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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 莊委桐 | |
dc.contributor.author | Jheng-Fong Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林正峯 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T04:18:01Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2010-07-28 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-07-28 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 中文部份:
林修葳 (2002).「國內商業銀行授信額對總體經濟及企業績效指標變動敏感程度之研究」行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告,計畫編號:NSC 89-2416-H-002-058執行機構及單位:國立台灣大學國際企業系。 英文部份: Adrian, T., and Shin, H. S. (2009). “Liquidity and Leverage,” Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000). “Financial Contagion,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, 1-33. Allen, F., Babus, A., and Carletti (2009). “Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence,” Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 1, 97-116. Babus, A (2009). “The Formation of Financial Networks,” Discussion Paper 06-093, Tinbergen Institute. Bearman, P. S., Moody, J., and Stovel, K. (2004). “ Chains of Affection: The Structure of Adolescent Romantic and Sexual Networks,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 110, 44-91. Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009). “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, 77-100. Cocco, J. F., Gomes, F. J., and Martins, N. C. (2009). “Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 18, 24-48. Ellison, G., and Fudenberg, D. (1993). “Rules of Thumbs for Social Learning,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101, 612-643. Furfine, C. H. (2003). “Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 35, 111-128. Greenlaw, D., Hatzius, J., Kashyap, A. K., and Shin, H. S. (2008). “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown,” US Monetary Policy Forum Report No. 2. Jackson, M. O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press. Mas-Collel, A., Winston, M. D., and Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. O'Hara, M. (1995). Market Microstructure Theory, Blackwell Inc. Press. Taylor, J. B. (2008). “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong,” NBER Working Paper No. 14631. Upper, C., and Worms, A. (2004). “Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank Market: Is There a Danger of Contagion?” European Economic Review, vol. 48, 827-849. Jermann, U., and Quadrini, V. (2009). “Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks,” NBER Working Paper No. 15338. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/22448 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 銀行擠兌所導致的金融危機傳染在近來的金融網路相關文獻當中被廣泛的討論。然而當金融風暴發生時,政府如何管制銀行對企業緊縮銀根的決策,這方面的問題被探討的較少。本文試圖藉由建構政府、銀行與企業三者在借貸市場的賽局架構,討論政府在景氣與投資環境驟變時介入銀行與企業的借貸關係是否能夠使得社會福利增加。結果發現當政府制定銀行抽銀根的資金折損率越高時,在景氣一般或是較佳的情況下對社會福利沒有影響。但是當投資環境變差,銀行在沒有政府管制的情況會撤回資金以求自保,倘若企業的投資案本身報酬率不算太差時,政府提高資金折損率不僅可以使企業免於銀行濫抽銀根,也可以使得整體社會福利提升。但假使企業的投資案報酬率不佳時,政府若是一味地制定較大的資金折損率以保護企業免於銀行抽銀根,整體社會福利反而會因此而降低。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The topics of financial crisis spreading caused by bank runs have been widely discussed in the finance literature. However, how should the government regulate banks’ tightening policies on firms’ investment funds when the financial turmoil occurs? This problem is less referred to so far. We attempt to build a game theoretic model of a loan market between three players: the government, the bank and the firm, in order to discuss the following issue. When recession occurs or the economic environment suddenly turns bad, whether the government regulation in the loan market increases the social welfare. We assume an exogenous variable, discount ratio, which means the ratio the bank would lose when it withdraws funds from the firm, and this ratio is set by government. Our results show that in the case of normal or better economic environments, the level of the discount ratio has no effect on social welfare. When the economy deteriorates, without the government regulation, the bank tends to withdraw their funds to protect themselves. If the return rate of the firm’s investment is good enough, then a sufficiently high level of the discount ratio set by the government will improve social welfare. On the other hand, if the return rate of the firm’s investment is poor, although a high level of the discount ratio could protect the firm from the bank’s withdrawal, the social welfare would decline as government’s regulation mistakenly save a poor investment project that should otherwise be aborted. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T04:18:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R96323050-1.pdf: 892576 bytes, checksum: 0d53d3b412eb49d75dc7a69cdbc175f7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
口試委員審定書 ................................................................................. i 謝辭 ................................................................................................. ii 中文摘要 ........................................................................................... iii 英文摘要 ........................................................................................... iv 1 前言 ............................................................................................. 1 2 模型架構 ....................................................................................... 4 2.1 模型概述 ................................................................................... 4 2.2 企業資金保留範圍 ...................................................................... 7 2.3 企業與銀行報酬之設定 ................................................................ 8 3 銀行決策分析 ................................................................................ 14 3.1 當企業資金保留落在 (c1) 的情形 ................................................. 14 3.2 當企業資金保留落在 (c2) 的情形 ................................................. 16 3.3 當企業資金保留落在 (c3) 的情形 ................................................. 17 3.4 銀行抽銀根的資金折損率的比較 ................................................... 21 3.5 其他影響銀行抽銀根資金折損率臨界值的原因 ................................ 26 4 企業最適保留金額分析 .................................................................... 28 4.1 企業的期望報酬函數 ................................................................... 28 4.2 企業最適資金保留比例與銀行最適決策 .......................................... 35 5 社會福利最適與政府政策之制定 ........................................................ 38 6 結論 .............................................................................................. 41 參考文獻 ............................................................................................ 42 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 銀行的放款緊縮決策分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Cutting Losses or Holding Tight?
Firm’s Investment Decision and Bank's Withdrawal Policy | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 98-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 葉俊顯,李怡庭 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 政府管制,抽銀根,投資決策,社會福利最適,賽局理論, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Regulation,Lending Crunch,Investment Decision,Pareto Optimality,Game Theory, | en |
dc.relation.page | 43 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2010-07-28 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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