Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22823
Full metadata record
???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.dcfield??? | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧 | |
dc.contributor.author | "Piwei, Tsai" | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蔡苾瑋 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:29:35Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2010-02-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-01-17 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 1. Aaker, D. A. (1984), 'Strategic Market Managemen.t' New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
2. Aggarwal, R. K. and Samwick, A. A. (2003), “Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms ? Agency Reconsidered.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 58 , pp. PP.71-118. 3. Amit, R. and Livnat, J. (1988), 'Diversification and the Risk-Return Trade-Off,' Academy of management, 31(1), pp.154-166 4. Ansoff, H. I. (1957), 'Strategies for Diversification,” Harvard Business Review35(5), pp. 113-124. 5. Berger, P. and Ofek, E. (1995), “Diversification's Effect on Firm Value,”Journal of Financial Economics 37, pp. 39-65. 6. Bernheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D. (1990), “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.21,No.1, pp. 1-26. 7. Berry, C. H. (1975), Corporate Growth and Diversification. Princeton University Press. 8. Billett, M. and Mauer D. (2003), “Cross-Subsidies, External Financing Constraints, and the Contribution of the Internal Capital Market to Firm Value,” Review of Financial Studies 16, 1167-1201. 9. Campa, J. -M. and Kedia, S. (1999), 'Explaining the diversification discount.' Unpublished manuscript, Harvard Business School. 10. Chandler, A. D. (1962), 'Strategy and Structure,” Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 11. Chapin, C. K. and Jermain, D. C. (1985), “Increasing The Success of Your Diversification Program,” Sloan Management Review, 26 (4), pp. 65-71. 12. Chatterjee, S. and Wernerfelt, B. (1991), “The link between resources and type of diversification: Theory and evidence.” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12 , pp. 33-48. Denis, 13. Denis, D., Denis D., and Sarin A. (1997), “Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification,” Journal of Finance 52, 135-160. 14. Denis, D., Denis, D., and Yost, K.(2002), 'Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm Value,” Journal of Finance 57, 1951-1979. 15. Faure-Grimaud A. and Inderst R. (2005), 'Conglomerate Entrenchment under Optimal Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review, vol. 95(3), pp. 850-861. 16. Gort, M. (1962), 'Diversification and Integration in American Industry,” Princeton University Press. 17. Graham, J., Lemmon, M., and Wolf, J. (2002), “Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?” Journal of Finance 58 , pp. 695-720. 18. Grant, R. M. (1948), 'Contemporary Strategy Analysis,' 6th edition, pp. 393-413. Blackwell Publishing. 19. Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., and Kim, H. (1997), “International Diversification: Effects on Innovation and Firm Performance in Product-diversified firms,” Academy of Management Journal, 40(4) , pp. 767-798. 20. Jacquemin, A. P. and Berry, C. H. (1979), “Entropy Measure of Diversification and Corporate Growth.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 27(4), pp. 359-369. 21. Jensen, M. (1986), 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76, pp. 323-329. 22. Kamiem, M. I. and Schwartz, N. L. (1975), 'Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 13, pp. 1-37. 23. Lamont, O. and Polk, C. (1999), 'The Diversification Discount: Cash flows vs. Returns.' Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago. 24. Lang, L. and Stulz, R. (1994), “Tobin ’s q, Corporate diversification and firm performance,” Journal of Political Economy 102, pp. 1248-1280. 25. Lichtenberg, F. R. (1991), 'The managerial response to regulation of financial reporting for segments of a business,” Journal of Regulatory Economics 3, pp. 241– 249. 26. Mansi, S. A. and Reeb, D. M. (2002), “Corporate Diversification: What Gets Discounted?” Journal of Finance 57, pp. 2167-2183. 27. Michel, A. and Shaked, I. (1984), “Does Business Diversification Affect Performance?” Financial Management, Vol. 13, pp.18-25 28. Montgomery, C. A. (1994), 'Corporate Diversification,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), pp. 163-178. 29. Morck , R., Shleifer A. , and Vishny R. W. (1988), “Management.ownership and market valuation , an empirical analysis, ” Journal of Financial Economics. 20, pp.293-315. 30. Mueller, D.C. (1969), “A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, 643-659. 31. Nathanson, D. A. and Cassano, J. S. (1982), “Organization, Diversity and Performance.” Wharton Management, (6/4), pp. 19-26. 32. Peters ,T. J. and Waterman,R. H. (1982), 'In Search of Excellence: Lessons from American Best Run Companies,' New York: Harper & Row. 33. Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. R. (1978), 'The External Control of Organizations: Resource Dependence Perspective,” NY: Harper and Row. 34. Pitts, R. A. and Hopkins, D. H. (1982), 'Firm Diversity: Conceptualization and Measurement. ' Academy of Management Journal, 7, pp. 620-629. 35. Porter, M. E. (1987), “From competitive advantage to corporate strategy,” Harvard Business Review, pp. 43-59. 36. Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990), “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review, pp. 79-91. 37. Ramanujam, R. and Varadarajan, P. (1989), 'Research on Corporate Diversification: A Synthesis,” Strategic Management Journal, 10, pp. 523-551. 38. Rumelt, R. P. (1982), 'Diversification Strategy and Profitability,' Strategic management Journal 3, pp. 359-70. 