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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳其美(Chyi-Mei Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Lin Tsai | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蔡依琳 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T06:59:16Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-14 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-06-29 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26054 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本篇論文研究提出關於善意收購協商過程中,當股票市場理性預期收購交易後,有機會出現內部人交易的可能性, 收購契約最適併購交易媒介的理論。除非主併公司直接以現金收購目標被併公司, 否則在收購交易發生之後, 會改變公司所有權結構, 而目標公司股東在獲得部分股權成為新股東後,有機會得到公司內部人優勢資訊,從而
增加內部人交易發生的可能性。主併公司認知新股東可由股票市場獲得的期望利潤決定於其搜集資訊的能力, 而此項能力為目標公司股東的私有資訊。因此, 主併公司試圖設計最適收購契約,以達成(i)篩選以及抽取目標股東的剩餘;同時(ii)促進未來股票市場中交易的流動性。了解到主併公司的目標,股票市場試圖由主併公司所提供予目標被併公司,以及目標被併公司股東接受的收購契約中,猜測關於內部人交易發生的可能性。我們證明最適收購契約型式, 與股票市場上的避險需求強度, 以及最差的目標股東所能獲得內部人優勢資訊的可能性有關。我們同時也證明股票市場表現(交易數量以及價格變異)決定於收購交易中所使用的併購交易媒介。特別地,篩選契約菜單中,當目標公司放棄純現金收購契約,股票市場中的交易數量最為低。此外,我們亦展示當股權稀釋效果嚴重時,主併公司會傾向以現金收購目標公司。而在股票-現金收購交易中,如果目標股東從股票市場上獲得的期望利潤太高,有可能使得目標股東願意轉移部分現金給主併公司。最後,我們考慮股票收購交易中內部人交易的可 能性,會如何影響主併公司管理階層的效率投資決策,甚至誘使沒有綜效的併購交易發生。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T06:59:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96723026-1.pdf: 996522 bytes, checksum: dd73b1f7990d42737a873a0f0045192d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1 緒論6
2 文獻回顧12 2.1 善意收購與敵意收購. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2 最適收購交易媒介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3 併購交易綜效討論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.4 併購交易、內部人交易暨證券市場之探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 模型設定20 4 主要結果22 4.1 股票市場交易均衡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2 第一期最適收購契約. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.3 最適契約設計與股票市場反應. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.4 所以,收購交易中,誰該付現金呢? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.5 經理人選擇最適投資計劃. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5 結論45 參考文獻48 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 內部人交易 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 收購交易 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 機制設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 併購綜效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Synergy effect | en |
| dc.subject | Insider trading | en |
| dc.subject | Takeover | en |
| dc.subject | Machanism design | en |
| dc.title | 內部人交易暨最適收購契約設計之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | StockMarket Reaction and the Optimal Takeover Contract | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王泰昌(Taychang Wang),池祥麟(Hsiang-Lin Chih) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 內部人交易,收購交易,機制設計,併購綜效, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Insider trading,Takeover,Machanism design,Synergy effect, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 52 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-06-30 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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