集團企業股權結構與公司價值之關聯性研究

Abstract

近幾年來台灣地雷股頻傳，包括博達公司和訊碟公司等，在在都衝擊了投資人對於資本市場的信心，而這些弊案的背後有一項共通的特點，即公司的最終控制股東掌握的董事席次比例往往高過於其持有之公司現金流量權，換言之，公司的最終控制股東僅以少量的資金投入便可取得公司大部分的控制權。此亦突顯了控制權集中的國家，代理問題的性質已非管理階層和股東間的權益代理問題，而是控制股東和其他股東間的核心代理問題。 本研究採用La Portal et al.(1999)追蹤最終控制股東的方式，計算2003年，共計284家屬於集團企業之台灣上市及上櫃公司控制股東的股權及現金流量權，並針對控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離的程度以及控制股東參與公司經營來衡量控制股東對於其他股東權益侵蝕的情形。透過複回歸分析，其實證結果如下： 1. 台灣上市、櫃公司有股權集中的現象，且以家族為主要控制型態。 2. 最終控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離幅度越大，其對其他股東權益的侵蝕程度也越大，公司價值越低。 3. 當最終控制股東利用董事長或總經理的職位參與公司經營時 ，平均而言，其對其他股東權益的侵蝕程度也越大，公司價值越低。 4. 當最終控制股東未擔任公司董事長或總經理且最終控制股東未採用複雜股權的方式提高其對公司之投票權時，該類型公司的公司價值相對較高。

Rescently, there are many financial scandals occurring in Taiwan, including Procomp Informatics Co., Ltd. and Infodisc Technology Co., Ltd., etc. These scandals had damaged the belief to the investing market of many investors. By the way, there is a common characteristic between these scandals: the percentage of directors controlled by the controlling shareholders tend to be much higher than the percentage of their cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate controlling shareholders input less cash flow to gain the most of the control right. It also highlights that the major principal-agency problem in the ownership concentrated countries centered on the problems between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, more than the equity agency problems between the management and the shareholders. The research adopts the method developed by La Portal, Lopez-de- Silanes and Shleifer(1999) to trace the ultimate controlling shareholders and compute the voting rights and the cash flow rights of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market in 2003. Then, the study measure the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders by focusing on the deviation of controlling rights from cash flow rights and whether the controlling shareholders participating the operation of business. Empirical results suggest: 1. The high concentration of ownership is more common in Taiwan publicly listed companies and those firms are typically controlled by families. 2. The more the controlling shareholders’ controlling rights deviate from cash flow rights, the more the controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders, and the lower the market valuation is. 3. In average, when the controlling shareholders interfere with the business operation by occupying the position of the board chairman or CEO,they are more likely to gain their private benefits by sacrificing the equity of minority shareholders. 4. If the controlling shareholders do not use the mechanisms to enhance their voting power over their equity ownership and they do not serve as the board chairman or CEO, these firms tend to have the relative higher market valuation.