39. Rumelt, R. P. (1974), 'Strategy, Structure and Economic Performanc,' Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business School. 40. Scharfstein, D. S. (1998), 'The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates,” NBER unpublished manuscript, No. 6352. 41. Scharfstein, D. and Stein, J. (2000), 'The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-seekingand Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 55, pp. 2537–2564. 42. Shin, H. and Stulz, R. (1998), 'Are Internal Capital Markers Efficient,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, pp. 531-553. 43. Stein, J. (1997), 'Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources,” Journal of Finance 52, pp.111-133. 44. Stulz, R. (1990), 'Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financial Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 26 ,pp.3-27. 45. Villalonga, B. (2004), “Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from the Business Information Tracking Series,” The Journal of Finance, Volume 59 Issue 2, pp. 479-506. 46. Wernerfelt, B.and Montgomery, C. A. (1988), 'Tobin’s q and the importance of focus in firm performance,” The American Economic Review 78 (March), pp. 246-50. 47. Williamson, O. E. (1975), “Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication,” New York: Free Press. 48. Chu, W., 1997, 'Managing Diversification: An Empirical Study of Taiwanese Business Groups,' Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, London Business School, University of London. 49. 蘇怡如(2002),「臺灣集團企業多角化程度之探討」,國立成功大學國際企業研究所碩士論文。 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22823 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 過去諸多研究對於多角化與企業超額價值的關係尚未達到一致性的結論,且相關的實證研究主要還是以美國企業為主,鮮少有實證探討臺灣區多角化策略對於企業超額價值之影響。因此,本研究欲以臺灣區上市上櫃企業(不包金融業)為主要研究對象,探討企業從事多角化策略是否會影響其企業超額價值,又什麼樣的類型的多角化可為股東帶來價值,最後檢驗臺灣多角化企業的超額減損是否來自於經理人的代理問題。本研究以標準分類碼(SIC Code)來判定是否有進行多角化,再以Herfindahl Index來計算多角化程度,及採用Jacquemin and Berry(1979)的Entropy法將企業多角化區分為相關多角化及非相關多角化,並依照Berger and Ofek(1995)提出的超額價值(excess value)計算方式來推算多角化策略是否對企業超額價值造成影響,最後。本研究所獲之實證結果與結論如下:
1.多角化策略在臺灣多能為企業產生正面效果,帶來超額價值,且越是分散的多角化,企業超額價值越高。 2.臺灣企業沒有因相關多角化而享受到「範疇經濟」的好處。相反的,臺灣企業確實能藉由非相關多角化而享受到「風險分散」的好處,非相關多角化程度和多角化企業超額價值成正比。換言之,在臺灣的多角化策略實證分析與傳統文獻相反,在臺灣反而是非相關多角化益於相關多角化。 3.經理人的代理成本對於臺灣多角化企業的超額價值並沒有太大影響。此外,本研究尚發現董監持股百分比與企業超額價值間呈現負相關,且發現大股東持股比例和董監持股比例存在顯著負向相關性。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Finance scholars spent more than last two decades answering the question – “Does corporate diversification create or destroy shareholder value?” However, the recent development in the literature on the relationship between “corporate diversification” and “firm value” is quite diverse. Furthermore, most of the empirical studies on corporate diversification are in the US.
By using DATASTREAM and TEJ from 2002 to 2007, this study chose the TSEC and OTC listed companies in Taiwan, excluding financial companies, as samples. In this study, we used SIC codes to define the industry segments and industry groups. Meanwhile, we defined “excess value' by the methodology in Berger and Ofek (1995) to investigate whether diversification strategy would affect firm value or not. Next, we utilized Herfindahl index and Entropy measurement (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) to examine what kind of diversification strategy can create value for shareholders. Finally, we tested whether diversification discount in Taiwan is as a result of the agency problem or not. The major empirical results are as followed. 1.In Taiwan, corporate diversification created value for shareholders. The more diversified the company became, the higher the excess value was. 2.Related diversified corporations in Taiwan did not enjoy the benefit of “economics of scope.” On the contrary, unrelated diversified corporations in Taiwan enjoyed the benefit stemming from “risk-reducing effects.” In Taiwan, firm excess value is positively related to unrelated diversification. In other words, the empirical result on diversification in Taiwan is different from traditional results – which is “unrelated diversification is better than related diversification.” 3.In Taiwan, manager agency problems (measured by equity ownership of managers) did not have a significant impact on firm excess value. In addition, this study found that the board equity ownership was negatively related to firm excess value. Also, block holder equity ownership was negatively related to the board equity ownership. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:29:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R96723009-1.pdf: 640064 bytes, checksum: 93389ed3f4b25c19b675a742c4d09630 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1 第二節、研究目的 4 第三節、研究範圍與流程 5 第四節、論文結構 6 第二章、文獻探討 7 第一節、多角化的策略意涵與定義 7 第二節、多角化動機相關文獻 11 第三節、多角化實證結果相關文獻 16 第参章、研究設計 20 第一節、研究架構 20 第二節、研究假說 21 第三節、資料來源與樣本選擇 24 第四節、研究變數定義 25 第五節、研究方法與模式建立 31 第肆章、實證結果與分析 33 第一節、樣本資料敘述統計 33 第二節、多角化程度對於企業超額價值之影響 39 第三節、「相關多角化」與「非相關多角化」對於企業超額價值之影響 40 第四節、代理變數對於企業超額價值之影響 42 第五節、總結所有自變數對於企業超額價值之影響 46 第伍章、結論與未來研究 48 第一節、結論 48 第二節、研究限制與後續研究建議 50 參考文獻 52 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 多角化策略對企業超額價值影響之研究-以臺灣上市上櫃公司為例 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Impact of Diversification Strategy on Firm Excess Value
- The Case of Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 98-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳一如,王衍智 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 多角化,超額價值,相關多角化,非相關多角化,代理問題, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate diversification,excess value,related diversification,unrelated diversification,agency problem, | en |
dc.relation.page | 54 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2010-01-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-99-1.pdf Restricted Access | 625.06 kB | Adobe PDF |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.