論「因是」：從名學觀點詮釋《莊子‧齊物論》

Abstract

「因是」一詞在《莊子‧齊物論》反覆出現。歷來注家或如郭象、林雲銘等將此詞視作獨立的語詞，或如王先謙、王叔岷等將之視作連接兩句子的推論用語。葛瑞漢（A. C. Graham）著名的翻譯將「因是」與「為是」視作一組對立的概念：「因是」被理解為「暫時接受當前情況的『是』」，是道家理想中的「是非」；「為是」則為「認為的『是』」，乃是儒、墨等辯者所使用的不理想之「是非」。 本文以「欲A則莫若B」及「亦」的句型為線索，得出不同於葛瑞漢的詮釋。第一，依據語法上的分析，本文認為「因是」的意思是「依著特定理由而成立的『是』」。它不僅僅是聖人才擁有的特質，《莊子‧齊物論》認為所有的「是非」都是「因是」，聖人與儒墨的差異並不在所使用的「是非」不同，而是對「是非」的態度不同，此一詮釋可以解釋在「因是」之前的「亦」的句型。第二，「因是」雖可以作為獨立概念，「為是」卻不行。相比之下，更適合與「因是」相對的語詞是「果是」。本文亦從名學理論的觀點檢視《莊子‧齊物論》獨特的是非觀以及它對其他名辯學家的批評。最後，本文反省以名學上的「彼亦是」來回應「儒墨之是非」是否真的能解決儒墨之間的理念之爭，價值上「是非」的對立不像名學上「彼是」的對立一般可輕易相泯。本文認為《莊子‧齊物論》從未簡單地將「彼是」等同於「是非」，「彼是莫得其偶」所提供的是一個用以應對「是非」的新的認知方式。

Yinshi (因是), a word reiterated several times throughout the Qiwulun chapter of Zhuangzi, has been interpreted as either a set term or a logical connector. The prominent English translation of A. C. Graham perceived yinshi and weishi (為是) as a pair of contrastive concepts: “yinshih is (…) to make relative judgments according to changing conditions like the Taoist sage; weishih is (...) to judge between alternatives according to one's fixed preconceptions, like the Confucius and Mohists.” In this thesis, I perform a syntactic analysis of yu A ze mo ruo B (欲A則莫若B, “if your intention is doing A, then no method compares to B”) and yi (亦, “also”), and I argue on this basis that (1) yinshi—shi that follows a particular reason—is not a distinctive feature of the sage but a general trait that is ubiquitous among everyone’s shifei (是非). The difference between the sage and the Confucians and Mohists is not the shifei they use but their attitude to shifei—both the sage and the Confucians and Mohists are using yinshi, which could explain two instances where yi immediately precedes yinshi; (2) guoshi (果是, “ultimate shi”) is a more likely candidate than weishi to constitute a contrast with yinshi. Another concern of mine is Qiwulun’s unique position on shifei and its criticism of other mingbian (名辯) debaters. I also examine the nature of Qiwulun’s criticism of rumo zhi shifei (儒墨之是非). The interchangeability between the demonstratives bi and shi (彼是, “that and this”) does not necessarily imply a similar relationship between the value judgements shi and fei. We must recognize that Qiwulun itself never simply equates bishi with shifei, and that bishi mo de qi ou (彼是莫得其偶, “bi and shi are not coupled as opposites”) only provides us with a different mindset to respond to shifei judgements.