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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢 | |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Ying Wu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 吳昱穎 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:59:51Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2007-08-28 | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2007-07-30 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Alon Brav, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Roni Michaley,“Payout policy in the 21st century.'Journal of Financial Economics, no.77 (2005): 483-527
Armen Hovakimian, “The Role of Target Leverage in Security Issues and Repurchases.”Journal of Business, no.4,October 2 Black, Fisher, 1976. “The Dividend Puzzle.'Journal of Portfolio Management 5-8 Baker, M. and Wurgler J. “A Catering Theory of Dividends.” Journal of Finance no.59 (2004):1125- 1165 Brennan, M., and A. Thakor. “ Shareholder Prefereneces and Dividend Policy.” Journal of Finance 45 no. 4 (1990): 993-1019 Comment, R., and G. Jarrell. “ The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open Market Repurchases.” Journal of Finance 46 no.4(1991): 1243-1271 Clifford Stephens and Michael Weisbach, “ Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market-Repurchase Programs,” Journal of Finance, V. 53 (1998): 313-333 Dann, L.Y., 1981, “Common stock repurchases: an anlysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders.” Journal of Financial Economic 9:113-38. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences.” Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177 Dittmar, A., “Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock ?” Journal of Business, 73, no.3(2000): 331-355 Fenn, G.W. and N. Liang. “ Good news and bad news about share repurchases.” Working Paper. (1997) Grullon, Gustavo and Roni Michaely, “Dividend, Share Repurchases and the Substitution Hypothesis.” Journal of Finance, 57 no.4(2002): 1649-1684 Gustavo Grullon & David L. Ikenberry “What do you know about stock repurchases?” Journal of Applied Corporation Finance no.13(2000) Hovakimian, Armen G., 'The Role of Target Leverage in Security Issues and Repurchases' (January 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=262584 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.262584 Jagannathan, M., C.P Stephens and M.S. Weisbach, 2000, “Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases”. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384. Jaemin Kim, Ralf Schremper, Nikhil Varaiya. “Survey on Open Market Repurchases Regulations: cross-country examination of the ten largest stock markets.” Working paper. Jensen, M. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeover.” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 323-329 Kahle, Kathleen M. “When a buyback isn’t a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options.” Journal of Financial Economic 63 (2002) 235-261. Lakonishok, J., and T. Vermaelen. “Anomalous Price Behavior around Repurchase Tender Offers.” Journal of Finance 45 no.2(1990):455-477. Lie, E. and J.J. McConnell. “Earning signals in fixed-price and Dutch auction tender offers.”Journal of Financial Economic 49: 161-186 Masulis, R. “ Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes.” Journal of Finance 35 no.2(1980):305-321. McNally, W. “Multi-dimensional signaling with fixed-price repurchase offers” Managerial and Decision Economic, forthcoming. Michael J. Brennan, Anjan V. Thakor, “Shareholder preferences and dividend policy” Journal of Finance No. 4 September 1990 Myers, Stewart G. “Determinant of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economic, no.5(1977):147-175 Nohel, T., Tarhan, V. “Share repurchases and firm performance: new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow.” Journal of Financial Economics 49(1998), 187–222. Ofer, A., and A. Thakor. “A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends.” Journal of Finance 42 (1987):365-394 Persons, John C. “Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchase: Dutch Auctions versus Fixed Price Tender offers” Journal of Finance No.4 September 1994. Rappaport, A., and Mauboussin, M. “Expectation Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001, 174 Robert Comment; Gregg A. Jarrell. “ The Relative Signaling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases.” Journal of Finance, no.4(1991): 1243-1271 Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. “Larger shareholder and corporate control.” Journal of Political Economy 94, 461-488. Stephen, Clifford. “Open-Market Share Repurchase And The Capital Gain Tax Preference.” Working Paper, University of Missouri.(1997) Tom Nohel and Vefa Tarhan, “Share repurchases and firm performance: new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow. Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998) 187-222 Vermaelen, T. “Common stock repurchases and market signaling: An empirical study.” Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1981):139-183. William McNally, “Who Wins in Large Stock Buybacks- Those who sell or Those who Hold?” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance v.11(1998): 78-88. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24996 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 公司買回其庫藏股主要有兩種方式,分別為從公開市場上買回庫藏股票抑或是利用公開收購之方式購入庫藏股票。本研究在於探討並且分析具備何種特質之公司將會影響其選擇買回庫藏股之方式。而所採用之樣本數為從西元1985年一月至西元2004年十二月之資料,包括317筆利用公開收購之方式購買庫藏股之資料以及7909筆從公開市場上買回庫藏股票之資料。本研究之目標為評估何種型態之公司偏好利用公開收購之方式買回其庫藏股票,即使需要付出相較於從公開市場上買回為高之成本。本研究結果顯視規模較小、擁有較高現金流量、以及槓桿比率較高之公司較傾向於利用公開收購之方式購買庫藏股來分配多餘之現金、避免敵意收購、以及有效地向市場傳遞消息。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines on firms' choices of repurchase terms and analyzes firms' characteristics to understand the information revealed by their choices of activities. A sample of 317 tender offers and 7909 open market repurchases that took place between January 1985 and December 2004 are investigated. The objective is to assess which types of companies will prefer to choose tender offers as their repurchase method, even-though the cost of conducting such method is much higher than open-market repurchases. As the results, companies with smaller size, higher cash-flow, and higher leverage ratio are likely to adopt tender offers as their means for distributing excess cash, preventing hostile take over, and providing strong signalling effectiveness to the market accordingly. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:59:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-96-R94723077-1.pdf: 384410 bytes, checksum: ea66e6822d61bed0310efc402ca3e230 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1.Introduction.............................................1
2.Past studies and hypothesis development..................3 3.Data and Sample Selection...............................14 Summary Statistics.....................................16 4.Research Design.........................................17 5.The Results Signaling Hypothesis...................................22 Agency problem of free cash flow hypothesis............24 Leverage...............................................25 Catering...............................................26 Correlation Matrix.....................................27 6.Conclusion..............................................31 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 公司為何公開收購? | zh_TW |
dc.title | Why Do Firms Still Tender Offer? | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 95-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 周冠男,張紹基 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 庫藏股, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Tender offers,Open-Market Repurchase,Signalling Hypothesis,Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,Leverage,Catering Theory, | en |
dc.relation.page | 35 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2007-07-31 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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