總經理變動時之盈餘管理決策行為探討

Abstract

當企業發生總經理變動事件時，新的總經理在上任的同時，通常都會有比較大規模的決策變更，包括在管理政策，以及會計政策都可能是改革的重點，而這些改革動作是否會因和自身利益有關，而出現盈餘管理的現象，是值得探討的問題。 本研究主要的目的在觀察公司發生總經理變動事件的時點前後，是否會伴隨著盈餘管理的情形存在，採用的衡量指標是利用Modified Jones Model衡量裁決性應計項目，並且計算原始的裁決性應計項目和調整過賖銷比例兩種估計結果，以及觀察營業外損益項目是否餘管理之現象存在。 資料來源為搜尋民國八十七年至民國九十二年之間，上市及上櫃公司有總經理變動之事件為樣本，進而蒐集各家公司總經理變動事件前後三年之財務資料，進行計算與分析，觀察是否在總經理變動事件前後，有盈餘管理的現象存在。除了討論整體盈餘管理的程度，以及就各期預期盈餘管理所要達到的目的分別探討以外，還探討電子業與非電子業、金融業與非金融業、集團企業與否和兼任情形的有無，是否會影響盈餘管理的程度。 研究之結果顯示在總經理變動事件前後，確實會伴隨著盈餘管理的發生，而且在變動前一年度和後一年度，裁決性應計項是增加收益；在變動當年度，主要的盈餘管理目的是要減少收益，雖然，在統計上而言，僅在總經理變動事件後一年度，結果是顯著的，但是仍可由此結果，看出盈餘管理的動機和手法。另外利用營業外損益項目來觀察盈餘管理的目的時，結果並不是非常地明顯。 在分組比較產業別和集團企業與否的部份，結果都顯示在總經理變動當年度和後一年度，電子業與非電子業，金融業與非金融業，集團與非集團之間，有明顯的差異。在兼任的議題上，並沒有發現由董事長兼任的總經理，進行盈餘管理的程度會大於非兼任的總經理。

When CEO change incident occurs in enterprises, the new CEO will usually have more extensive decision change, including the management policy, and accounting policy. It is interesting to investigate whether these changes will involve one's own interests. This thesis examines company which happened CEO change and whether the incident will follow earnings management. The measurement adopted is to utilize Modified Jones Model to weigh the discretionary accruals, and has calculated the adjusted discretionary accruals which adjusted the proportion of change in account receivables, and observe the non-operation items. The source of the data is to search from 1998 to 2003, listed company in Taiwan that with CEO change incident as the sample, and then collect the financial data for three years from last year to next year surrounding CEO change incident of every company. Except that discuss the degree and purpose of management of the whole earnings management, it probes into whether the earnings management in electrons industry will different from the non-electron industry, how about financial industry with non-financial industry? Then whether conglomerate or not and duality will influence the degree of earnings management. The result studied shows surrounding CEO change incident, it really followed the earnings management, especially in the year after CEO change. While utilizing the non-operation items to detect earnings management, the result is not very obvious. When divided sample into two groups according to the factors of industry: one is electron vs. non-electron; the other is financial vs. non-financial, and conglomerate or not, and the duality of chairman of the board of directors and CEO or not. The results show that the electron industry and conglomerate company have more earnings management than the other group. The results of financial industry issue and duality issue were not as expected.