美國銀行業採用公平價值選擇權之決定因素

Abstract

為解決金融商品評價基礎不一致的問題，美國財務會計準則委員會(FASB)於2007年2月發布第159號財務會計準則公報，規範有關公平價值選擇權(Fair Value Option)的會計處理。該公報允許企業自行指定金融資產或金融負債以公平價值衡量，將各期公平價值變動列入損益。藉由相關的金融商品間公平價值變動之相互抵消，使盈餘資訊更能反映經濟實質，以達到提升財務報導品質與簡化避險會計處理之主要目的。 第159號公報於2008年第一季開始適用，亦允許於2007年第一季提早採用。本研究針對金融商品持有較多之美國銀行控股公司為樣本，探究企業採用公平價值選擇權之決定因素。實證結果發現企業採用該公報的動機因採用時點不同而有所差異：提早於2007年第一季採用的公司主係基於操弄動機，而於2008年第一季採用的公司，其動機則與公報目的相符。由於公平價值選擇權肩負金融商品邁向全面性公平價值會計前之階段性任務，本文的研究結果可供主管機關與專業團體作為政策與準則制定之參考。

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 159 provides firms with the option of measuring eligible financial assets and liabilities at fair value with the aim of mitigating earnings volatility and reducing the complexity of hedge accounting. The fair value option (FVO) provides firms with the discretion of measuring financial instruments at fair value each reporting period with changes in those fair values reported in earnings. This paper investigates the determinants that motivate banks to adopt the FVO. Specifically, I examine if banks behave in accordance with the standard’s objectives, or they wield the discretionary powers to manipulate accounting numbers. SFAS No. 159, enacted in February 2007, is effective for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 (FY 2008 Q1), with early adoption allowed for the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 (FY 2007 Q1). Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies, I discern divergent incentives for different timings of the FVO adoption. In particular, I find that early adopters were mostly motivated by manipulation incentives, consistent with other FVO studies (Song 2008; Henry 2009). However, I present positive evidence on regular adoption complying with the standard’s objectives, which has not been discovered by recent research. The findings provide a more balanced perspective on the assessment of SFAS No. 159, and have significant implications for the FASB since they regard the FVO as an interim step toward full fair value accounting for financial instruments.