台灣3G執照拍賣業者競價行為之研究

Abstract

行動通信及其衍生應用在人們的生活中日益重要，因此1999年至2002年間世界各國所進行的3G釋照，備受各方矚目。我國3G執照於2002年1月16日至2月6日進行釋照拍賣，前後進行了19天、180回合的競價，為政府創造了新台幣488.99億元之收益，亦是國內迄今確定金額最大的公共資源拍賣案件。 本篇論文係以此一事件中業者的競價行為為研究標的，由產業環境及業界競爭態勢作為探討的起點，在論述了競價前國內外的情勢後，進行拍賣理論、電信執照拍賣制度及英國3G執照拍賣之文獻研究。最後再以這些研究結果為基礎，對我國3G執照拍賣中業者的競價行為進行比較與分析。 本研究所得出的主要結論如下：現行拍賣理論所衍生出來的「單純競價法」，不論是從理論的本質或是從其應用方式，都無法適當地解釋3G執照拍賣中業者的競價行為，反而會造成見樹不見林的誤導；而且電信業者的競價行為經常是十分策略性的，絕不可能只考量執照價格與價值的差額、而採取近乎機械式的非策略性競價方法。

As mobile communication and its application become more and more important in our daily life, the release of 3G licenses from 1999 to 2002 in different counties always held the spotlight. From January 16th to February 6th, 2002, Taiwan authority held the 3G license auction. This auction, continued for 19 days, total 180 rounds, has created revenue of NTD 48.899 billion for the government. It’s so far the biggest auction of public resource in Taiwan as well. This thesis focuses on the bidding behavior of the Taiwan 3G auction, starting from the industry environment and the competition in telecom industry, to a thorough survey of domestic/international situation before the auction. Then follow the study of auction theories, auction systems of telecom licenses, and the UK 3G auction. Based on the above research results comes the comparison and analysis of the bidding behavior of 3G auction in Taiwan. The conclusion of the thesis is as follows: “straightforward bidding” deriving from the current auction theories can not properly account for the bidding behaviors in the 3G auctions, whether approach them theoretically or from its aspects of application. It will only be misleading and fail to see the wood from the trees. The bidders’ behaviors in the 3G auctions are always strategic. The differences between the prices of the licenses and their values are not the only consideration that decides their bidding behaviors, and makes them choose the almost robotistic, non-strategic bidding method.