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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 蘇永成 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hsin-Ying Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王馨瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:29:33Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2010-01-21 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2010-01-17 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1. Admati, A. And P. Pfleiderer, 1988, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability, Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40.
2. Barclay, M. And J. Warner, 1993, Stealth Trading and Volatility, Journal of Financial Economics 34, 281-305. 3. Comment, R., Jarrell, G.A., 1991. The Relative Signaling Power of Dutch-auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases, Journal of Finance 46, 1243-1271. 4. Chordia, T. R. Roll, and A. Subrahmanyam, 2004, Order Imbalance, Liquidity, and Market Returns, Journal of Financial Economics 72, 486-518. 5. Chordia, T. R. Roll, and A. Subrahmanyam, 2005, Evidence on the Speed of Convergence to Market Efficiency, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 271-292. 6. DeAngelo, H. and R. W. Masulis, 1980, Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation, Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3-29. 7. Dann, L.Y., 1981, Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138. 8. Dann, L.Y., Masulis, R.W., Mayers, D., 1991, Repurchase Tender Offers and Earnings Information, Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 217-251. 9. Easley and O’Hara, 1987, Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities markets, Journal of Financial Economics 19,69-90. 10. Hertzel, M., Jain, P.C., 1991, Earnings and Risk Changes Around Stock Repurchase Tender Offers, Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 253-274. 11. Kenneth R. French, 1986, Stock Return Variances, Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5-26 12. Lie, E., McConnell, J.J., 1998. Earnings Signals in Fixed Price and Dutch Auction Self-Tender Offers, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 161–186. 13. Llorente, G., R. Michaely, G. Saar, and J. Wang, 2002, Dynamic Volume-Return Relation of Individual Stocks, Review of Financial Studies 15, 1005-1047 14. Masulis, R.W., 1980, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers, Journal of Financial Economics 8, 139-178. 15. Masulis, R.W., 1980. Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes. Journal of Finance 35, 305-319. 16. Marcia, M.C., Travlos, N.G., 1989, Information Effects Associated with Debt-for-Equity and Equity-for-Debt Exchange Offers, Journal of Finance 44, 451-468. 17. Sung C. Bae and Daniel P. Simet, 1998, A Comparative Analysis of Leveraged Recapitalization Versus Leveraged Buyout as a Takeover Defense, Review of Financial Economics 7, 157-172. 18. Vermaelen, T., 1981, Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An Empirical Study, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 139-183. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22822 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | When firms feel their stocks are undervalued and are confident about their future performance, they may announce self-tender. Thus, self-tender is usually a good signal. At this moment, informed traders trades and result in order imbalances. In practice, the market is not efficient, if it’s long enough for uninformed traders enter the market once they find out trading activities executed by informed traders and still make profits, then order imbalance is worth of our research since it also represents one of the signals sent out by informed traders.
The main idea of this thesis is to find out does order imbalance affect price volatilities. According to our results, since market makers care more about price volatilities than inventory risk, they tend to lower bid and ask prices to control prices. This result is different with previous paper which argues that market makers tend to increase bid and ask prices to control inventory risk. Also, we use GARCH (1,1) model to discuss the same issue and find out the result is the same. This tells us that order imbalance doesn’t affect the price volatilities of self-tender firms. We further find out that firm’s capitalization does not affect the level of order imbalance, which means there is no small firm effect exists in self-tender firms. The reason why this is so may because the capitalization distribution of our sample is skewed to the right. Last but not least, we form a strategy under quote and trade prices basis to buy the stock upon seeing positive order imbalances and sell the stock once we see negative order imbalances. However, we regret to say no matter under which basis, we cannot beat the open-to-close returns. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:29:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R96723037-1.pdf: 515524 bytes, checksum: 7bb111af1ca3a042bb6099322551c5a8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | CONTENT
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 MOTIVES AND PURPOSES 1 1.2 FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 6 CHAPTER 2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 7 2.1 THE DATA 7 2.1.1 Data Sources 7 2.1.2 Data Processing Methods 8 2.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 9 2.2 METHODOLOGY 10 2.2.1 Unconditional Lagged Return-Order Imbalance OLS Model 10 2.2.2 Conditional Contemporaneous Return-Order Imbalance OLS Model 11 2.2.3 Dynamic Volatility-Order Imbalance GARCH(1,1) Model 12 2.2.4 Small Firm Effect 13 CHAPTER 3 EMPRICAL RESULTS 14 3.1 UNCONDITIONAL LAGGED RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 14 3.2 CONDITIONAL CONTEMPORANEOUS RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 16 3.3 DYNAMIC VOLATILITY-ORDER IMBALANCE GARCH(1,1) RELATION 17 3.4 SMALL FIRM EFFECT 18 3.5 TRADING STRATEGY 18 3.5.1 Trading strategy under the basis of quote price 18 3.5.2 Trading strategy under the basis of trade price 20 CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION 22 REFERENCES 25 FIGURE & TABLES FIGURE 1: BASIC INFORMATION OF THE SAMPLE STOCKS 27 PANEL A. DISTRIBUTION OF OPEN-TO-CLOSE RETURN 27 PANEL B. DISTRIBUTION 27 TABLE 2.1: BASIC INFORMATION OF SAMPLE STOCKS 28 TABLE 3.1: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE UNCONDITIONAL LAGGED RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 31 PANEL A. ESTIMATES OF EACH INDIVIDUAL STOCK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL INTERVALS 31 PANEL B. SUMMARY OF THE UNCONDITIONAL LAGGED RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 36 TABLE 3.2: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE CONDITIONAL CONTEMPORANEOUS RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 37 PANEL A. ESTIMATE OF EACH INDIVIDUAL STOCK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL INTERVALS 37 PANEL B. SUMMARY OF THE CONDITIONAL CONTEMPORANEOUS RETURN-ORDER IMBALANCE OLS RELATION 41 TABLE 3.3: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE DYNAMIC VOLATILITY-ORDER IMBALANCE GARCH(1,1) RELATION 42 PANEL A. ESTIMATES OF EACH INDIVIDUAL STOCK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL INTERVALS 42 PANEL B. SUMMARY OF THE DYNAMIC VOLATILITY-ORDER IMBALANCE GARCH(1,1) RELATION 48 TABLE 3.4: ESTIMATES OF SMALL FIRM EFFECT 49 TABLE 3.5.1: TRADING PROFIT UNDER THE BASIS OF QUOTE PRICE 50 PANEL A. RETURN OF EXCH INDIVIDUAL STOCK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL TIME INTERVALS 50 PANEL B. HYPOTHESIS TEST OF RETURNS 51 TABLE 3.5.2: TRADING PROFIT UNDER THE BASIS OF TRADE PRICE 53 PANEL A. RETURN OF EXCH INDIVIDUAL STOCK UNDER DIFFERENTIAL TIME INTERVALS 53 PANEL B. HYPOTHESIS TEST OF RETURNS 54 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 自我股權收購 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Self-tender | en |
| dc.title | 自我股權收購報酬、波動性與買賣單不平衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Self-Tender Return, Volatility, and Order Imbalance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 98-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星陽,黃漢青 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 自我股權收購, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Self-tender, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 55 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2010-01-18 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 | |
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