不完全競爭廠商從事產品別廣告與品牌廣告誘因之探討

Abstract

本論文旨在探討兩不完全競爭廠商的最適廣告與價格策略，文中考慮一雙佔市場，市場中存在忠誠顧客與游移顧客，游移顧客對於兩廠商之產品有不同的心理距離理想點，理想點為兩廠商差異距離之間的均勻分配。在第一階段，兩廠商從事廣告策略之選擇，可以選擇的策略為：產品別廣告、品牌廣告、與不做廣告；產品別廣告能夠擴大市場規模，品牌廣告會說服部分的游移顧客轉變為該品牌的忠誠顧客，不做廣告可以節省廣告成本。在廣告策略決定之後，第二階段兩廠商從事價格競爭。我們假設強勢廠商相對於弱勢廠商，擁有較多原始的忠誠顧客以及較強的品牌廣告力量。主要的結果如下： 1. 弱勢廠商有較強的誘因選擇執行產品別廣告； 2. 如果產品別廣告能夠吸引進入的新使用者夠多，即使是強勢廠商也會在預期對手不執行廣告策略時，選擇執行產品別廣告； 3. 雖然在弱勢廠商的品牌廣告力量較弱，且在廣告競爭下會使得增加忠誠顧客的效果下降，但是只要廣告成本夠低，即使正確預期對手執行品牌廣告，弱勢廠商依舊可能執行品牌廣告與之正面衝突。

This paper analyzes the optimal advertising and pricing strategies for duopolistic firms. We consider a market consists of consumers who are loyal to the two firms and switchers whose ideal points are uniformly distributed between the positions of the two firms. In the firs stage, the two firms choose among three strategies: generic advertising, which expands the market, brand advertising, which converts part of switchers into loyal customers, and no advertising. After their advertising decisions, they compete in prices. Assuming the leading firm has the larger loyal base and the stronger brand than the second firm, we find the following results: (i) The second firm has stronger incentives to conduct generic advertising than the leading firm. (ii) If the number of new users created by generic advertising is large enough, even the leading firm will choose to conduct generic advertising when expecting his rival will not advertise. (iii) Though the effect that the weaker firm's brand advertising on expanding its loyal base is lower (than its rival) and reduced by its rival's brand advertising, if the advertising cost is low enough, the weaker firm may choose to conduct brand advertising when expecting its rival to do so.