高階經理人股票選擇權薪酬制與風險承擔之關聯性

Abstract

本研究主要的目的是希望能夠探究經理人的股票選擇權薪酬的發放與經理人風險承擔行為上的關聯性。為了探究兩者之間的關聯性，本研究分別從經理人投資決策與融資決策的角度出發，嘗試利用由KMV模型所推導出的公司資產波動度 (implied asset volatility) 以及公司的負債比例當作衡量經理人風險承擔行為的代理變數，並利用經理人股票選擇權佔總薪酬的比例當作經理人風險誘因的代理變數，根據美國經理人薪酬資料進行實證分析。 根據本研究的實證結果，普遍而言，我們發現在投資決策上，當公司發放給經理人的股票選擇權佔總薪酬比例越高時，的確能鼓勵經理人進行高風險性的投資計畫案；此外，若當經理人持有的是價內 (in-the-money) 的股票選擇權時，經理人會基於守成的心態，反而不願意去進行高風險的投資行為。 然而，若是進一步將經理人持有的股票選擇權分為價外 (out-of-the-money) 與價內 (in-the-money) 兩大類，我們發現不論是持有價外或價內股票選擇權的經理人，股票選擇權佔總薪酬的比例高低與公司資產波動之間，其實並沒有存在非常明顯的關聯性。但當經理人持有的股票選擇權越為淺價內時，經理人的確會較有誘因去從事高風險性的投資案，使得公司資產的波動程度也跟著上升；相反的，當經理人持有的股票選擇權已處於價內時，則較無法準確預估其對經理人風險承擔行為的影響效果。 而在融資決策面上，本研究的實證結果並不支持經理人股票選擇權的發放，能夠增加經理人去操作高槓桿財務決策的風險承擔行為，亦即本研究認為美國企業經理人股票選擇權薪酬的發放，對於促進經理人在投資決策上的風險承擔影響效果，是優於其在經理人融資決策面上的影響。

The main purpose of this empirical research is to discuss the relation between CEO’s stock option compensation and CEO’s risk-taking behaviors. We try to decompose CEO’s risk-taking behaviors into investment decisions and financing decisions. In our empirical research, we use KMV model to derive implied asset volatility as the proxy for CEO’s investment decisions, and we use debt ratio as the measurement of CEO’s financing decisions. Furthermore, in order to measure the risk-taking incentives, we use CEO’s stock option value divided by total compensation in a given year as the proxy for CEO’s risk-taking incentives. Our empirical research shows that on average the level of CEO’s stock option compensation incentive did induce CEO to make risky investments decisions. On the other hand, if CEO own in-the-money options, CEO would prefer less risky project due to their conservative attitude. Furthermore, if we divide CEO’s stock option into two different groups- out-of-the money and in-the-money option, we find out that the level of CEO risk-taking incentives does not have obvious relation with asset volatility. However, if the out-of-the money options which CEO holds are near the exercise price, CEO will have higher but not significant incentive to take risky investment for the reason that CEO want to elevate asset volatility. Nevertheless, the relation between in-the-money stock option compensation and investment behaviors is ambiguous. On the other hand, our empirical research does not support the idea that CEO’s stock option can lead CEO to make risky financing decisions. As a result, we conclude that the risk-taking incentives which stock options provide to CEO may have higher influence on CEO’s investment decisions than on financing decisions.