE 1. DEFINITIONS OF THE EXOGENOUS VARIABLES.......- 6 -
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES..............- 7 -
TABLE 3. REGRESSION RESULT WITH THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE LN(RR)..................................................- 20 -
TABLE 4. REGRESSION RESULT WITH THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE LN(LR)..................................................- 22 -
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject逆選擇zh_TW
dc.subject資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject再保險市場zh_TW
dc.subject道德危險zh_TW
dc.subject優勢選擇zh_TW
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationen
dc.subjectadvantageous selectionen
dc.subjectmoral hazarden
dc.subjectadverse selectionen
dc.subjectreinsurance marketsen
dc.title再保險市場資訊不對稱之實證研究zh_TW
dc.titleTesting for Asymmetric Information in Reinsurance Marketsen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear96-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee王仁宏,陳業寧,黃瑞卿
dc.subject.keyword資訊不對稱,再保險市場,逆選擇,道德危險,優勢選擇,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric information,reinsurance markets,adverse selection,moral hazard,advantageous selection,en
dc.relation.page23
dc.rights.note未授權
dc.date.accepted2008-07-07
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept財務金融學研究所zh_TW
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