DRAM產業合資評估：應用實物選擇權和博弈理論

Abstract

本論文應用實物選擇權與博弈理論來探討在資本密集的動態記憶體(DRAM)產業內之競爭。在此寡占市場下的研發及產能的競賽，企業的競爭策略首先以實物選擇權與博弈理論加以整合分析。目前DRAM產業正處於由Samsung為首的Stackelberg產業競爭，其他後進企業如何在此殘酷的競爭環境下生存已經成為值得探討的課題。因此，產業內的策略聯盟成為企業為避免被壓縮生存空間的趨勢，其中包含研究發展合資及成立生產製造的合資企業，皆在本文中有詳細的探討。合資企業的策略價值是可以藉由實物選擇權加以衡量，在研發的競賽下，研發授權及合資研發不同策略價值分析，可提供更精準的決策判斷。再者，後續的產能擴充決策，亦可藉由賽局理論加以分析。

This thesis establishes an option games framework to present the competition in capital intensive DRAM industry. The competitive strategies under R&D and capacity races in this oligopoly market are first analyzed using the integration of real options and game theory. The Stackelberg competition is currently present in DRAM industry leading by Samsung. How the followers can survive under such cruel market environment has become an interesting topic. The trends for strategic alliances among the followers to avoid being preempted by market leader are then discussed. The firms’ motivations for both the joint R&D and production ventures are investigated. It shows the strategic value of a joint venture can be determined using option valuation with different type of value drivers (option to defer, option to expand/acquisition and option to innovate). Under R&D race, the differences for firms to choose license or R&D joint venture are modeled to provide a managerial decision. Further, the consequences of aggregating firms’ expansion strategies on both joint venture and their own capacities are discussed with game theory.