公司股利政策與現金增資次序之實證研究

Abstract

本論文研究公司是否會在其第一次或第二次現金增資宣布之前宣告股利來影響公司股價。對於已經有過多次現金增資經驗的公司而言，由於公司本身的資訊不對稱程度較小，因此應該較無誘因來使用股利來支撐股價。實證結果發現，雖然公司傾向在第一次現金增資前來增加股利，但股利增加的公司並沒有因此獲得較佳之股價反應，因此我們無法斷定公司這樣的行為是出自於故意。對較先發生的現金增資而言，股利的信號效果並沒有明顯效果，對於進行多次現增的公司來說，同時維持股利的公司股價表現反而明顯高於未發放股利的公司。此外特別股利並不會影響現金增資的股價反應。公司利用股利來操弄現金增資的證據並不明顯，我們的發現並不支持股利信號假說。

We investigate whether managers declare dividends to support their stock price around the first or second time of equity issues. For firms have already conducted multiple issues, there is no incentive to do so due to the low level of information asymmetry. The evidence shows although firms tend to increase dividends prior to earlier equity offerings, dividend increase firms do not exhibit better announcement effects. Thus, we can not conclude firms are intended to do so. Dividend signaling effects do not have more significant impact on earlier issues. And later issues conducted by issuing firms with unchanged dividends outperform other subsample. There is no relation between special dividends and equity offering announcement returns. The evidence for firms to time the equity offerings with dividend announcements is weak and do not support the dividend signaling hypothesis.