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標題: | 過度自信經理人如何影響公司的股利政策? Do Overconfident CEOs Influence Dividend Payout Policy ? |
作者: | Yen-Cheng Huang 黃彥誠 |
指導教授: | 何耕宇 |
關鍵字: | 經理人過度自信,股利政策,股票市場反應, CEO Overconfidence,Dividend Policy,Stock Market Reaction, |
出版年 : | 2010 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本論文指出「經理人過度自信」可以用來解釋公司股利政策。由於過度自信的經理人過度投資,因此他們宣告股利的相對次數較少且股利發放金額較低。股利減少的情況隨著公司未來成長機會及投資增加而更加嚴重;隨著公司內部資金變多及公司規模變大而減輕。非過度自信經理人宣告股利增加,短期股票市場對於此事件的反應顯著為正,然而過度自信經理人與非過度自信經理人宣告股利增加的短期股票市場反應並沒有顯著差異。非過度自信經理人宣告股利增加,長期股票市場對於此事件的反應顯著為正。除此之外,過度自信經理人宣告股利增加的長期股票市場報酬顯著低於非過度自信經理人。 We argue that overconfidence of CEO helps to explain dividend decisions. Since overconfident CEOs are prone to overinvest, they would like to declare dividend less frequently and pay smaller amount of dividends as well. The reduction in dividends of overconfident CEO is larger if firms with higher growth opportunity, but smaller if firms with higher cash flow and larger firm size. The short-run stock market reactions, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), to dividend-increase declarations are significantly positive for non-overconfident CEOs, but not significantly positive for overconfident CEOs. However, there is no significant difference for the two groups of CEOs in the short-run. The magnitude of long-run positive reactions, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), to dividend-increase events are also significant for non-overconfident CEOs. Specifically, the BHAR of overconfident CEOs are significantly lower than non-overconfident CEOs in the long run. Overall, overconfidence of CEOs can explain the dividend policies. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22669 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
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