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標題: | 薪酬顧問與CEO薪酬品質 Compensation Consultants and the CEO Pay Quality |
作者: | Yi-Ru Shyu 徐懿儒 |
指導教授: | 許文馨 |
關鍵字: | CEO 薪酬,薪酬顧問,利益衝突,薪酬績效敏感性, CEO Compensation,Compensation Consultants,Conflicts of Interest,Pay-performance Sensitivity, |
出版年 : | 2011 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文旨在探討薪酬顧問是否能幫助公司設計更好的薪酬制度,抑或是導致CEO獲取較高薪資的關鍵因素。研究發現,聘用薪酬顧問的公司,CEO傾向獲取較高的紅利、股票和總薪酬,即但如此,CEO的底薪與薪酬績效敏感性呈明顯正相關。在研究中亦探討到當薪酬顧問面臨潛在的利益衝突時,是否會使CEO的薪資提高。證據顯示,當薪酬顧問提供其他非薪酬顧問服務時,CEO的薪酬會相較為高,且當非屬薪酬顧問的費用支出相對於薪酬顧問費用越高時,CEO薪酬提高的情形越趨明顯。另外,如聘用具有利益衝突的顧問則會降低CEO的薪酬績效敏感性。 This study is aimed at examining whether compensation consultants can help companies design a more effective payroll system for executives, or whether they have a reinforcing effect on the level of CEO compensation. The findings suggest that the CEO’s bonus, equity and total compensation are larger in firms that use compensation consultants and CEO’s salary proves to be positively correlated with his/her performance. In addition, I have examined whether compensation consultants will possibly lead to a higher CEO pay when the consultants are involved in a potential conflict of interests. I have also found that CEO pay is higher in companies where the consultants are engaged to provide other services, and that the CEO pay goes even higher in firms where more fees paid to consultants for other services than for executive compensation consulting services. Finally, I have observed that CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity decreases when the consultants who have a conflict of interests are engaged. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/23693 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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