謝勒的現象學與人格主義之批判研究

Abstract

本質主義者認為一切對象都有所謂的「本質」，本質使一對象成為它自身。謝勒的哲學思想的一個顯著特點就在於他的現象學本質主義。他認為我們可以藉由所謂「現象學直觀」認識到事物的本質，此種本質在謝勒看來也是一切科學理論的預設與出發點。本論文的目標在於反駁此種對事物的本質主義觀。在討論中將帶入一些自然科學中的發現，論證謝勒所謂的現象學經驗相對於一般經驗並沒有任何知識論上的優先性，現象學經驗也不能被視為是一切理論的基礎預設。我將論證人對一切新經驗的開放性才是求知過程的關鍵，而不在如現象學那般追求一個無預設的知識出發點。謝勒倫理學體系的中心基礎－位格論－的背後預設了本質主義的正確性，因此也是站不住腳的。最後我將討論哲學與經驗科學研究之間的關係，進一步說明現象學本質主義不能對知識領域的奠基與擴展有所幫助。

Essentialists claim that behind every object there is a so-called “essence” which designates what it is to be that particular object per se. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of Scheler's philosophy is his “phenomenological essentialism.” He claims that man can grasp the essences of objects by way of phenomenological “intuition.” The essences thus obtained, according to him, also serve as the foundation of all subsequent theoretical formulations. The purpose of this thesis is to refute his phenomenological essentialism. Bringing some findings in natural sciences into my argument, I am going to show that the so-called “phenomenological experiences” do not possess any epistemological priority over empirical experiences in man's cognitive process. Moreover, phenomenological experiences, contrary to Scheler's opinion, are not the foundation of subsequent theoretical formulations. The crucial point in cognitive process is not to find out a presuppositionless foundation for knowledge, but to adopt an open attitude towards novel experiences. Then I will show that the central tenet of Scheler's ethic—his personalism—is founded upon this implausible doctrine of phenomenological essentialism, hence cannot serve as a solid basis for his ethical system. Finally I discuss the dialectical relation between philosophy and scientific research, showing that phenomenological essentialism is a distorted view of this relationship, thus not defensible as a valid epistemological standpoint.