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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 胡星陽(Shing-Yang Hu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tse-Yun Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃則允 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T03:39:58Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2019-07-11 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-08 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi and D. M. Reeb (2003), “Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt,” Journal of Financial Economics, 68:2, 263-285.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/21618 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 當企業面臨向外尋求融資時,有負債融資以及權益融資等管道。本文探討影響企業選擇負債融資且為發行普通公司債或與其性質相似之分割債的因素為何。臺灣過半企業屬於家族企業,此公司特性是否為影響企業決策之重大因素;最終控制者是否為避免權力被分散而迴避權益融資,有選擇發行公司債等負債融資之傾向;本文以Tobin's Q作為企業成長性指標,而公司未來前景良好會不會使企業發行公司債券之誘因增加;以資產衡量規模之大型企業在發行公司債上是否較小型企業更有利,企業規模與公司債發行之間為正向還是負向關係;ROA在本文為企業經營表現的衡量比率,而其對於發行公司債之決定有何影響;以上為本文探討之因素及其影響力;且考慮背景總體環境,本文也在不同時間區間下討論這些可能的影響因素。
研究結果發現,家族企業對於企業決定發行公司債並無重大影響力;最終控制者擁有的投票權多寡與公司債發行為正向關係;企業成長性低之企業傾向發行公司債融資;規模愈大之企業愈可能會選擇發行公司債;企業經營表現良好對於選擇發行公司債有正向影響。不同時間區間下各個因素的影響力強弱不一定和在別的時段相同,然結果大致相同。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | When companies are faced with financing problems, they are between the choices of debt financing and equity financing. This paper discusses the factors that affect companies to choose ordinary company bonds or STRIPS over other financing options. Over half of the companies in Taiwan are family businesses, is this feature vital enough to affect the decision making process? Whether the ultimate controller intends to maintain his or her control power over the company, therefore avoiding equity financing and is inclined to issue bonds? Using Tobin’s Q as an identification of a company’s growth, if a company with good prospects, does this increase the incentives of issuing bonds? What is the relationship between the size of a company, which is measured by the company’s asset, and the bond issuance? Do larger firms have more advantages over the smaller ones? ROA is used as a representation of performance, how does it affect the decision of issuing bonds or not? Additionally, taking the background and the overall environment into consideration, this paper discusses these factors under different time intervals.
The results find out that a family business is not a powerful factor to influence the bond issuance decision. The voting rights owned by an ultimate controller has a positive relationship with bond issuance. Companies with low growth opportunities tend to issue bonds when financing is needed. If a company performs well, it has a positive effect on issuing bonds. The factors have different degrees of influence under different time intervals; however, the results are roughly the same. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T03:39:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R06723002-1.pdf: 1141519 bytes, checksum: ad118a63aaa6b0fc4c440dcf38079e5d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書....................... ⅰ
誌謝............................. ⅱ 中文摘要........................... ⅲ Abstract........................... ⅳ 第一章 緒論..........................1 第二章 文獻回顧........................2 第三章 研究假說........................5 第四章 研究方法........................7 4.1 樣本及資料........................7 4.2 模型...........................8 4.2.1 應變數........................8 4.2.2 自變數........................8 4.2.3 迴歸模型...................... 10 4.3 樣本分組之迴歸分析................... 10 4.3.1 區分2002年至2004年............... 11 4.3.2 以金融海嘯為分界................ 11 4.4 不同樣本比例之迴歸分析.............. 12 4.5 加入家族企業與投票權之相乘項............. .13 第五章 實證結果...................... 15 5.1 敘述性統計....................... 15 5.2 迴歸結果........................ 18 5.2.1 全體樣本之迴歸結果.................. 18 5.2.2 2002年至2004年樣本之迴歸結果.............21 5.2.3 以金融海嘯為分界之樣本迴歸結果............ 22 5.3 不同樣本比例之迴歸結果................. 24 5.4 家族企業與投票權相乘項之迴歸結果............ 24 第六章 結論........................ 26 6.1 結論.......................... 26 6.2 研究限制及未來研究建議................. 26 參考文獻........................... 28 附件一............................ 31 圖一............................. 16 圖二............................. 16 圖三............................. 17 表一............................. 35 表二............................. 36 表三............................. 37 表四............................. 38 表五............................. 39 表六............................. 40 表七............................. 41 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 影響臺灣企業發行公司債之因素探討 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | An Investigation of What Factors Affect Taiwanese Companies Issuing Corporate Bonds | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 莊文議,陳業寧,林岳祥 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 普通公司債,分割債,家族企業,投票權,企業成長性,企業規模,企業經營表現, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Ordinary company bonds,STRIPS,Family business,Voting rights,Company’s growth,Company’s size,Company’s performance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201901293 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-07-08 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 | |
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