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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌(Taychang Wang),劉嘉雯(Chiawen Liu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ting-Chun Liu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉亭均 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T07:19:41Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2009-01-20 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-07-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26661 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 近年來,國內企業不斷傳出企業資產遭掏空,打擊投資人對資本市場安全的信心,阻礙往後經濟發展,故儘早針對資產掏空特性建立防堵機制有其必要性。本研究利用新聞資料庫,搜尋2000-2007年我國上市櫃公司發生經濟犯罪之報導,再挑選出因管理當局掏空資產遭檢方起訴之公司作為研究對象,另搭配一組控制公司,利用Logit模型分析資產掏空的發生與台灣市場普遍存在的特性-集團企業模式以及頻繁的關係人交易-是否具關聯性。
本研究發現在單一變數基礎下,資產掏空公司與控制公司於是否屬於集團企業、控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離程度,以及應收關係人借支三個變數下,兩組樣本間均數呈現顯著差異。多變數Logit迴歸分析結果則顯示,(1)若公司屬企業集團之成員,發生資產掏空可能性較高。(2)資產掏空有較高程度的應收關係人借支。 本研究實證結果支持集團企業模式存在管理與代理問題,較容易發生資產掏空舞弊案件。此外,本研究發現企業資產會以特定方式-融資予關係人-掏出。然而,儘管單一變數基礎下的實證結果支持本研究控制者誘因越大,越容易發生資產掏空的推論,但於多變數基礎下,本研究未發現足夠證據支持推論成立。同樣地,本研究亦未於單一變數或多變數迴歸下,發現任何證據支持企業會經由與關係人財產交易的方式將資產掏出。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In recent years, there have been so many accounting scandals, especially the cases involved asset misappropriation, hurting people’s confidence of the safety of the security exchange market in Taiwan. It seems that the importance of establishing the mechanism to prevent asset misappropriation from happening is getting higher. This study uses data on the two main Taiwan news databases during 2000-2007, searching out the stories related to the management leading asset misappropriation, and then examining the relationship between the two characteristics in Taiwan market- Business groups and frequent related party transactions-and the happening of business asset misappropriation.
Under univariate basis, this study yields the following findings: On average, compared with the control companies, companies with asset misappropriation are more likely to be a group affiliated business, have higher level of the deviation of controlling shareholder’s control form ownership, and higher level of account receivables from related parties. As to multivariate Logit analysis, this study yields two major findings. First, this study finds that when a company belongs to a business group, it has higher possibility to occur asset misappropriation. Second, the occurrence of business asset misappropriation is positively related to higher level of account receivables from related parties. The above results suggests that there exist management and agency problem in business group, and company would use specific way-lending money to related parties-to tunnel out it’s assets. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:19:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-R95722007-1.pdf: 456355 bytes, checksum: 290149e650356c856c047a63950e3650 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究架構 3 第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 5 第一節 文獻回顧 5 第二節 假說建立 19 第三章 研究設計 22 第一節 模型建立與變數衡量 22 第二節 資料分析方法 32 第三節 樣本選取與分析 34 第四章 實證結果 45 第五章 結論與建議 60 第一節 結論 60 第二節 研究限制與建議未來研究方向 62 參考文獻 63 表目錄 表3-1 起訴案件與牽涉公司數目分配表 35 表3-2 排除無法判別案例數 38 表3-3 舞弊案件類型分析彙整 39 表3-4 本研究樣本觀察值個數 41 表3-5 資產掏空起訴案件與樣本觀察值分配 43 表3-6 資產掏空公司與控制公司比較 44 表3-7 樣本公司產業分配表 44 表4-1 研究樣本敘述性統計分析 53 表4-2 資產掏空公司與控制公司樣本敘述性統計與各項變數差異分析 54 表4-3 Pearson相關分析 56 表4-4 Logit迴歸分析 57 表4-5 係數穩定性測試 58 圖目錄 圖3-1 資產掏空最早發生年度分配圖 43 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 企業集團、關係人交易與台灣上市櫃公司發生資產掏空關聯性之研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A Study on the Relationship between Business Groups, Related Party Transactions and Asset Misappropriation in Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林瑞青 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 舞弊,資產掏空,企業集團,關係人交易,控制股東, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Fraud,Asset misappropriation,Business groups,Related party transactions,Controlling shareholders, | en |
dc.relation.page | 67 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-07-25 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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