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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 杜榮瑞 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chi-Cheng Chang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 張琦琤 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:30:04Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2005-07-15 | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2005-07-04 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部份
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24539 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 為了要維持證券市場的公平性及效率性,世界各國無不制定法律,企圖對內部人交易作出限制,但執法成效卻不如預期。然而,內部人交易不僅會造成違法行為,甚至對公司的聲譽、股價等等皆會造成負面影響,因此,公司本身應該有限制內部人交易之政策。但若真對內部人交易作出限制,使內部人的預期利潤降低,是否應該從薪酬上給予內部人補償。而亦有研究指出,內部人交易獲得的報酬在傳出有利資訊的公司較內部傳出不利資訊的公司為大,故可推斷若內部人欲獲得較高的超額報酬,必須努力追求公司經營績效的極大化,但若對內部人交易作出限制,將使內部人喪失追求極大化股東價值行為之誘因,故依據代理理論,有必要支付內部人較多的變動薪酬。又經理人的薪酬可由客觀績效指標(例如:總資產報酬率、股票報酬率)決定或是由主觀認定而來,然而對受到內部人交易限制的經理人來說,由主觀認定所決定的薪酬是否較由客觀績效指標所決定的薪酬更具有補償效果。
本研究以民國92年上市櫃公司為研究對象,並使用統計軟體SPSS進行資料分析,以迴歸分析方式進行實證的研究。本研究的研究結果彙整如下。 1.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司,有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之總薪酬較高。 2.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司,有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之總變動薪酬較高。 3.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司,有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之變動薪酬中依主觀認定的部分較高。實證結果發現,有限制內部人交易政策的公司其總經理會獲得較高比例的依主觀認定所決定的當年度現金、依主觀認定所決定的當年度現股兩項具激勵性質的薪酬 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis aims to explore whether firms with a policy of restricting insider trading compensate their top management for the “loss” arising from not being able to profit from such transactions. Specifically, it examines, in designing chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation contract, whether firms with restritions on insider trading (1) offer more compensation in total (2) have higher proportion of variable compensation, and (3) have higher proportion of compensation determined subjectively than firms without such a policy.
The data on the CEO’s compensation are obtained via a questionnaire survey from 80 publicly traded companies. Corporate financial data are obtained from TEJ database. The main findings are as follows. 1)Firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading. 2)Firms that restrict insider trading use more variable compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading. 3)Firms that restrict insider trading use more variable compensation determined subjectively relative to firms not restricting insider trading. The implications and limitations are offered. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:30:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-94-R92722034-1.pdf: 466116 bytes, checksum: 9d287d7af5f66397d1837c1d164003ef (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
摘 要 I ABSTRACT III 目 錄 IV 表 目 錄 VI 圖 目 錄 VII 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究目的 5 第三節 論文架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 8 第一節 內部人交易及相關法律規定 8 第二節 經理人薪酬制度之探討 17 第三節 限制內部人交易與薪酬制度之關聯 34 第四節 研究假說 37 第三章 研究方法 39 第一節 研究樣本與限制 39 第二節 變數衡量與實證模型 42 第四章 實證結果與討論 50 第一節 敘述性統計分析 50 第二節 PEARSON相關係數分析 53 第三節 假說檢定 55 第四節 敏感度分析 61 第五章 結論與建議 71 第一節 研究結論 71 第二節 研究限制與建議 72 參考文獻 74 表 目 錄 表1 限制內部人交易之政策與類型 16 表2 問卷設計 40 表3 樣本分布(按台灣經濟新報TEJ產業別分類) 40 表4 T檢定(92年1月底自結數與92年4月底查核數) 44 表5 敘述性統計量 51 表6 PEARSON變數相關係數表 54 表7 假說1 迴歸分析(應變數為總薪酬之對數) 56 表8 假說2迴歸分析 58 表9 假說3迴歸分析 60 表10 假說1迴歸分析(以SALEST為控制變數) 61 表11 假說2 迴歸分析(以問卷原始資料為應變數) 63 表12 假說3迴歸分析(以問卷原始資料為應變數) 64 表13 以不同標準來界定假說1中的「有限制內部人交易之公司」 65 表14 以不同標準來界定假說2中的「有限制內部人交易之公司」 67 表15 以不同標準來界定假說3中的「有限制內部人交易之公司」 69 圖 目 錄 圖1 研究流程 7 圖2 內部人在可以交易時間及禁止交易期間每一交易日的交易頻率 17 圖3 CEO的薪資架構 20 圖4 高階經理人薪資設計之基本決定因素 22 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 內部人交易限制與總經理薪酬制度之關聯 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Relationship Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and CEO’s Compensation. | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 93-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李書行,顏信輝 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 內部人交易,總經理薪酬,變動薪酬,主觀薪酬, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Insider trading.,CEO compensation,Variable compensation,Subjectivity, | en |
dc.relation.page | 79 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2005-07-05 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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